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ABSTRACT 
Beyond "Detached Concern": The Cognitive 
and Ethical Function o f Emotions in Medical Practice 
Jodi Lauren Halpem 
Yale University 
1993
This dissertation analyzes the ideal o f "detached concern" in medical practice. 
This ideal arises as an attempt to bridge the gap in medicine between managing 
diseases and recognizing patients "as persons." First, physicians take their 
emotions to interfere with making objective diagnoses and making every aspect o f 
their practice "scientific." Second, physicians idealize detachment as the stance o f 
the impartial moral agent who is able to care for all types o f patients out o f a sense 
o f duty. Third, physicians also recognize the need to be empathic; however they 
conceive o f empathy as a purely cognitive capacity that is compatible with 
detachment.
Chapter one analyzes the features o f emotions that contribute to and also 
threaten rational agency. Chapter two analyzes Descartes' theory o f the emotions, 
which is the outcome o f his "scientific" method for understanding reality. 
Descartes' legacy to physicians is not only the capacity to build powerful 
mechanistic models o f  diseases, but the failure to account for human experience 
via such models.
Chapter three considers the turn to Kantian ethics to restore respect for 
patients "as persons" to the practice of medicine. Kantian impartiality is shown not
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to require detachment. Further, the practice o f  Kantian ethics in medicine is 
impoverished when physicians are not affectively engaged.
Whereas chapters two and three show the limitations o f the arguments for 
emotional detachment, chapters four and five give positive arguments for the role 
o f emotions in medical practice. Chapter four examines the cognitive and affective 
aspects o f clinical empathy, and argues that emotions are essential for directing the 
empathizer to imagine what the patient is experiencing. The final chapter argues 
that given the importance o f  emotional engagement and the fact that emotions can 
obstruct rational and moral agency, physicians need to regulate their emotions 
without detaching themselves from patients. Physicians can best meet the goals 
o f medicine by cultivating overarching emotional attitudes like curiosity and 
courage to effectively move themselves towards a more realistic and respectful 
appreciation o f patients.
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1Introduction
The increasing interest in medical ethics in the United States over the past 
twenty years arises in the context o f widespread public dissatisfaction with 
physicians. The effective treatments that are the fruits o f medical science do not 
assuage patients' unprecedented concern that physicians will not talk to or listen 
to them. Patients fear that their suffering will go unrecognized and their dignity 
will not be respected.
The prevalent ideal that guides physicians in their conduct towards patients is 
the ideal o f "detached concern." "Detached concern" is a complex concept that 
posits that physicians can detach themselves from their personal emotions, while 
maintaining a professional concern for patients.1 Physicians believe that detaching 
themselves emotionally best meets the special cognitive and moral demands that 
distinguish medicine from other helping professions.
Twentieth century physicians take the ideals o f scientific objectivity and 
technological reliability as overarching principles for every aspect o f  medical 
practice. The current AMA Code o f Ethics emphasizes science as the basis of 
appropriate medical conduct: "A physician should practice a  method o f healing 
founded on a scientific basis; and he should not voluntarily associate professionally 
with anyone who violates this principle."2 Physicians have interpreted the goal of 
practicing medicine "scientifically" to require that they turn themselves into reliable
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instruments for diagnosing and treating disease, by purifying themselves from the 
influence o f any personal emotions.3
In contrast, therapists, social workers and nurses, who rarely view themselves 
as applied scientists or technicians, have models o f professional conduct that allow 
an important place for sympathetic emotions. Yet the goal o f medicine is the same 
as the goal o f  these other professions — to alleviate the suffering o f human beings. 
In the current environment o f medicine, physicians translate this obligation to 
understand and care for the patient as a sufferer into an obligation to have an 
impartial respect for the patients rights and a cognitive awareness o f the patient's 
feelings.
The ideal o f  "detached concern" is well-suited to the current climate o f medical 
care. Most physicians today are trained in hospitals that are like factories trying 
to mass produce "health" in the limited sense o f repairing body parts.4 The 
institutional emphasis on technological reliability and economic efficiency are 
extended to every aspect o f the physician's conduct. If  the physician hesitates 
during a  cardiac arrest she may lose the precious moments necessary to save 
someone's life. I f  she takes time to grieve afterwards, she will not be reliably fresh 
and available for the next patient whose body is in need o f repair. During surgery 
and other invasive procedures physicians avoid looking at the faces o f their 
patients. And every physician in training is regularly "on call" during which she 
gives up not only sleep and food, but her familiar personal environment and
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
relationships, for endless hours o f  treating one "case" after another. In this 
environment, emotional interactions seem extraneous and even threatening to the 
physician's usefulness.
The increasing anonymity and compartmentalization o f medical care has 
coincided with an increasing emphasis in medical journals on the moral obligation 
to respect the rights o f patients. The AMA Principles o f Medical Ethics say that 
"The principal objective o f the medical profession is to render service to humanity 
with full respect for the dignity o f  man."5 The American Hospital Association 
provides a "Patient's Bill o f Rights," beginning with the statement that "The patient 
has the right to considerate and respectful care."6 Note the tension in using the 
language o f  rights, which arises in contracts between atomistic "entities" where the 
primary obligation is non-interference, in the realm o f considerate and respectful 
care.
This focus on rights contrasts with a long tradition o f emphasizing the 
physician's beneficent guardianship of the patient's best interests. The ideal of 
respecting patients as persons has become popular in part out o f a rejection of the 
idea that the physician knows better than the patient what is best for the patient. 
The recent movement in medical ethics has been inspired by cases in which 
physicians believed they were making decisions in the patient's best interest, but 
did something invasive that was tragically at odds with the patient's own wishes.7 
There has also been an increasing concern about the mistreatment o f human
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4subjects. Such concerns, thematized by the increasing involvement o f the legal 
profession in medicine, have contributed to the erosion o f the ideal of beneficent 
guardianship and to the increased emphasis on patient autonomy.
Yet, it is conceivable that respect for the autonomy of patients could be based 
in an emotionally engaged relationship in which the physician is genuinely moved 
to respect the patient as a person. It is in the context o f a fragmenting physician- 
patient relationship that respecting patients has been reduced to not interfering with 
patients' rights. H. Tristam Engelhardt argues that the physician's responsibility to 
respect patients could not spring from anything but a bare commitment to rational 
procedure, given the anonymity o f current medical practice. W hat Engelhardt 
actually shows is not that respecting patients' rights is adequate for recognizing and 
valuing suffering persons, but rather that such "respect" is the most appropriate 
moral standard given the detachment that informs institutionalized medicine.8
Just as the pressures of institutional medicine have reduced the richness o f the 
ideal o f  respecting patients as persons, they have reduced the concept o f  clinical 
empathy. Physicians believe that they can understand the subjective experiences 
o f their patients empathically while remaining emotionally detached. In their essay 
"Training for Detached Concern," Renee Fox and Howard L ief describe the 
transformation o f the physician in medical training.9 Their thesis is that only after 
medical students go through a period o f alienation in which they overcome all their 
personal responses to patients (in the same way that they overcame their fear and
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disgust at dissecting a cadaver) can they develop the special medical skill to listen 
empathically without becoming emotionally involved.
The ideal o f "detached concern" presupposes that, at least theoretically, the 
basic demands o f medical practice for objectivity and impartiality on the one hand, 
and for a  respectful and empathic approach to patients on the other hand, are 
compatible with the current structure o f  medical care. The key presupposition is 
that the physician could recognize and respond appropriately to suffering patients 
without becoming emotionally engaged. This "could" refers to a conceptual rather 
than an empirical possibility. Physicians are aware that as human beings they can 
never actually rid themselves o f all emotional responses to patients; the point of 
such an ideal, like the ideal o f  objectivity in science, is to provide a standard for 
which the physician ought to aim. Yet this ideal has important consequences, 
because physicians take their inevitable personal feelings o f grief and affection as 
marks o f failure, and do not question themselves when they are unmoved by the 
suffering o f their patients.
I The Ideal o f Objectivity
The physician's first task is to make an accurate diagnosis o f the patient's 
problem. The ideal o f accuracy arises in medicine for pragmatic reasons. The 
efficacy o f the physician depends upon "diagnosing," (literally, distinguishing
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6between) those complaints and symptoms that are relevant to and those that are not 
relevant to the health o f the patient. This goal requires that the physician be wary 
o f  judging the importance o f things inappropriately, or o f missing valuable 
information.
Physicians have long observed that their emotions can, at times, disrupt the 
diagnostic process. One need not point to the extreme examples o f an anxiety 
attack or o f profound depression making concentration impossible. The physician 
may be quite able to think, and yet misperceive or misjudge something because o f 
her emotional responses to the patient. For example, she may miss a breast lump 
out o f  her own fear o f breast cancer, or underestimate the significance o f rectal 
bleeding out o f terror at losing a patient to colon cancer. And not only negative 
emotions but positive emotions can lead one to miss aspects o f the patient's 
situation that less emotionally engaged people would perceive. For example, a 
physician who admires a  patient may be slow to recognize that the patient has a 
drug problem.
The claim that emotions influence how the world is perceived rests on several 
interdependent assumptions that I consider in chapter one. First, emotions are not 
only physiological occurrences or bodily "feelings" on the model o f an itch, but 
intentional attitudes that imbue the world with certain qualities. One is afraid o f 
something fearful, and one is sad about something, even if that includes everything 
in one's current situation. Second, emotions involve partial depictions o f reality.
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Like lighting that casts shadows, emotions reveal some aspects o f a situation and 
conceal others. Third, emotions express motives of the agent, so that they may at 
times be wish-fulfilling.
Because emotions are partial and can be wish-fulfilling, physicians have 
traditionally been aware o f the need to regulate their ordinary emotional responses 
to people. However, prior to the scientific era in medicine, such regulation was 
not yet equated with detaching oneself from all emotions. Rather, the physician 
was to rise "above" selfish and petty emotions out o f a compassion that transcends 
self-interest.
For example, the Hippocratic writings portray the physician as overcoming the 
lust and greed that interfere with the practice o f medicine by developing a special 
"philia" for all patients. This "friendliness" was not based on an erotic bond with 
the patient, but on "'physiophilia' or love of universal nature, in its special form 
o f  human nature1."10 Yet, however lofty, this philia was an actual emotional 
experience in which the physician found himself moved. The writer o f the 
Hippocratic work "On Breaths" notes that there are some arts "which to those that 
possess them are painful, but to those that use them are helpful," and medicine is 
one of these. The physician "sees terrible sights, touches unpleasant things, and 
the misfortunes o f others bring a harvest o f sorrows that are peculiarly his."11
Later, under the influence o f Christianity, physicians modeled themselves on 
priests, who were to care for patients out o f agape, a transcending, non-erotic love
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for humanity. The priestly ideal still lingers in the language o f the guidelines of 
the American Association o f Internal Medicine, which refer to medicine as a 
"calling."12 The late nineteenth century and early twentieth century saw the rise 
o f the gentleman physician, who cared for patients out of benevolent emotions 
inspired by a sense o f "noblesse oblige." The common theme in these views o f the 
physician as vessel o f natural healing forces, priest, or gentleman, is the idea that 
the physician's special compassionate understanding of human nature allows him 
to overcome ordinary feelings o f resentment, lust, anger, etc. in order to care for 
all patients appropriately.
In the Hippocratic writings, the physician struggles to tame his hubris, lust, and 
greed because o f his overarching interest in phvsiologia. an understanding o f nature 
based on logos, or "true reason."13 By the nineteenth century, this interest includes 
understanding human nature as it really is, a goal that echoes the Hippocratic view 
but adds a  psychological emphasis. For example, in his tract on the physician- 
patient relationship written in 1849, Worthington Hooker says o f the physician:
He sees them [the patients] in their unguarded moments and when suffering 
and trials of every variety ...are acting upon them as tests, searching and 
sure. He sees much that glitters before the world become the merest dross 
in the sick chamber; and he sees too the gold shining bright in the crucible 
o f affliction. He sees human passion in every form and condition...thought 
and feeling are often revealed to him [the physician] unconsciously, and the
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very fountains from which they rise are almost open and naked to his view, 
and I may add to his influence also.14
Hooker portrays the physician as a  non-judgmental witness to the variety of 
human passions. The physician's openness and clarity presuppose emotional self­
regulation. He neither idealizes patients out o f romantic affection, nor denigrates 
them out o f anger or bitter disappointment upon witnessing their transition from 
gold to dross. Instead, this "disillusioning'' exposure to human weakness leads the 
physician to a certain emotional skepticism. He will not believe too easily his 
immediate emotional judgments about other persons. After all, he sees apparent 
bravery and kindness evaporate under the stress o f illness, and cannot help but 
question his initial responses o f respect or affection for such persons. Yet the 
physician does not question the validity o f the emotions o f respect or affection in 
general; for as Hooker immediately points out, there will be times when such 
judgm ents will be borne out, when the gold shines bright in the crucible o f 
affliction. The physician cannot see the gold without feeling respect or affection; 
hence a necessary price for appreciating the valuable aspects o f human experience 
is suffering disappointment.
According to Hooker, the capacity o f the physician to understand human nature 
as it really is, is based on his heartfelt appreciation o f the patient's position, as well 
as his wide exposure to human emotion. Hooker emphasizes that the physician 
could not influence the patient therapeutically if he were r.ot genuinely moved by
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the patient's suffering. But given that Hooker is also aware that the physician is 
an ordinary human being, whose emotions can mislead him into confusing dross 
for gold, what is to prevent the physician from being mislead? Hooker implies that 
the physician's exposure to a  wide range o f human emotion is an educational 
process that transforms the physician's own emotional reactions. For example, 
living through various situations with patients educates the physician to overcome 
ordinary prejudices about what types o f persons will respond with courage or fear 
in the face o f  illness. However, Hooker never explicitly addresses the issue o f how 
the physician is to guard against being led astray by his emotions.
The very force o f our concern about whether the physician can be certain that 
her emotions have not mislead her from an accurate understanding of the patient's 
illness was probably inaccessible to Hooker. For this insistence on certainty is 
distinct to the practice o f medicine in the twentieth century. The modern physician 
has become much more effective than her predecessors by basing her interventions 
on an understanding o f the body mechanism that conforms to the standards of 
scientific certainty. From a twentieth century perspective, the history o f medicine 
is predominately an account o f how wrong conceptions of the functioning o f the 
sick body left physicians impotent in the face o f disease and death. The incentive 
o f the modern physician to purify every aspect o f her practice from anything that 
is not testable by scientific methods can only be understood with respect to this 
history o f impotence and failure.
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Sir William Osier, "father" o f modern medicine, addresses the topic o f the 
physician-patient relationship only seventy years after Hooker, but with the new 
mantle o f the scientific physician. In "Aequanimitas"15 Osier emphasizes that the 
physician must strive to control all o f his bodily emotions towards patients. His 
goal is not only to neutralize all outward show of emotion, such as blushing or 
sweating, but to control the interaction o f his mind and his body so that his blood 
vessels will not constrict, his heart rate not go up when he sees terrible sights. 
Osier takes the physical state of "imperturbability" to be a necessary condition for 
the mental state o f "equanimity." In addition, "equanimity" requires a reflective 
understanding o f human nature that aims for "clear knowledge" o f  what human 
beings are. This clarity requires seeing through the illusory emotional attitudes 
towards life that ordinary people have. Osier describes a three step process 
through which the physician is able to achieve "equanimity" by transcending his 
emotions:
The more closely we [the physicians] study their [the patients] little foibles, 
o f  one sort or another in the inner life which we see, the more surely is the 
conviction borne in upon us o f the likeness o f  their weakness to our own. 
This similarity would be intolerable if a happy egotism did not often render 
us forgetful o f it. Hence the need of an infinite patience and of an ever- 
tender charity toward these fellow-creatures.16
At first glance, Osier's idea that the physician needs to overcome ordinary
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emotions to have special access to the "inner life" o f patients seems closely related 
to Hooker's conception. The ideal physician "detaches" himself from sentimental 
attitudes in order to see persons unmasked by suffering. And the special 
experience o f the physician involves witnessing not only the hidden "weakness" 
o f  others, but also his own hidden "weakness." The physician sees human frailties 
that most people never see, even on introspection.
But consider the difference between Osier and Hooker's pictures o f what 
understanding the patient involves. Osier speaks o f "seeing" into the "inner lives" 
o f  patients. Hooker speaks of "seeing" human passion, but instead o f referring to 
the "inner" workings of the patient, he speaks o f seeing the fountains from which 
thought and feeling rise. The image of rising from a well-spring refers to origins 
rather than to mechanisms. Hooker's physician seems to have special insight into 
the psychological roots o f his patients' feelings: their emotional characters, as 
rooted in their histories.
Hooker does not take the physician to have a theoretical understanding of 
human nature that is independent o f his experiential responses to patients. Rather, 
he pictures the physician's understanding of the patient as practical: the physician 
"knows how" the patient feels because o f  his capacity to imaginatively grasp a 
variety o f  affective attitudes. The physician develops a special ability to recognize 
the expressions o f human feeling. He learns to grasp what the patient shows 
indirectly in gestures and words, even when the patient him self is "unconscious,"
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in the sense o f unaware, o f his own emotion. This emphasis on a practical 
understanding correlates with Hooker’s statement that the fountain o f thought and 
feeling is "almost” open to the physician's view. Hooker's ideal physician seems 
to have an approximate understanding of, rather than certain knowledge of, his 
patient's thoughts and feelings.
In contrast, Osier is interested in knowing the mechanisms of his patients' 
"inner lives." Osier uses the term 'inner life' to refer to a hidden reality that only 
someone who had achieved a kind of imperturbability could see. He emphasizes 
that the physician's special knowledge of human nature is not merely a result of 
his extensive exposure to personal feelings and suffering. Rather, it is because 
physicians are trained to neutralize all o f  their own emotions that they can 
understand human nature objectively. Osier does not trust ordinary feelings of 
compassion any more than he trusts lust or greed: it is false to see a patient as 
really heroic, pitiable, or lovable, and hence wrong to be moved by feelings of 
respect, sympathy or affection. This is because the emotions that disclose such 
qualities are necessarily transient and tied to the body and social life.
Osier's view is still prevalent. Consider how physicians focus most o f their 
efforts on "objective" disease processes that can be measured and observed by 
anyone, rather than on "subjective" complaints that do not fit into mechanical 
models o f disease. Whereas the term "health" means flourishing, the patient's 
"health" is taken to be an empirically knowable condition that is defined as the
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well-functioning o f the body parts. To say that someone is healthy is to say that 
she has a healthy cardiovascular system, and a healthy renal system, and so on, but 
not to imply anything more about her personal condition. A healthy cardiovascular 
system is a  clear descriptive concept based on the measurement o f  various 
physiological and biochemical parameters. In circular fashion, equating the 
patient's condition with measurable physical occurrences justifies the picture o f  the 
ideal diagnostician as the observer who will be omniscient about the workings of 
things.
Osier views the diagnostic process as detective work in which the physician 
attempts to "see through" both the patient's illusory subjective complaints and the 
physician's own misleading reactions to the patient17. This reflects the Cartesian 
assum ption18 that there is an objectively real disease process behind these 
subjective experiences that can be modeled mechanically and thus changed through 
technological interventions. Osier presupposes that whatever really influences the 
patient's sickness can be known in the same wav that the objects o f physical 
science can be known; the model o f  observing and measuring entities is taken to 
be adequate for observing and measuring illness in human beings.
One cannot help but think here o f the influence on Osier o f the daily autopsies 
that were a routine part o f medical practice in his day. The disillusioned tone of 
his reference to the real "inner" lives o f persons echoes the common experience of 
physicians who not only see their patients die, but then dissect their bodies. This
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access to the "inside" o f patients, the blood and guts, reveals that human beings are 
actually physical objects through and through. As living organisms, humans are 
bound to die and decay. The personal features are lost, and the 'inner' material 
remains are all that is left o f the person.
For Osier, a truthful understanding of human nature requires getting "behind" 
the veil o f  all emotional qualities. Emotions in general are false "projections" 
rather than genuine perceptions o f reality. And Osier's concern is not ju st with the 
workings of the patient's body, but with the patient's "inner life," which includes 
necessarily subjective phenomena. He says that the physician can "see into" the 
patient's "inner life." This presupposes that the physician can set before his 
"mind's eye" a representation o f the patient's psychological life that is entirely 
independent o f  the physician's emotions towards the patient. Osier thus extends 
the ideal o f "objectivity," which has shown its utility in the understanding of 
disease processes, to the overall approach to ill persons.
But Osier's confidence that the psyche could be observed from a detached 
standpoint is an unwarranted extension o f the Cartesian wish to make every aspect 
o f nature transparent. In chapter two I show how Descartes' work on the emotions 
leads him to see the inadequacy of mechanical models for representing 
psychological experience. Ironically, Descartes himself is less "Cartesian" than 
Osier and modern physicians in that he recognizes the limits o f detached 
observation for apprehending all aspects of reality.
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II The Ideal o f Impartiality
One way o f explaining patients' increasing dissatisfaction with physicians as 
well as the rise o f interest in medical ethics is that the Oslerian perspective leaves 
no room for patients as "persons" in two senses — as affective selves or 
personalities, and as centers o f  initiative and value. In chapter three I consider the 
turn to Kantian ethics as an attempt to provide this missing acknowledgment of 
patients as "persons." Kantian views are well suited to medicine since Kant faces 
a challenge similar to the physician's: to explain how human beings can be free 
moral agents without disturbing a mechanistic causal explanation o f nature 
(including human nature). However, I show how the traditional reading o f  Kant 
favored by medical ethicists perpetuates impersonal interactions between physicians 
and patients.
Kant envisions moral relations independently o f affective ties by emphasizing 
the moral agent's impartiality. There are good reasons for physicians to strive for 
"impartiality" in two senses that derive from Kant. First, the physician is expected 
to value all patients as persons, ie. because they are persons, regardless o f  her 
inclination to like or dislike them. She is expected to overcome prejudices towards 
certain "types" o f people that might prevent her from responding with appropriate 
"concern" to the needs o f all patients.19
Second, the physician needs to be like the Kantian moral agent in striving to
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
17
overcome not only narrow prejudices, but all motives that lead her to treat some 
persons differently from others when their situations have similar moral features. 
Kant's ideal moral agent is independent o f all influences except that o f  her own 
reason in committing herself to action. Kant argues that to recognize one's moral 
obligation, one must consider one's acts from a standpoint that creates an 
equivalence o f value among the needs o f all persons.20 To act impartially is 
precisely to act from motives endorsed from this disinterested point o f view.
This more radical notion o f impartiality is well suited to the doctor-patient 
relationship. The physician needs to be impartial in the sense o f  transcending 
narrow self-interest. Consider the example o f a physician motivated by lust or 
greed, who responds attentively to all patients, and hence meets the standard of 
overcoming prejudice. She is still not impartial in the moral sense. The ideal of 
an "impartial concern" rules out the physician's manipulative use o f the patient as 
a means to the physician's own gratification, narrowly construed. Such a use of 
others is partial to one's own interests. The physician is expected to value the 
patient as a subject in her own right, without ulterior motives. This ideal is 
expressed by Kant as the obligation to treat other persons as ends and not as 
means.
However, the idea that one could appropriately respond to the moral features 
o f patient's situations from the detached position is o f  a piece with the idea that 
one could understand and effectively act on the medical features o f  the patient's
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situation from the detached position. Both ideas are based on the notion that what 
is important is a  state o f affairs that is independent o f one's relationship to the 
patient. The Kantian agent's allegiance to others derives from his allegiance to 
reason. But respecting patients as persons in medical practice requires an
appreciation o f the "weal and woe" o f such persons, and an "appropriate" response 
to such emotionally laden events as suffering, dying, recovery, and grief. The 
problem with fitting the ideal of pure practical reason to medical practice is that 
it does not account for the moral significance o f recognizing and responding to the 
concrete human situation of patients. Recall Sir William Osier's idea that from the 
position o f equanimity, the physician could have an "infinite patience" and an 
"ever-tender" charity towards his "fellow-creatures." We have already questioned 
whether Osier's ideal physician would be equipped to understand how his fellow- 
creatures felt about anything. It is also questionable whether Osier's physician 
could value, and hence recognize the relative importance of, the personal 
experiences o f his patients from the position o f equanimity? How could he respect 
them, in any concrete sense? Ordinarily, respect involves perceiving another as 
courageous in the face o f suffering, honest despite the painful facts, etc. Respect 
also involves particular motives; these show in the physician's attempts to reassure 
the patient w ithout deceiving her, to help her retain as much dignity as possible 
while inserting tubes in her body, and not to abandon her in the face o f her 
impending death. These perceptual and motivational attitudes ordinarily are rooted
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in the physician's compassionate emotions for the patient.
Given the importance o f compassionate emotions for respecting patients as 
persons, I rethink the linkage o f impartial respect and detachment in chapter three. 
Kant's contention that a moral agent must be independent o f all influences except 
her reason is inherently ambiguous. According to a traditional interpretation of 
Kant, the independence o f the moral agent characterizes her as she acts morally. 
That is, she must not be moved by anything but her sense o f duty in doing what 
she does. Hence, to be moved by ordinary feelings o f compassion is as 
problematic as being moved by greed. Both lead to actions based on empirical 
interests, rather than on the independence of pure reason, and hence lack moral 
worth. In contrast to this traditional reading, recent Kant scholars argue that it is 
the moral justification for one's actions that must be independent o f one's personal 
feelings; but in acting one can be moved by emotion, so long as what one does 
receives the endorsement o f one's disinterested reason. Building from this 
revisionist reading, I argue that acting from duty requires acting in accordance with 
rules that hold regardless o f one's transient emotions, but that these rules 
themselves involve lasting emotional commitments.
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Having argued that physicians need not detach themselves emotionally to 
diagnose diseases "objectively" and to respect patients impartially, I then turn in 
chapter four to the question o f what role emotions play in understanding patients. 
It is not only a moral imperative, but a practical imperative that physicians 
understand the "weal and woe" o f their patients. Patients do not usually display 
observable disease processes to the physician, but present a story about how they 
are feeling. The capacity to understand how the patient is feeling is crucial for 
making a correct diagnosis. For example, the physician needs to be able to 
differentiate between lassitude and exhaustion unaccompanied by pessimism and 
guilt, which might indicate anemia, from the same exhaustion with pessimism and 
guilt, which might indicate depression. And in order to know how to ask questions 
to gain more accurate information about patients, physicians need to understand a 
great deal about how individual patients see the world. As twentieth century 
physicians have become increasingly occupied with seeing diseases objectively, 
they have started to describe explicitly what used to be taken for granted — that 
physicians need to listen to patients to understand and treat them successfully. A 
substantial number o f  pages in clinical texts since the turn of the century describe 
what being a good listener involves.21 In the past thirty years there has been 
increasing medical use o f the more "specialized" concept o f "empathy" where
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"feeling into" the patient refers to understanding (via listening and other means) 
how the patient is feeling.22
In addition to the diagnostic role o f empathy, physicians are beginning to 
come up with scientific evidence that understanding how the patient feels promotes 
healing. For example, emotions have been shown to be causally efficacious 
components o f illness: grief suppresses the immune system; anxiety exacerbates 
chronic illness; certain personality traits predispose one to bowel disease. Research 
has also shown the importance o f good physician-patient communication for 
promoting patient adherence to medications, diet and exercise.23
The view that clinical empathy is compatible with detachment is motivated by 
the observation that sympathy can obscure physicians' understanding of and 
effective treatment o f patients.24 In chapter four I take seriously the difference 
between empathy and sympathetic merging, and show why physicians who take on 
their patients' problems as their own may fail to be empathic. Nevertheless, I 
argue that "sympathetic" or resonance feelings are essential for directing the 
physician's imaginative grasp o f the patient's situation.
However, there is nothing inherently truth-seeking or respectful about 
resonance feelings, which are also the basis o f mob hysteria, etc. Given that 
emotions can be concealing and wish-fulfilling, physicians do need a way to 
regulate their emotions in order to meet their goals o f objectivity and impartiality. 
Yet, what is needed is not a way of detaching themselves from all their emotions,
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but a way o f using their emotions in the service o f the goals o f medicine. In 
chapter five I give an account o f emotional self-regulation that does not reinvoke 
the need for detachment at any level. Instead, physicians can use reflective 
emotions like curiosity to loosen the hold o f emotions like anger and fear that 
constrict their understanding o f patients. They can also use curiosity when they 
are too disengaged, to better focus their attention on patients' stories. In addition, 
physician's can cultivate emotions like courage to help themselves endure loss 
w ithout abandoning their obligation to genuinely care for patients. In doing so, 
they develop their own moral character rather than divorce their affective selves 
from their professional roles.
In summary, "detached concern" is medicine's attempt both to bridge and to 
hide the gap in medicine between managing diseases and recognizing patients "as 
persons." In chapter one I analyze the features o f emotions that contribute to and 
also threaten rational agency. In chapter two I take seriously Descartes' theory of 
the emotions, because it is the direct outcome of his project o f making nature 
transparent and hence modifiable. Descartes' legacy to physicians is not only the 
mechanistic management o f disease, but the problem o f fitting human beings into 
this world-picture.
In chapter three I consider the turn to Kantian ethics to restore respect for 
persons to the practice o f medicine. I argue that Kantian impartiality does not 
require that physicians detach themselves from patients, and that the practice of
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Kantian ethics in medicine is impoverished when physicians are not affectively 
engaged.
W hereas chapters two and three consider the arguments for "detached concern" 
and show their limitations, chapters four and five give positive arguments for the 
role o f  emotions in medical practice. In chapter four, I offer a conception of 
clinical empathy as a unique form o f cognition, in which emotions are used to 
imagine the "weal and woe" of others. In the final chapter I argue that given the 
importance o f  emotional engagement with patients and also the fact that emotions 
can obstruct rational agency, physicians need to regulate their emotions without 
detaching themselves from patients. Physicians need to develop their own 
emotional characters in order to move themselves towards a more realistic and 
respectful appreciation o f patients, thus meeting the goals o f medicine.
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Chapter One: The Intentional Character o f Emotions
In this chapter I consider the features o f  emotions that have implications for 
their role in rational agency. I begin with the claim that emotions are intentional, 
and then consider some attempts to assimilate emotions to intentional acts — 
autonomous beliefs, desires and choices. In contrast to these views, I argue that 
emotions essentially involve being moved by circumstances and have a temporal 
structure and generality o f  focus that distinguishes them from these mental acts. 
By arguing that emotions do not spring from an agent's autonomous reason or will, 
I emphasize the passivity o f emotions, thus aligning with the view that motivates 
the ideal o f "detached concern." But in contrast to this position, I argue here and 
in the following chapters that the passivity, inertia, and generality o f emotions are 
compatible with an essential role for emotions in providing knowledge o f reality.
I The Cognitive Aspects o f Emotion
My most basic premise is that emotions are intentional, they are about 
something of which the agent has at least potential awareness. In contrast, 
philosophers have argued that emotions are reducible to non-relational feeling 
states.25 For example, William James equates emotions with the sensory 
experience o f the physiological changes one undergoes in emotion, so that anger
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is awareness o f one's accelerated heart beat, etc. In opposition to the Jamesian 
view, Cannon points out that we cannot identify emotions based merely on the 
consciousness o f  any bodily feelings. The same bodily feelings may occur with 
anger, grief, disappointment, or frustration. Further, if emotions were simply non­
relational feelings, like itches, than they would only be contingently connected to 
intentional objects. But to be afraid is necessarily to be afraid o f something 
frightful, to be angry is necessarily to be angry at something infuriating. Also, if 
emotions were m ere consciousness of bodily feelings, than they would only be 
contingently related to one's motives and actions. But, the relation between 
wanting to flee and fear is not contingent. To be in fear includes being disposed 
towards certain actions and thoughts, rather than others. Emotions are essentially, 
rather than contingently, related to mental objects and ends.26
How are emotions, which are experiences an agent endures, like the 
"intentional acts" that have been well characterized by philosophers: beliefs, desires 
and choices? First, are emotions assimilable to beliefs? Let us consider three 
properties that differentiate emotions from beliefs in general. First, although some 
emotions are like beliefs in having propositional objects, other emotions do not 
have such objects. For example, my being angry implies that I am angry at x for 
doing (or not doing) y, which entails that I believe that x did (or did not do) y. 
But my sadness may be much more non-specific. I may be sad about moving far 
from my home o f  many years, missing friends and familiar places. Thus a first
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difference between emotions like sadness and beliefs is that although sadness is 
about something, it is not about a matter o f fact. Rather, sadness is about an entire 
situation — it is a generalized attitude that colors the whole of an experience, like 
lighting.
Emotions like sadness are less like beliefs than they are like Heideggerian 
"moods." Heidegger conceives o f  "mood" as a generalized orientation o f one's 
attention, that unites specific objects and circumstances out o f an infinite range of 
possible objects, into one's own "situation."27 This leads us to further specify the 
sense in which emotions differ from other intentional mental processes. The idea 
o f  intentionality brings to mind the picture o f an arrow with a sharp focus: one 
believes that the Pope is Catholic. This picture fits certain emotions, like anger: 
one is angry about a certain rebuff. But other emotions, like sadness or anxiety, 
may lack a sharp focus, and be about a large field o f one's experience, or even 
one's entire situation in the world.
A mood can be thought of metaphorically as the space one carves out in the 
world as one's own. A mood is a kind o f "mattering map"28 that relates events and 
objects by how they weigh on one. Ronald de Sousa captures this notion of 
emotions as creating a context o f interest by drawing an analogy between emotions 
and a committee chairperson.29 Emotions create the opportunity for certain beliefs 
and desires to come to the fore in the way the committee chair steers the agenda 
by asking certain questions that guide the work of the committee.
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I f  we use de Sousa's image of the committee chair to begin to imagine the 
cognitive function of the emotions, then it seems that while emotions may not be 
assimilable to beliefs, they interact causally with beliefs. This leads us to the 
second issue in our comparison o f emotions and beliefs, which is whether emotions 
interact causally with beliefs in the wav beliefs interact with other beliefs?
W e expect beliefs to influence other beliefs according to their explicit 
conceptual relations. There are two aspects of this expectation. First, we expect 
that the connections between the beliefs that one holds will be logical. That is, if 
I believe that people swim in the ocean only on warm days, and I believe that 
people are swimming in the ocean now, I believe that it is warm outside. If I 
change my belief about it being warm, I then question one o f my two previous 
beliefs. Second, we expect believers to hold onto or reject beliefs insofar as their 
knowledge remains static or changes. That is, we expect that if  one changes one's 
beliefs, it will be because one has changed other, supporting beliefs.
But emotions do not function vis a vis beliefs in the way other beliefs do. 
Emotions often persist despite relevant changes in one's beliefs, showing what 
Descartes calls "inertia."30 For example, imagine that I feel sad about the 
misfortunes o f  other people. I focus on poor Smith, who really got screwed by his 
corporation. But the belief about Smith is not itself essential to the sadness; if I 
find out that actually Smith made a fortune out o f his run in with his employer, I 
may either stop focusing on Smith altogether, or think about how Smith's children
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have taken advantage o f him, thus maintaining my generalized focus on the 
pathetic. O r consider the example o f anger that persists despite changes in belief. 
My anger may not fade upon my hearing that the harm you did me was completely 
accidental; I may believe it was an accident, and yet still feel angry at you, for 
your failure to feel genuinely apologetic. The fact that certain emotional attitudes 
involve us in seeking out new, relevant beliefs, when the original beliefs no longer 
merit the emotion, implies that emotions cannot just be beliefs, but rather must be 
something else that influences beliefs.
Further, emotions not only show inertia with respect to beliefs; they also can 
subside without any adequate explanatory changes in one's beliefs about the object 
of the emotion.31 For example, consider how one can just stop loving or resenting 
someone without a prior change in one's beliefs about that person. Such shifts do 
not necessarily suggest that the agent is an irrational or disturbed person. They 
may be explainable in psychological terms that show that the person is acting in 
an understandable way. Perhaps the person stopped needing to be dependent on 
a parental figure, and the object o f her erotic love was a parental type. Such 
psychological explanations help us understand how shifts in emotion make sense 
in the life o f  the agent. But such explanations are importantly different from the 
explanations we expect for a change in one's beliefs. One changes one's beliefs 
because one obtains new information that undermines the justification o f an earlier 
point o f  view.32 But one can stop loving or resenting someone without such a shift
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in one's information about the loved or resented person. The tragic aspect o f 
someone asking her lover why he has stopped loving her would certainly be 
undermined if  the answer were as simple as citing a new belief.
Thus emotions like sadness, resentment, some types o f anger, erotic love, etc. 
are relatively independent in their temporal course from changes in belief. This 
fact is significant for our model o f  emotions. For we cannot simply take emotions 
to follow from beliefs, as for example, Joseph Fell does.33 Fell argues 
compellingly that emotions are not reducible to beliefs because they have an 
essential passive, embodied aspect. But he goes on to assert that emotions are the 
bodily response to changes in belief. But this view does not account for the inertia 
and transience that are typical o f many emotions.
Fell's idea is that where there is an emotion, there is a belief that caused it. 
He has in mind emotion instances like the occurrence o f grief on hearing o f the 
death o f a  loved one, in which the emotion would not have occurred if a particular 
belief had not been formed. But emotions can occur without beliefs as causes. 
Emotions are often occasioned only by the occurrence o f an emotion in another 
person: for example if  someone addresses one in an angry voice, one will often 
become instantaneously irritated and angry, prior to judging the other person as 
rude, pushy or "just like my brother." Fell might argue that in such cases there is 
a hidden or unconscious change in belief that occurs prior to the responsive anger, 
which occasions the anger. But, as I discuss in chapter four, experiences o f
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emotional resonance with other people, such as "contagious" joy, sadness or fear, 
need not be mediated by belief formation.
So far we have argued that emotions may differ from beliefs in the generality 
(versus specificity) o f their objects, and in the relation o f their temporal shifts to 
shifts in beliefs. A third way in which emotions differ from beliefs is that we 
assess the appropriateness o f emotions in a different way than we assess the 
appropriateness o f beliefs. Patricia Greenspan34 argues that an emotion may be 
appropriate when there is insufficient evidence for a justified belief. Her view is 
that emotions differ from beliefs in that they play a motivational role in rational 
agency. Emotions allow agents to keep their focus on certain evaluations. They 
do so by virtue o f their essential impact on the agent's level o f comfort or 
discomfort. She defines emotions as affective states o f comfort or discomfort that 
are about evaluative propositions. For example, fear involves discomfort at the 
thought that danger looms. There are thus two layers involved in any emotion: an 
evaluative layer that involves a thought like: danger looms; and an affective state 
that takes as its intentional object the evaluative thought. Thus, in contrast to Fell's 
view o f the affective element o f  emotion as following the cognitive element, 
Greenspan's view of the affect as intentionally related to the evaluative judgm ent 
entails their temporal unity.
Greenspan argues that because o f their essential motivational role, it is proper 
for emotions to rest on lesser evidence than would be necessary for a belief. She
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makes this point through examples, including the following example o f wary 
suspicion in regard for one's own self-interest. She imagines being involved in a 
business transaction in which the salesman's (X's) body language — especially the 
darting o f his eyes — leads her to become uncomfortable at the thought that X is 
involving her in a bad deal. Yet she has reason to believe, and no good reason not 
to believe, from other people's testimony, and from X's work, that X is entirely 
trustworthy. Greenspan's claim is that even if there is nothing about X that 
explicitly justifies the belief that X is untrustworthy, the suspicion may be 
appropriate, so long as it is...
'controlled by' some relevant features of the perceptual situation. I might 
have at least prima facie evidence for belief, if  I were able to specify these 
features at least roughly; but as things stand now, I do not know enough 
about the 'subliminal' sources o f my emotion even to attribute them to its 
object. I am reacting to something about X's eye movements, say 
something whose relevance to untrustworthiness could be explained by a 
developed science o f "body language" if there were one.35 
So some aspects o f the situation are sufficient to merit suspicious feeling even 
though they are insufficient to justify the corresponding belief that the salesman 
is untrustworthy. Greenspan thus concludes that "the emotion may be appropriate 
in a case where its corresponding belief is neither warranted nor held."36
Greenspan's point is not that the emotion is appropriate if  it is triggered by any
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perceivable aspect o f the situation. Rather the emotion must rest on some pertinent 
perceptual cues that begin to form a pattern that would, if further information 
followed in an expectable way, be sufficient to substantiate a  belief. Greenspan 
argues that it is essential for emotions to require a lesser, or more partial evidential 
basis than belief in order for emotions to sustain our focus on what is salient, and 
to motivate us to do the kind of further exploration that is needed to form pertinent 
beliefs, and engage in appropriate actions. The key differences for the evidential 
basis o f an appropriate emotion versus a justified belief are that the evidence may 
steer the agent without the agent recognizing it, and the evidence need not be so 
complete as to rule out competing views.
Thus Greenspan's view helps explain the common phenomenon of emotional 
ambiguity in an apparently rational agent. One situation may offer perceptual 
warrant for 'opposing' affective responses. For example in the above case o f wary 
suspicion it is also conceivable that Greenspan might feel a sense o f affectionate 
gratitude towards X in virtue o f his consistently responsible behavior in the 
business deal, even as she struggles with her sense o f wary suspicion. According 
to Greenspan's view both o f  these emotions would be appropriate because o f their 
perceptual warrant in X's conduct, even though to hold the relevant beliefs that X 
was untrustworthy and that X was trustworthy simultaneously would be irrational.
I would go beyond Greenspan in distinguishing the criteria by which we judge 
the appropriateness o f  emotions from the criteria by which we judge the
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appropriateness o f beliefs. It is not just that the propositional content o f emotions 
properly rests on lesser, more partial, or non-verbal sources o f evidence. Rather, 
I take it that the appropriateness o f emotions is not something that can be 
ascertained by looking at the evidence on which the propositional content o f the 
emotion rests. For example, consider a case in which someone becomes 
overwhelmed with grief because her goldfish dies.37 Our concern whether this 
response is appropriate is not about whether this person is correct in judging the 
goldfish to be dead. Rather we are concerned about whether the target o f the 
emotional judgm ent is worthy o f the response. In describing what is awry we use 
evaluative terms like "ov.erreaction" that weigh and measure the suitability o f  the 
emotional response to its object. When we imagine cases o f inappropriate 
emotional responses, we think o f such grief, or fear or anger as overreactions, or 
of examples o f failing to be moved by suffering or threat as underreactions. The 
evaluative element o f our thought here is apparent: the agent is not giving the 
situation its due. These judgments are like the judgments involved in noting the 
failure o f a person to help another person, or seeing someone as being unduly 
preoccupied with herself. They are about the value o f the agents response rather 
then about the truth o f the proposition embedded in the emotion.
Greenspan's point that emotions properly rest on more partial evidence than is 
required for true beliefs is correct but incomplete; she leaves out the characteristic 
evaluative, non-evidential basis o f our assessments o f  emotional appropriateness.
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Consider for example someone who feels intense fear on spotting a schizophrenic 
person on the street talking to herself. Is this an inappropriate reaction? We could 
just say with Greenspan that it is not inappropriate, for the same reasons the 
suspicion o f the salesman is not inappropriate. The schizophrenic person's 
behavior suggests psychosis, and people who are psychotic from street drugs like 
PCP can be dangerous, so that even though the belief that this person is dangerous 
is unwarranted, the feeling o f fear has perceptual warrant. But such an assessment 
sidesteps the more central question o f whether the agent is overreacting to the 
schizophrenic person because something is awry in her own attitude towards 
mental disorder/ nonconformity, etc. To assess this question we would want to 
know much more about the agent's beliefs and their connection to her reactivity to 
this street person. Is the agent simply ignorant about schizophrenia, so that with 
some education she would recognize the patient's disorder and no longer be afraid? 
I f  so there seems to be nothing inappropriate about her emotional response. Or 
would she respond this way regardless o f understanding fully that this person 
presents a relatively low risk to her safety. If  so, then it seems that her intense fear 
would be inappropriate in the sense that the intense grief over the goldfish is 
inappropriate. I would apply the same questioning to Greenspan's salesman 
example to tease out whether her suspicious focus on the non-verbal messages 
given o ff by the apparently trustworthy salesman represents an unduly vigilant 
approach to other persons and is therefore inappropriate.
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Emotions disclose reality but they do not do so in the way that propositions do. 
Rather, they allow happenings in the agent's world to weigh on her to different 
degrees, and thus determine the openness of the agent to various aspects o f her 
situation. In assessing the appropriateness o f emotions versus beliefs, we ask 
something more o f the agent, not just something less. We do not ask whether she 
is able to step out o f her partializing perspective, but rather whether her partializing 
perspective is an adequate approach to the world. For example, we are not asking 
a  man who is angry at (or loves) a woman to justify his anger (or love) in terms 
o f her qualities, as if he could provide evidence that she is worthy o f his anger (or 
love). Rather, we are asking, as in the case o f the person who grieves inconsolably 
over her goldfish, whether we feel that this person is losing proper perspective on 
what matters in the world. In assessing the appropriateness o f an emotion, we are 
thus making an evaluative judgement, rather than a judgment about the truth or 
falsity o f  a proposition.
In summary, emotions considered qua judgments, still differ from beliefs in at 
least three senses: the generality of their objects; the way they interact causally 
with beliefs; and the criteria by which we assess the appropriateness o f emotions. 
This is sufficient argument to reject strict judgmentalist accounts of emotions that 
reduce emotions to beliefs, or accounts like Fell's that portray emotions as bodily 
responses to changes in belief. Greenspan's picture o f emotions as affective states 
that are about evaluative thoughts but that rest on a lesser evidential basis than that
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required for belief is compatible with all the above properties o f emotions. 
Further, Greenspan takes emotions to play a special extra-judgmental role in 
motivating the rational agent precisely because o f their inertia and partiality. Let 
us now consider the extra-judgmental or motivational aspect o f emotions in order 
to fully credit emotions for their role in rational agency.
II The Volitional Aspects o f Emotion
In what sense are emotions related to behavior, desires, and strategic actions? 
Emotions have a sense of purposefulness that is not captured by comparing them 
with beliefs. I f  we accept that emotions involve dispositions to act, as for example 
fear involves the disposition to flee, than we have committed ourselves to 
accounting for emotions in terms o f practical as well as theoretical reason. And 
in characterizing emotions as directing attention like a committee chairperson, I 
already imply that emotions straddle our usual conceptions of practical and 
theoretical reason.
Since I cannot fully consider here the range of conative theories o f emotion, 
I turn to two thinkers who represent the boundaries o f these theories, Ryle and 
Sartre. Ryle38 represents the extreme behaviorist tradition, arguing that emotions 
are nothing but dispositions to behave. Ryle's claim is that a necessary condition 
for ascribing emotions to persons is that they behave in discernible patterns. But
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while some emotions lead directly to behavior o f  some kind, others do not. The 
sadness described above need not show up as behavior. Perhaps the subject tends 
not to cry or to express sadness in gestures. In that case, if  we want to make out 
a dispositional structure inherent in such an emotion, it will be a disposition to feel 
badly when the old home town is mentioned, etc. But if  the disposition defining 
the emotion is a disposition to feel a  certain way, then the behaviorist goal of 
defining a non-observable attitude in terms o f  patterns o f  behavior is undermined. 
Thus, the fact that emotions can be analyzed into dispositional attitudes does not 
support the idea that emotions can be analyzed into behaviors.
Other analytic philosophers attempt to reduce emotions to basic pro-attitudes 
or functional desires. But de Sousa points out that an essential structural feature 
o f  such desires is absent from emotions. When one has a functional desire, one 
is focused on an immediate goal o f some sort. But if  one cannot achieve that goal, 
one can regress through a hierarchy o f  more general wants, to focus one's desire 
on another concrete object. For example, if  I want to take a  walk in order to relax 
and refresh myself, and I cannot take a walk, I may take a shower for the same 
general purpose. De Sousa says that such a hierarchy does not arise with 
emotions.39 I think this is not quite right. Emotions do transfer from less 
accessible to more accessible "objects" all the time — for example, we learn to love 
in spouses what we once loved in our parents. But in such cases, it does not quite 
make sense to speak about the new object satisfying the emotion in the way the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
38
new object may satisfy the desire. The transferred love is still haunted by the 
earlier object. This is because emotions are essentially rather than contingently tied 
to their targets — to what they are about. Emotions cannot fit into the construct 
o f  "functional desires," which are ahistorical "functions" that are satisfied, emptied 
out, and open for the next variable.
In the continental tradition, Sartre offers a distinct and influential conative 
theory o f emotion.40 His view is that emotions occur because o f the agent's freely 
chosen desire to preserve her self-esteem. In emotions one does not act 
efficaciously in the world. One acts "magically," by changing one's embodied state 
to transform an intolerable situation. For example, one faints in fear and thus 
"magically" escapes the situation without being effective in the world.41 Sartre's 
view  is that emotions can only effect the agent's situation through such distortion. 
He posits a radical dichotomy between the world of efficient causality, through 
which work gets done in the world, and the world o f emotion, which only has 
"magical" or non-causally efficacious impact on the world.
In support o f Sartre, there are common examples o f "magical" transformations 
via emotions. For example, one can idealize through admiration or love, 
overlooking flaws in another, or seeing reciprocal feelings where there are none. 
Such emotions are wish-fulfilling at the expense o f enhancing the agent's realistic 
appraisal o f her circumstances. But this does not show that emotions have no 
place in the nexus o f efficient causes of action in the world. Behind Sartre's
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division o f reality into efficient causal relations and magical relations is the 
assumption that the emotion's own occurrence is unconditioned by any causal 
events implicating the body or the person qua psychologically determined agent. 
This assumption is essential for equating emotions, as Sartre does all other mental 
acts, with radical choice. But how can emotions be understood as the chosen 
actions o f an autonomous will, independent o f  the causal nexus o f conventional, 
embodied beings?
Consider an example given by Robert Solomon,42 following Sartre: a wife 
picks a fight with her husband by accusing him of spending too much time with 
a co-worker she is jealous of; in picking the fight she creates distance between 
them that prevents them from going out to a party she does not want to go to. So 
her emotion functions strategically. Is it plausible to understand her jealousy as 
a  radical act o f will, undetermined by her embodied/social situation?
First o f all, to see emotions as strategic does not require seeing emotions as 
uncaused. We can make strategic use o f illnesses that have obvious physical 
causes. Secondly, and more importantly, for an emotion like the wife's anger to 
be operate successfully, there must be a pre-defined context to establish the 
correspondence between the emotion and the situation she is in. That is, there 
must be a convention that allows anger to mean what it does and thus to work 
strategically. Anger serves a purpose in this example because it fits with the 
evidential basis at hand: a neglected wife responding to her husband's close
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relationship with a co-worker. This evidence of a possible betrayal serves as 
perceptual warrant, in Greenspan's terms, for anger, but not for terror or joy, 
because o f what anger means to embodied conventional beings like us. But it is 
impossible to see how any situation could offer perceptual warrant for one affect 
rather than another without relying on bodily/conventional determinants for human 
behavior.
W hat we can say after considering Sartre and Solomon, is that emotions are 
overdetermined. The occurrence of a particular affect now may serve a strategic 
purpose. But in order to explain how an emotion instance can serve a purpose, we 
still need to explain how the agent's situation has typical features that warrant that 
emotion. For we cannot choose unrestrictedly which aspects o f life merit anger, 
joy, fear, etc. Rather, it is only because we learn through social, embodied 
experience what type o f events merit anger that we can use anger in an appropriate 
way. So for emotions to work strategically, they need to be part o f  the nexus o f 
causation in the real world.
I ll Emotions Determine Salience
De Sousa offers a developmental account o f emotions that serves as an 
excellent response to what is missing in the Sartrean account, and also in the
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previously discussed attempts to equate emotional judgments with beliefs. De 
Sousa starts by focusing on how we learn emotions: his view is that people are 
biologically programmed to have basic proto-affective responses to certain stimuli; 
but the fact that there are heritable emotional dispositions does not entail that there 
are full-fledged emotional primitives (as Descartes, for example, presupposes). De 
Sousa says that "we do need a repertoire o f primitive instinctual responses, but 
emotions are not mere responses."43 Rather, it is possible for infants and children 
to learn how to have full-fledged emotions from other persons because their proto- 
affective responses are triggered by typical situations. Children learn that certain 
responses are related to certain scenarios: for example, normally children learn that 
affection is related to being lovingly held; but in pathological cases, affection may 
relate to disturbed ways o f being attended to, including being hurt. De Sousa's... 
hypothesis is this: We are made familiar with the vocabulary o f emotion by 
association with paradigm scenarios. These are drawn first from our daily 
life as small children and later reinforced by the stories, art, and culture to 
which we are exposed. Later still, in literate cultures, they are 
supplemented and refined by literature. Paradigm scenarios involve two 
aspects: first, a situation type providing the characteristic objects o f  the 
specific emotion-type [what the emotion is about], and second, a set of 
characteristic or 'normal' responses to the situation, where normality is first 
a  biological matter and then very quickly becomes a cultural one. It is in
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large part in virtue o f the response component of the scenarios that emotions 
are commonly held to motivate. But this is, in a way, back-to-front: for the 
emotion often takes its name from the response disposition and is only 
afterward assumed to cause it.44
This passage makes two important points. First, de Sousa's claim is not only 
that we learn what emotions are about, but that we also learn how to respond 
emotionally, from these proto-typical situations of childhood. De Sousa 
summarizes his view by saying that "the role o f paradigm scenarios in relation to 
emotions is analogous to the ostensive definition o f the common noun."45 But it 
might seem that the ostensive definition o f a noun only gives a name to some 
experience, without teaching one what it is like to experience the thing named. I 
take it that de Sousa is presupposing here a contextualist view of ostensive 
definition (he calls him self a contextualist elsewhere). That is, he seems to view 
the social naming o f an experience as of a piece with the differentiating o f the 
experience within the stream o f consciousness: to recognize how it feels to be 
angry is already to recognize some experiential features o f anger that tag this 
experience as the same one that has occurred on other occasions.
Second, de Sousa says that the emotion takes its name from the response 
disposition, "and is only afterward assumed to cause it." I think de Sousa is right, 
because emotions could never be learned as they are, if they were divisible into a 
prior cognitive event and a responsive bodily feeling. For infants and children
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would then need to make inferences from their fear about the bogeyman, to the 
affect associated with fright. But we can find no rules of thought to appropriately 
ground such inferences (the reasons behind this claim are put forth in chapter four 
in my argument against an inferential mechanism for empathic imagining). 
Rather, de Sousa's point is that emotions can be learned via paradigm scenarios 
because they are bodily attitudes that inherently portray situations. De Sousa is 
close to Greenspan here. As noted above, she argues that an emotion is 
distinguished from a collection of thoughts and bodily sensations by the relation 
o f  the bodily sensations to the thoughts: the affective aspect o f  the emotion is 
about the evaluative aspect o f the emotion.
In summary, I agree with de Sousa and Greenspan that although emotions have 
essential cognitive and volitional significance that likens emotions to beliefs, 
desires and choices, the act model of emotion is incorrect. Emotions do not 
originate in a  spontaneous act o f theoretical reason or in an independent act o f will. 
Rather, emotions are embodied, learned responses to situations.
In contrast to Descartes, who views emotion as the intrusion o f  animal nature 
on rational agency, de Sousa and Greenspan see emotions as essential for rational 
agency. De Sousa takes the inertia o f some emotions to changes in belief, and the 
generality o f focus o f  emotions like sadness, to show that emotions are 
conceptually prior to beliefs, rather than physiological responses to beliefs. De 
Sousa's point is not that emotions happen to direct one's attention but rather that
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emotions are necessary for focusing one's attention on a limited set o f objects out 
o f an infinite array o f possible objects. He says that emotions are needed to 
"determine salience."
Greenspan makes a similar point with regard to the special motivational role 
o f affect. She says that emotions "'register' evaluations in positive or negative 
affect,"46 thus exerting an ongoing motivational influence on the agent. An agent 
in a  state o f  discomfort at an action requirement will have a compelling extra- 
judgm ental reason to act. The physician who feels moved by the patient's suffering 
will have her own discomfort as an immediate reason to focus on helping the 
patient, in addition to her other reasons for helping the patient. As embodied 
responses to one's situation, emotions direct one's attention and sustain one's 
motivation, and therefore determine a pattern of interests in, rather than a chaotic 
response to, one's circumstances in the world. Without such focusing, one would 
lack the capacity to form relevant concrete beliefs in the first place.
Following de Sousa and Greenspan, I take the inertia, partiality, generality and 
passivity o f emotions to indicate their primacy in directing attention prior to any 
act o f  judgm ent or volition. Emotions "give us frameworks in terms o f which we 
perceive, desire, act and explain."47 Emotions can direct our attention only because 
their efficacy is somehow independent of, and thus deeper than, and irreducible to 
the rules o f thought. This independence from rule governed behavior shows itself 
in the inertia and partiality o f emotions. This depth shows itself in the passivity
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and generality o f emotions: one's entire situation in the world can "weigh" on one 
in emotion prior to any activity o f deliberating. I now turn to Descartes to argue 
against the conception o f emotions as disrupting rational agency that is still 
prevalent in medical practice today.
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Chapter Two: The Rationality of the Emotions
In this chapter I challenge the Cartesian picture o f emotions as irrational that 
is central to the ideal o f "detached concern." I first show that although Descartes 
account o f  emotions as rooted in the interaction o f mind and body in the pineal 
gland is often caricatured, it thematizes issues that are still problematic today, 
particularly in medicine. I consider sympathetically Descartes view of emotions 
as essentially passive, bodily, conventional responses that cannot be about "things 
as they are in themselves" in the way scientific judgments can; but I argue against 
the assumptions, rooted in Cartesian ontology, that these aspects o f emotions entail 
that they are therefore "projections" of imaginary objects into an otherwise clearly 
given human world.
In his work Passions of the Soul.48 Descartes describes emotions in terms of 
the interaction o f the soul with the tiny physical "animal spirits" at the locus o f the 
pineal gland. Descartes uses the term "soul" to refer to the quality o f being mental 
or conscious; the emotions straddle the realm o f physical interactions (res extensa) 
and conscious experience (res cogitans). Descartes says that the "animal spirits" 
are "nothing but material bodies and their one peculiarity is that they are bodies 
of extreme minuteness."49 Descartes conceives o f "passion" and "action" in 
animals as entirely lacking intentionality. An approaching tiger causes a movement 
in another animal's visual receptors that travels to the pineal gland, moving the
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"animal spirits," which then cause a muscle movement causing the animal to flee. 
And Descartes describes pre-reflective "passion" and "action" in human beings as 
equally mechanistic:
I f  someone quickly thrusts his hand against our eyes as if  to strike us, even 
though we know him to be our friend...that he will take great care not to 
hurt us, we have all the same trouble in preventing ourselves from closing 
them ; and this shows that it is not by the intervention of our soul that they 
close, seeing that it is against our will, which is its only, or at least its 
principal activity; but it is because the machine o f our body is so formed 
that the movement of the hand toward our eyes excites another movement 
in our brain, which conducts the animal spirits into the muscles which cause 
the eyelids to close.50 
Descartes' mechanistic account is based on his assumptions that human reflexes are 
like animal motion, and that animals are no more conscious than machines.
However, in human beings, in non-reflexive reactions, there is an additional 
step in which the movements of the tiny animal spirits lead to the conscious 
experience o f emotion, prior to mechanistically causing further movements. And 
this conscious experience is not simply a flashing moment o f intuiting a discrete 
quality, like a  flash o f color, but involves an interpretation o f states o f  affairs. This 
is apparent in Descartes' teleological explanation o f typical emotional attitudes. 
Fear is accounted for by the tendency to avoid danger, anger by the tendency to
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protect oneself from harm. The explanation of revulsion is that phenomena related 
to death produce an agitation of the pineal gland "which causes the soul to employ 
all its forces in order to avoid an evil so present." And Descartes says that the 
soul is moved to feel joy when it sees the brain pattern that is associated with 
pleasurable sensations so long as it knows the body is healthy, much the way a 
theater-goer assured o f her own safety enjoys what goes on in a show.51 The idea 
that the soul's pleasure is a fitting response to the condition of the body entails that 
emotions have a meaning structure that involves the depiction o f situations in the 
world.
This intentional aspect of emotions subjects them to appraisals o f their 
adequacy as ways o f  recognizing reality. The reasons why Descartes takes 
emotions to be falsifying projections can, for the purposes o f our project, be 
distinguished into two different problems. First, there is the problem o f emotions 
overcoming reason by clouding and distorting the perceptions and thoughts o f the 
agent, on the model o f hallucinations and delusions. I turn to this problem of 
"irrationality" next. Second, there is the problem o f "projection" as an ontological 
state o f affairs arising from the unbridgeable gap between the causes o f  emotion 
(res extensa) and the objects o f emotion (res cogitans). Because o f their 
amphibious nature, emotions cannot fit into the form o f explanation that gives 
everything its place in Descartes scientific world-picture. I consider the 
implications o f this opacity or "arationality" o f emotions in the second part o f this
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chapter.
I The Problem o f Irrationality: Emotions as Pathogens
For Descartes it is not simply because emotions are caused by bodily events 
that they cannot be trustworthy sources o f knowledge o f reality. Perceptions, 
which are caused by bodily events, can be sources o f true knowledge of reality 
when there is a  correspondence between the cause and the formal object o f the 
perception. This is not just because the causes o f perception are observable in the 
public realm; for Descartes describes proprioception, in which the bodily events 
causing the information are initiated inside someone's body, as a trustworthy source 
o f knowledge as long as there is a correspondence between the cause and the 
formal object o f the proprioception. In the case o f normal proprioception, for 
example, awareness o f the location o f one's arm with respect to the rest of one's 
body, the object o f  proprioception is the same inner body parts that originate the 
movements that cause the proprioception. That is, there are tiny movements in the 
muscles o f  the arm that, according to Descartes, cause a chain o f  movement 
through the blood, into the pineal gland, resulting in awareness of the arm. Hence, 
there is a reliability and correctness inherent in perception and proprioception in 
a  healthy body.
Descartes takes those cases in which the relational object o f perception or
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proprioception does not correspond to the cause of the information to raise the 
possibility o f  doubting even the most apparently indubitable, first-hand 
"knowledge."
is there anything more intimate or more internal than pain? And yet I have 
learned from some persons whose arms or legs have been cut off, that they 
sometimes seemed to feel pain in the part which had been amputated, which 
made me think that I could not be quite certain that it was a certain member 
which pained me. even although I felt pain in it.52
This example o f pain in a phantom limb, in contrast to the example o f reliable 
proprioception in a healthy body, illustrates Descartes picture o f "projection" as an 
epistemological problem: to attribute the pain to the phantom limb is to mistakenly 
impute physical reality to a limb that has no spatial being but only a subjective 
presence. The cause of the pain imputed to the limb is not the real limb, which 
no longer exists, but the body's dependence on already entrenched information. 
The example o f the phantom limb shows that Descartes sees error as arising from 
dependency on pre-reflective, experiential knowledge or "common sense." To 
grasp and locate each new pain, indeed to use one's body reliably, depends upon 
a history o f associations o f  bodily sensations with navigating one's body in the 
world.53 And such body-knowledge is vulnerable to error because o f the influence 
o f past bodily experience on present bodily experience. The "projection" o f the 
phantom limb is possible because body-knowledge has inertia: the old body
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experiences persist even when they are unwarranted by the objective world. The 
agent is fooled by her dependence on her own subjective history o f bodily 
experiences, mistaking a subjective limb-experience for evidence o f the objective 
being o f the limb.
According to Descartes, all emotions fit the paradigm o f pathological perception 
illustrated in the phantom limb example. First, just as there is a gap between the 
experience o f pain in a  phantom limb, and knowledge o f  the existence o f the limb, 
there is a gap between the experience o f emotion and knowledge o f the existence 
o f the objects o f the emotion. The objects o f emotions are propositions that the 
person holds in mind, but their causes are the movements o f the animal spirits. In 
contrast, Descartes takes not only beliefs but even "pure" desires to be potentially 
rational because they are caused by the same mental events that they are about. 
That is, in the case o f pure desires, the agent's own will is both the source of and 
the object o f the desire. This makes it possible for the agent to use introspection 
to have veridical first hand knowledge of her desires according to Descartes. But 
in the case of emotions the cause is not mental, even though the object is, so the 
agent cannot use introspection to verify the attunement o f cause and object.
Second, emotions differ from perceptions in that their occurrences do not 
correspond in a linear fashion to shifts in the external environment or in the beliefs 
o f the agent. Rather emotions impose a structure on situations that is rooted in the 
prior history o f the person. Descartes argues that the inertia o f emotions is
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essential for their pragmatic role as reflexive behaviors that allow the agent to 
escape harm; but this inertia also entails that emotions lack the sensitivity and 
flexibility to modify themselves as the agent's environment changes. This factor 
leads to the idea that emotions impede perception by causing the agent to view the 
world in certain ways; and that emotions disrupt reflective thought by causing the 
agent to posit relationships in the world that have no present empirical basis, like 
the phantom limb.
Descartes interprets the phenomenon o f emotional inertia to signify the 
passivity o f  reason with respect to emotion. For example, in his descriptions o f  the 
interaction o f the soul and body in the cases of joy and revulsion, Descartes 
pictures the movements o f the animal spirits in the pineal gland as projecting an 
image that acts on the respectively passive soul. Thus, if the animal spirits portray 
the body as healthy and give the message for "pleasure," the soul will respond with 
joy, even if  the body is not really healthy, and the source o f pleasure not really 
good for the body. This case is analogous to the man with pathological thirst in 
the sixth meditation, who feels pleasure at quenching his thirst, even if the 
ingestion o f water is terribly dangerous for his body. The source o f such deception 
is the arationality of the animal spirits, which cannot correct their movements to 
insure a correspondence with objective reality, and the passivity o f  the soul with 
regard to the animal spirits. Thus the observed property of emotional inertia 
prompts the view of the passions as akin to a disease that distorts consciousness,
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leading one to falsely "project" situations into the world that have no objective 
reality, and thus to act in ways that are irrational; I will refer to this view as the 
model o f the "pathogenicity of the emotions."
According to the Cartesian picture, the very "projection" of res extensa into res 
cogitans that is essential to emotion leads to an analogy between emotions as a 
class and faulty perception: emotions are like delusions and hallucinations in their 
unwarranted amplification o f the products o f consciousness. But in the case of 
faulty perception what is illegitimate is the content of the "projection", ie. the 
phantom limb. In the case o f emotions what is illegitimate is the process by which 
something that originates in res extensa takes on a propositional object, thus 
insinuating itself in the agent's reasoning but not originating in thought. This 
seamless imposition o f a surd mental process into the agent's consciousness is at 
the core of Descartes picture o f the "pathogenicity" of emotions and o f  subsequent 
versions o f this view in medicine and psychiatry. Descartes views thought as 
passive with respect to emotions because emotions do not obey reason, yet they 
becom e a part o f the agent's reasoning.
To summarize the problem o f irrationality: Descartes' view of emotions as 
falsifying "projections" on the model of human error includes a fundamental 
assumption about the passivity o f  reason with respect to emotions. Descartes 
pictures emotions as diseases o f reason in which "ideas" are imposed upon reason 
by foreign forces. The pathogenicity o f emotions does not follow from the fact
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that emotions are caused by physical events, for such passivity characterizes 
healthy perception. Rather, because the "ideas" imposed upon consciousness via 
emotions are not o f thought they do not obey the rules o f thought. But because 
these unruly "ideas" have a propositional structure, they engage with and influence 
beliefs that have their proper origin in reason. Therefore emotions categorically 
involve "projection" not only because their genuine causal origins (the movements 
o f  the animal spirits) are elided from their intentional objects, but also because they 
amplify reality without sufficient material cause.
The idea that a surd pathogen could intrude on reason, thus disrupting one's 
judgm ent, occurs throughout the Meditations. For example in the "First 
Meditation" Descartes describes delusions, hallucinations and illusions as the result 
o f black bile acting on the cerebella. In these cases of human error, the mind is 
caused by surd events to portray the world as it does. And for Descartes these 
examples o f the influence of a surd cause on mental life pose a serious threat to 
knowledge and action: the delusions occasioned by the black bile then continue 
to disrupt the agent's judgment. The mental effect of the black bile becomes a 
model for all human error; the background presupposition is that our thinking is 
always vulnerable to the mental effects o f pathogens given the vulnerability 
inherent in our embodiment and our reliance on habit/convention. Descartes uses 
the example o f the influence o f black bile in the "First Meditation" to justify the 
skeptical questioning of all common sense knowledge that will lead to a new basis
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for knowledge. And the example o f the phantom limb in the "Sixth Meditation" 
is used to illustrate the dangerous tendency to mistake common sense for a true 
understanding o f reality.
II Rethinking the Pathogenicity of Emotions
Let us now leave our analysis of Descartes to rethink the assumptions that lead 
him to picture emotions as pathogens. Let us grant that there are certain emotional 
experiences that can lead to errors o f judgment and misperceptions. The fact that 
emotions can lead one astray does not prove that it is the nature of emotional 
experience in general to overcome or misdirect reason. The Cartesian error, as 
embodied in the Oslerian view o f "detached concern," is to presuppose that the 
passivity o f emotions with respect to external events is perpetuated within the 
emotion occurrence so that the state o f emotion itself exerts a foreign influence on 
reason. According to Descartes, the tiger causes the fear, and the fear "comes 
over" or "overcomes" reason. Because the emotion has as its real cause some 
physical event that follows the rule of res extensa and not res cogitans, the emotion 
imparts into the agent's mental life the unruliness (from the standpoint o f  the 
mental) o f res extensa.54
I think that Descartes arrived at this picture o f emotions as "pathogens" by 
conflating two different types o f irrationality that emotions are subject to: first,
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because emotions are psychological occurrences partially determined by arational 
causes (the movements o f the pineal gland) they can come over the agent like 
states o f drunkenness imposed by an intoxicant; second, because emotions have 
inertia, they can involve a kind o f boot-strapping in which they create their own 
wished-for objects. Let us consider these two types o f irrationality in turn. First 
consider, for example, alcohol induced rage. One may be enraged about one's job, 
one's spouse or the price o f tea in China. But the real cause o f one's rage is the 
alcohol. Such an example shows that a  physical event can cause an affect which 
then "takes on" a  focus in the world, thus becoming an emotion. So even if one's 
rage is then about one's job, this rage was not originally caused by one's thoughts 
about one's job. This suggests that surd physical causes can occasion emotions that 
would not otherwise be occasioned by the person's appraisal o f her situation. Yet 
this example does not demonstrate that emotions themselves have pathogenicity, 
since it only shows that an organic cause can occasion an emotion and not that an 
emotion itself causes the agent to make unwarranted evaluations. Certainly organic 
causes can induce beliefs and perceptions as well as emotions, so the fact that 
emotions can be so induced is insufficient for supporting the model o f emotions 
as pathogens. Rather, the picture o f emotions as pathogens requires showing that 
it is the emotion itself that acts on the agent as the alcohol does in the case of 
intoxication.
A second type o f  irrationality, the boot-strapping that follows from the inertia
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of emotions, appears to provide an example o f  emotions themselves functioning as 
intoxicants. Consider for example emotional transference, in which one is drawn 
or repelled by situations that would not otherwise merit such responses. For 
examples, consider an erotic love for someone who reminds one o f an abandoning 
parent, or a  fearful apprehension o f a non-threatening situation that rekindles a past 
trauma. These examples show that in the absence o f some physical aberrancy, 
emotions can involve "bootstrapping," or the creation o f their own foci, and thus 
their own self-perpetuation. Does the fact that emotions create their own foci in 
such cases show that emotions operate like intoxicants, or pathogens, imposing 
surd influences on consciousness?
I f  we consider the basis o f neurotic transference, we see that emotions do not 
operate like intoxicants in such cases. In transference it is not the case that past 
emotions act like surd physical influences perturbing the sensorium o f the agent 
in the way that the agent is perturbed by alcohol. Rather, older, more remote 
aspects o f one's personality operate like independent agents that exert a persuasive 
influence on one's here and now functioning self. For example, a fearful attitude 
that one learned as a child has such occurrent psychological force that it moves one 
in the here and now to fear what might not otherwise be frightening. One is not 
invaded by transference emotions, one is moved by transference emotions. The 
irrationality involved in transference is like the error involved in being persuaded 
by another person to accept their opinions about a situation rather than relying on
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
58
information that has primary perceptual warrant. But this type o f irrationality, in 
which one is persuaded by the charisma o f another rather than by one's own senses 
or rational argument, occurs just as easily for beliefs and actions as for emotions.
Certainly one can be persuaded to believe that a skin cream will take away 
wrinkles, and one can be persuaded to break a rule by a charismatic other, even 
when one's here and now belief system and code of action would have otherwise 
inhibited such belienaction.
The irrationality emotions can be subject to because o f their inertia is similar 
to akrasia, in which a person acts on reasons that are not her all considered reasons 
for action. In both cases the agent's attitudes appear to lack something in the way 
o f rationality. In chapter five I compare Davidson's account o f akrasia with 
emotional self-persuasion to show how in both cases there is a division in mental 
life, so that the person fails one important standard for rationality — internal 
coherence. But in such cases it is absurd to characterize such attitudes as 
anomalous from the standpoint o f the mental since such divisions instantiate 
psychological "laws," for example the "rules" o f persuasion on which rhetoric is 
based.
In summary, transference emotions do not involve reason being overcome by 
something surd, but rather one aspect o f  a person being seduced by another, 
hauntingly familiar aspect o f her psychological life. Transference emotions involve 
irrationality in that they create their own foci, but they do so in a way that cannot
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be incorporated into the pathogenicity model.
However, before we reject the pathogenicity model entirely, it might be argued 
that a better example than transference for emotions invading reason comes from 
overwhelming states o f  emotionality. Descartes uses the example o f the onrushing 
tiger to illustrate the way an external cause might set off a  chain o f events that 
intrude upon reason. I f  an overwhelming emotion is caused by a particular 
external determinant, can we necessarily infer that the agent is acted upon by her 
emotion?
Robert Gordon considers precisely this issue, and argues that even in the case 
o f  emotions like focused fear and embarrassment, which result from something 
having acted on the agent, the agent is not acted upon by her emotion:
It is a fallacy to infer, from the assumption that the term 'embarrassment' 
characterizes a person's state as a product o f something's having acted on 
him, that the resulting state - embarrassment - also acts on (much less 
'com es over' or 'overcomes') the person. It is similarly fallacious to infer 
that a second state of affairs, namely that o f his being embarrassed by S. 
also acts on or comes over him. One cannot properly draw the conclusion 
X [X=state o f  being embarrassed] is a state that acts on (a person) 
from either o f the following:
X is a state o f being acted on in a certain way 
X is a state produced by being acted on in a certain way.55
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This is a  consistent argument showing that even when an approaching tiger 
scares an agent, this does not entail that the state o f fear then acts upon the agent.
However, the pathogenicity model depends upon the idea that there is a 
physical cause o f the emotion which sets into motion a chain o f physical events 
that disturb reason. So a  Cartesian argument against Gordon would be as follows: 
the 'S ' that is invoiced here refers to the focus o f the emotion —the meaning o f the 
tiger-as-scary. But this 'S ' is not the real cause o f the emotion. The real cause is 
the tiger itself, whose movements set in motion a chain of physical events that has 
as its m ost proximal element the tiny movements o f the animal spirits in the pineal 
gland. And this chain o f  causes has no place for 'S ', the agent's grasp o f the tiger- 
as-frightening.
And while the Cartesian idea that the meaning o f the emotion is an 
epiphenomenon seems wrong, it turns out to be problematic to assert the opposite - 
- that the meaning of the event plays an essential causal role in the emotion 
occurrence. For to say that 'S ' is an efficient cause o f the emotion occurrence 
requires separating out the focus o f the emotion as a distinct event from the 
experience o f the emotion. But this contradicts our picture o f an emotion as an 
affect that is about an evaluative thought. That is, the evaluative thought registers 
by weighing on one in a particular way through an affective experience. Thus, 
while we do not have difficulty saying that certain intentional events cause other 
related events — for example, beliefs and desires cause actions, we cannot apply
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this model to the relation between evaluative judgm ent and affect within an 
emotion occurrence.56
It is clarifying to consider here a  less focused emotion than embarrassment or 
fear, like feeling sad. The focus o f  one's sadness, which might include all the 
heavy, disappointing aspects o f one's current life, registers a certain way via one's 
sad feelings. But if  we try to impose the language o f efficient causality on the 
relationship o f the evaluation 'S ', where 'S ' is "the disappointing world" to the 
emotion event o f sadness occurring,'X', we fall into error. For there is no 
independent event o f evaluating the world as disappointing that interacts causally 
with one's sadness in the way an event of believing interacts causally with an event 
o f  acting.
However, if we return to Descartes' pineal gland account we see that it is 
equally problematic to elide 'S' from the causal explanation o f the emotion. For 
to divide an emotion into a distinct event o f  detached perception — ie. the tiger 
approaching moves the animal spirits — and then an affective response, makes it 
impossible to characterize the experience as an emotion. Whereas a  belief and a 
desire are sufficient to explain an action, no simple addition o f belief, desire, and 
bodily feeling is sufficient to explain an emotion. I f  one believes a tiger is 
approaching, and that tigers are dangerous, and if one desires to avoid harm, then 
one will, barring other conflicting desires or beliefs, run away from the tiger. In 
such a case, one may also experience physiological symptoms that indicate a
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generalized state o f  arousal. But one need not be afraid o f the tiger. What, in 
addition to "nonevaluative" perception is needed to account for the occurrence of 
the fear event is a statement about how the perception weighs on the agent. To 
characterize the experience as fear, entails that one's focus 'S' on the tiger-as-scary 
registers in terms o f  feelings o f displeasure (including bodily feelings) in the face 
o f  the tiger. Thus, while we cannot argue that 'S ' is the cause of emotion 'X ,' 
if  we elide 'S ' from our causal account we cannot characterize the agent's reaction 
to an event o f tiger-approaching as fear.
This account of the grammatical structure o f emotions leads us to question how 
the pathogenicity model ever took hold in the first place: for i f ' X '  emotion event, 
is not an independent event from 'S ', than the passivity o f emotions cannot be 
pictured as the projection of an unruly idea, caused by the animal spirits, into 
reason: for neither 'S ', nor some detached movement which "projects" itself as 'S ' 
can be the efficient cause o f 'X ' on the mechanical model. But once this model 
is rejected it becomes impossible to understand what sense the very notion of 
pathogenicity makes: how can we understand any physical cause as explaining an 
emotion? And this unclarity in the notion of 'cause' cannot be solved by saying 
that mental events that interact causally with physical events are also physical 
events, so that the real reason for mental event 'Y 's' occurrence will be the same 
event as the physical event causing 'Y .'57 For, as we showed above, the 
motivating mental event that is essential to the explanation o f the occurrence o f an
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emotion is not an independent event from the occurrence o f the emotion. And 
there is no way to capture the idea of the person being acted on by 'S' in the 
language o f efficient causality alone.
In summary, the passivity o f emotions is an essential grammatical feature that 
differentiates the way we explain emotions from the way we explain other mental 
events like beliefs and actions. A unique and defining feature o f emotions is that 
they involve the experience o f being acted on by the something that they are about. 
Yet if  one tries to translate this experience into a mechanistic causal claim, one 
falls into error, because the focus o f the emotion is not an independent event from 
the emotion occurrence.
Let us reject the Cartesian counterargument to Gordon, which depends upon 
divorcing the focus o f the emotion 'S ' from the cause o f the emotion, because 
ultimately it cannot ground itself in a comprehensible account o f the causal 
structure o f  emotions. So we can accept Gordon's argument as it stands. Thus the 
Cartesian assumption that the passivity o f the emotions entails the passivity o f 
reason with respect to emotions is false. And we have already rejected the 
Cartesian picture o f emotions as intoxicants that perpetuate the anomalousness o f 
res extensa in the realm o f res cogitans. We can therefore put to rest the Cartesian 
worry that emotions act upon/overcome reason, that is at the core o f the ideal o f 
"detached concern."
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
64
III The Problem o f Arationality: Do Emotions Disclose Reality?
Let us now address the second Cartesian worry: that emotions are essentially 
arational because they cannot conform to the ideal o f objectivity. Descartes gold 
standard for knowledge is the "clear and distinct" ideas o f the cogito and 
mathematical principles. These two very different types of ideas are both non- 
empirical intuitions; they are standards o f  truth because they can be held free from 
doubt given the thinkers direct access both to his own thinking and to mathematical 
propositions. The direct apprehension o f  the truth o f  mathematical principles for 
us qua thinking substance cannot be achieved for knowledge o f nature.
Knowledge o f nature is based upon putting mathematics to work to build 
mechanical models. We can build models o f nature because there is, divinely 
guaranteed, a correspondence between our intuition of extension (mathematical 
knowledge), and the form o f nature, insofar as all o f nature has extension, or 
spatial being. In order to ensure that such models are trustworthy we need to build 
these models from irreducible building blocks, invoking only efficient causal 
connections. Only mechanistic models will allow for certainty, because only 
predictions that are based on mathematical principles alone will be unassailable 
from  later vantage points in time and will allow our knowledge o f reality to 
progress. However, even so, Descartes says that the divine guarantee is not one 
o f an absolute correspondence between our mechanistic models o f reality and
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reality. Rather, our models o f nature can only allow us to make accurate 
predictions about the workings o f nature.
Thus, Descartes envisions two kinds of knowledge o f reality, direct intuitive 
knowledge o f  res cogitans and res extensa, and indirect knowledge o f  nature via 
mechanical models. The goal o f fitting the workings o f nature into the form of 
thought (pure mathematical intuition), and the inevitable gap between intuitive and 
empirical knowledge gives rise to the ideal o f objectivity. The ideal o f objectivity 
is an extension of the ideal o f indubitability that replaces the coincidence of 
knower and known with the ideal o f  an aperspectival grasp o f nature secured by 
the coincidence of the method of applying mathematical models and the 
measurability o f nature. Note that the conception o f an aperspectival apprehension 
o f  reality is unnecessary for intuitive knowledge; it makes no sense to think of 
ideas like the cogito in which the object of thought is fully given to itself, as 
aperspectival or perspectival. Rather, the ideal o f the aperspectival observer 
presupposes a  gap between the knower and the known so that a correct approach 
for apprehending reality fully is needed in the first place. Thus the idea of an 
aperspectival grasp o f reality already presupposes the problem of alternative 
perspectives, o f seeing things otherwise, which does not arise for the indubitable 
clear and distinct ideas.58
The transition from the intuitive knowledge of the clear and distinct ideas to 
building models o f nature therefore involves a subtle shift from secure knowledge
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o f reality to secure knowledge of our models o f reality. This shift becomes 
apparent in Descartes' later writings as he points out the problem that the indefinite 
complexity o f nature poses for the human knower. Karsten Harries uses Descartes 
example o f two clocks to make the point that for Descartes our ability to build 
models that predict natural occurrences "need not mean that the real causes have 
been understood; indeed, given the infinite divisibility o f matter it is very unlikely 
that our finite models will ever allow us to duplicate nature's processes."59 
Descartes writes...
For just as the same artisan can make two clocks which indicate the hours 
equally well and are exactly similar externally, but are internally composed 
o f  an entirely dissimilar combination o f small wheels; so there is no doubt 
that the greatest artificer o f things could have made all those things which 
we see in many diverse ways. And indeed I most willingly concede this to 
be true, and will think that I have achieved enough if  those things which I 
have written are only such that they correspond accurately to all phenomena 
o f nature.60
Descartes' awareness that the being o f nature somehow escapes our 
mechanical models is revealed most o f all in his discussion of the emotions. We 
have already pointed out that emotions involve propositions about our experience 
in the world as part o f nature, and thus cannot be composed only o f clear and 
distinct ideas, which are non-empirical intuitions. But neither is Descartes' account
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of emotion occurrences in terms o f the workings o f the pineal gland a mechanical 
model o f  emotion, as is often supposed. Descartes' choice o f terms here - the 
animal spirits are bodies o f "extreme minuteness" that are "indefinitely" small - 
recalls his language in discussing the related problem o f saying that God is his own 
efficient cause. In a response to Arnauld's objections to his conception o f God, 
Descartes says that "intermediate between efficient cause in the proper sense, and 
no cause, there is something else, viz. the positive essence o f a thing, to which the 
concept o f efficient cause can be extended in the way in which ... the concept o f 
a rectilinear polygon with an infinite number o f sides [can be extended] to that o f 
a circle."61 Just as the indeterminacy of the model o f the infinite polygon invites 
us to think o f the coincidence o f the polygon and the circle, God as in existence, 
and as the creator o f God's existence, the indeterminacy o f the movements o f the 
animal spirits as bodies moving the soul, invites us to think of the coincidence of 
body and soul. But while we are free to think this coincidence, we cannot 
adequately conceptualize it, ie. build a mechanical model o f this interaction.
This inadequacy poses a major threat to Descartes' ontology, which moves 
beyond the threat to his epistemology posed by the example o f the two clocks. It 
might appear that as science progresses one could develop more sensitive ways of 
ascertaining the real causes o f the workings of the clock. But the very concept of 
cause cannot be understood as connecting res cogitans and res extensa, as their 
interaction in the pineal gland demands. So the pineal gland account, far from
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explaining the workings o f emotions in nature, points to the inadequacy o f any 
mechanical explanations for accounting for the existence o f emotions.
Descartes thus faces the dilemma o f failing to explain emotions or 
acknowledging the inadequacy either o f his method for objective knowledge of 
reality, or o f his ontology. His solution is to preserve his conception o f objectivity 
but to challenge his own ontology by affirming the subjective reality o f emotional 
experience while denying that emotions represent things as they really are. In a 
letter written in 1643, he modifies the list o f the basic building blocks of 
knowledge he had defined in The Rules (1628). In The Rules he argued that only 
notions that could be grasped with certainty by the reflective thinker could be the 
basis o f  true knowledge: number, extension, and the cogito are examples o f such 
transparent sources o f information. But in 1643 he adds to this list a new simple, 
which is rooted in embodied experience:
Finally, as regards soul and body together, we have only the notion o f their 
union on which depends our notion o f the soul's power to move the body, 
and the body's power to act on the soul and cause sensations and passions.62 
As a  direct challenge to a strictly dualist ontology, Descartes says that it is 
unscientific to attempt to explain the experiential union of soul and body in 
extensional or cognitive terms.
Yet, Descartes is forced by his attribution o f reality to emotions and his 
conviction that we can only know those aspects o f nature that can be modeled
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mechanically to acknowledge the finitude o f human knowledge of reality. He says 
that even though this experiential knowledge of the passions is "fully" given to us 
in a dependable fashion, such experiences:
do not have an objective reality to which a formal reality must correspond. 
Real as modifications of consciousness, they are not otherwise res. A part 
o f my composite nature, outside o f which they have no reality, for they are 
the result o f it. the divine guarantee works only in the sense that as 
teachings o f nature they constitute a pragmatic guide to the needs o f the 
composite being, If  the union were not real or substantial this role could 
not be efficaciously fulfilled.63 
Here we see that even when Descartes fully acknowledges the reality o f emotional 
experience for human beings, he rejects the idea that emotions are sources o f 
knowledge o f things as they really are. Rather, he argues that the modifications 
o f  consciousness involved in emotion are merely the result o f the composite nature 
o f human beings. The implicit thought here is that knowing things as they really 
are requires approximating a divine standpoint, free o f all bodily and social 
determinants. Descartes adherence to the ideal o f objectivity here causes a rupture 
in his ontology between 'subjective' and 'objective' reality.
We can now explain the generalized Cartesian claim that the arationality o f 
emotions is based on their "subjectivity." The kind of "subjectivity" that Descartes 
takes to exclude rationality is not based simply on agent-relativity. The problem
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with emotions is not that they must be experienced by someone; for all perception 
is subject-relative in this sense: seeing presupposes eyes, hearing presupposes ears, 
etc. And perception is not only contingently agent-relative in the sense that all 
thoughts, including thoughts about mathematics, must be had by someone. Rather, 
the information involved in perception is relative to the experiencing subject. That 
is, whereas the thinking that contributes to mathematics is unrelated to the situation 
o f  the thinker, perceptual information always incorporates this situation: seeing is 
from an angle, at a certain distance, static or changing with the agent's movements. 
And touch and taste and smell are even more agent-relative. Yet Descartes takes 
perception to provide true knowledge o f reality, when it conforms to certain 
criteria. This is because, the validity o f the information derived from perception 
and proprioception is based on a correspondence between the cause o f the 
perception and the object o f the perception. And this correspondence can be 
ensured by evaluating perception according to a standard or measure that is itself 
aperspectival. That is, true knowledge o f the location of body parts, and of the 
dimensions o f physical objects, is available through scientific measurement. We 
can build mechanical models to predict the interactions o f body parts and other 
physical objects. Thus, while perception can be faulty and proprioception can lead 
one astray, these sources o f information are always testable and correctable by 
scientific reasoning, and thus need not be taken to be impediments to knowledge. 
But there could be no such standard to serve as a measure for emotional
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information. There is no entity that transcends temporal, embodied human 
experience that corresponds to the intentional object o f emotional experience.
In summary, Descartes' claim that emotions provide a pragmatic guide to the 
needs o f  composite human beings does not imply that emotions contribute to 
rational agency. For Descartes rational propositions are those that an objective 
knower would assent to. By attributing to emotional experience only a 'subjective' 
reality Descartes is affirming the reality o f emotional experience while denying that 
emotional propositions have representational rationality. Emotions are real effects 
o f  our com posite being; but qua evaluations they are epiphenomena that have no 
genuine objects in the real world. Thus, although emotions have adaptive 
rationality in that they are useful for our composite beings, they are inessential for 
rational agency in the full-blooded sense.
IV The Essential Role o f Emotions in Rational Agency
In this last section I will argue that although emotional judgments cannot 
provide objective knowledge o f reality, emotions are essential for apprehending 
reality. First, I show that Descartes goal o f securing knowledge o f reality against 
the arbitrariness of the human knower cannot succeed; I then show that his 
reduction o f reality to what can be objectively known elides the representation of 
human beings. Given the Cartesian equation o f  rationality with the ideal of
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openness to all further evidence, it is therefore irrational to overlook the 
representational rationality o f emotions.64
The goal o f securing knowledge o f reality from the arbitrariness o f  human 
interests is at the heart o f the ideal o f  "detached concern." Physicians worry that 
i f  their rational understanding o f the patient is guided by their emotions, then they 
will be arbitrary in what they attend to. For example, the doctor whose insights 
into the patient's attitudes are guided by empathy may very well miss the forest for 
the trees because o f a preoccupation with some irrelevant part o f the patient's story, 
or a blindness to the significance o f some other part o f  the story. The paradigm 
o f  "detached concern" posits that such arbitrariness must be eliminated by adhering 
to a method o f inquiry that does not depend upon the attitudes o f the observer in 
any way.
A Cartesian (and as we soon discuss, a Kantian) views reason as self-sufficient 
not in the sense o f providing its own content but in the sense o f directing itself. 
That is, reason may need to make use o f other faculties, most notably sensation, 
but it alone directs inquiry. To the degree that emotions direct one's attention, they 
enforce an arbitrary order on reason, which cannot be trusted to provide the proper 
access to reality. One hears echoed in this view the Platonic notion o f desires 
projecting their ends onto practical reason from below, from the animal part of 
one's nature. The idea is that emotions seek their own ends, and these ends are 
inessential to reason, and thus untrustworthy paths to information about reality.
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The rationalistic assumption o f the Cartesian view is that our very attention to 
reality could be determined by logical rules alone. But this assumption is called 
into question by philosophers as different as de Sousa and Heidegger, who show 
that the so-called arbitrariness o f emotion is a feature o f human inquiry in general. 
De Sousa does not dispute the Cartesian observation that emotions introduce non- 
rational determinants into human inquiry, but rather views this phenomenon in light 
o f  a different anthropology than that o f Descartes. De Sousa takes emotions to 
play an essential role within the economy of higher cognitive beings, rather than 
to be a carry over o f the "animal" part of our being. In fact, de Sousa argues that 
less cognitively complex beings, call them ant-machines, could get along perfectly 
well without emotions, because they have a finite range o f concrete interests/ a 
finite 'world' in which their beliefs, desires and actions could be utterly determined 
by external rules.65
In contrast to ant-machines, beings o f our cognitive complexity, who have an 
infinite range o f possible interests, must determine what is salient to their situation 
among an infinite set o f inferences they could be making. According to de Sousa 
it would be impossible for such beings to think or act efficaciously unless there 
was something guiding and maintaining their attention appropriately. De Sousa 
takes the role o f emotions in rational agency to be the focusing and maintenance 
o f motivated attention. He says that emotions "determine salience," they 
encapsulate experience into organized patterns o f importance for the agent. De
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
74
Sousa argues that there is no non-affective mental activity that can substitute for 
emotions in this regard. His argument is based on a version o f the "philosopher's 
fram e problem," as described in an example by Daniel Dennett: a robot knows 
everything about bombs and airplanes, and has all the appropriate intentions to 
preserve itself, when it is informed that it is in an airplane that has a  bomb on it 
that is about to blow up. The robot decides to leave the airplane, but in fact the 
bomb is on the robot's own wagon, a fact the robot had stored away, but "it had 
not 'thought' to draw the inference."66 When the robot's designers then instruct it 
to draw the consequences o f what it knows, it is busy deducing that "pulling the 
wagon out o f  the room would not change the price o f tea in China" when the 
bomb explodes. When the designers tell the robot only to deduce what is relevant 
to it, the robot is busy ignoring thousands o f irrelevant implications when the bomb 
again explodes.67 Without fear the robot would have no non-random reason to 
organize its approach in such a way as to prioritize and act on the relevant 
knowledge needed to serve its given goal o f preserving itself.
De Sousa emphasizes that the "philosopher's frame problem" is not the problem 
o f  induction; the issue is not which inferences are valid, but rather, before making 
any inferences, what clusters o f information will be relevant in the first place. He 
argues that for cognitively complex beings, knowledge of reality presupposes 
selectively attending to some things rather than others; but "no logic determines 
salience: what to notice, what to attend to, what to inquire about."68 And de Sousa
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points out that this problem o f what to pay attention to is a problem both for 
factual knowledge and for choosing strategies o f  action given one's complex set o f 
existing desires. De Sousa points out, for example, the insufficiency o f  Bayesian 
decision theory for directing action. Bayesian theory dictates "maximize expected 
gain." Thus, according to this theory, "a fair bet is equivalent to no bet at all." 
But there is a  meaningful difference between minimizing one's losses (by not 
betting) and maximizing one's gains (by betting). De Sousa acknowledges that an 
additional principle could describe this difference; but his point is that this 
additional principle could not "be dictated by rationality alone."69
In contrast to the robot and the Bayesian gambler, affective beings have 
resources to handle dilemmas o f this sort. Fear will certainly give one the 
directedness to flee a life-threatening situation; and attitudes like boldness and 
timidity will influence one to gamble or not to gamble. This leads de Sousa to put 
forth the hypothesis that "emotions are species o f  determinate patterns o f  salience 
among objects o f attention, lines o f inquiry, and inferential strategies."70
De Sousa's view o f emotions as encapsulating reality into quanta in the way 
perceptions encapsulate sensory experience is appealing, but invokes the 
problematic language o f mechanisms. But de Sousa is using perception as a 
metaphor. He says that emotions imitate the encapsulation o f perceptual modes.
I turn to Heidegger for a deeper and more radical account o f emotions as 
determining attention , which allows us to understand the metaphor o f perception
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non-mechanistically.
Heidegger argues that all knowing presupposes attending, and that attention 
originates in being in a 'm ood'.71 Second, Heidegger challenges the Cartesian 
reliance on the visual model of the knower as a subject observing an object that 
is before her. These two developments in Heidegger's thought make it possible for 
Heidegger to offer a radical critique o f the Cartesian project o f  purifying 
knowledge o f reality from the arbitrariness of human existence.
Heidegger emphasizes that affectivity, which he refers to as being-in-a-mood 
or having a state-of-mind, is a constitutive feature o f human being in the world. 
In direct opposition to the Cartesian premise that thought is independent o f 
affectivity, he states that even "undisturbed equanimity" is an affective attitude, or 
mood. Heidegger also notes that apparently "pallid" states in which one seems to 
lack feelings for anything are in fact conditions in which one feels burdened by, 
or uncomfortable about the oppressive details o f one's day to say existence; such 
a  mood is the basis o f the possibility o f experiencing the opposing mood of joy 
when one feels free o f the burdensome character o f existence.72 Heidegger's point 
here is well supported by the common observation that depressed persons do not 
always feel sad or anxious, but often feel "flat," with an awareness o f the 
burdensomeness of getting through the moments o f  the day; recovery is often noted 
by the observation that the events o f  the day are flowing together again, without 
the awful weightiness o f time on one's hands.
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Heidegger's general claim is that "when we master a mood, we do so by way 
of a counter-mood; we are never free o f moods."73 In contrast to the Cartesian 
picture o f the passions as disrupting consciousness, Heidegger views the continuity 
o f consciousness as the ebbing and flowing of one mood into another; the cessation 
o f mood altogether is the cessation of consciousness. "The fact that moods can 
deteriorate and change over means simply that in every case Dasein always has 
some mood."74
Heidegger's conception o f the function of moods in human existence is close 
to de Sousa's. Both take moods/emotions to be the primary basis o f encountering 
oneself-in-a-world, where "world" has the significance o f an organized field o f 
interests, as in the ordinary language use o f the term "world" to refer for example 
to the world o f baseball. Heidegger says that "mood is a primordial kind o f Being 
for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, 
and beyond their range of disclosure 75
Let us consider what Heidegger means by the priority o f mood, and contrast 
this notion with de Sousa's idea that human beings would lack direction for thought 
and action without emotional attitudes steering their attention. Whereas de Sousa 
comes to his notion of emotions as encapsulating reality by way of the analogy of 
perception, and especially the analogy of vision, Heidegger makes it clear that he 
does not see the disclosive function o f moods as comparable to the perceiving of 
reality by a subject beholding an object. The metaphor o f  the subject looking at
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an object, s— o, is entirely misleading when applied to the role o f moods in 
determining conscious life; in fact, it is to avoid and undermine this metaphor that 
Heidegger explores the phenomenon of affectivity.
There are several aspects o f the s— o metaphor that Heidegger challenges in 
his discussion o f mood. First, there is the idea that a  mood is equivalent to a 
psychical condition o f the subject. De Sousa moves beyond the view that emotions 
are inside someone's head, by integrating the embodied aspect o f emotion with the 
intentional aspect o f emotion. However he still takes the significance of the 
emotion to derive from the experiences o f a  particular historic, embodied subject. 
For de Sousa the possibility o f emotional communication presupposes that the 
affective meaning residing in one individual conveys messages to other individuals 
who then may or may not take on embodied affects o f their own. This Cartesian 
atomism is hard to overcome insofar as physiological occurrences are essential to 
emotional occurrences, and individual bodies underlie physiological events. But 
as we have seen, there is an insufficiency in pointing to the occurrence of 
physiological events to explain the occurrence of the emotion. And most 
importantly the resonance between persons manifested in "shared" emotions in 
clinical empathy, the effects o f rhetoric, the placebo affect, love poetry, etc. cannot 
be explained using an atomistic event model o f emotion. This suggests that it is 
one-sided to see emotional experience as originating in the psychical or even 
psychophysical condition of a subject.
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Rather than taking emotions to reside in the subject, Heidegger views the 
subjectivity o f the person as residing in the emotion, or mood. That is, Heidegger 
first rejects the idea that a person exists in the world in the way that an entity 
exists inside a room. Human beings are not mere things, and no thing could be 
equivalent to a human world. Rather, the very possibility o f consciousness, of a 
reality for a  subject, undermines the possibility o f understanding the world as a 
mere collection o f things. For the mode o f disclosure o f  reality for human beings 
presupposes the problem that human beings are not only here in the world, present 
in the way that entities are present; for reality to be disclosed presupposes that 
human beings are also there, ahead o f themselves, directed outward spatially and 
towards the future. And the very spatial and temporal structure o f experience, the 
gap between near and far others, and the temporal gap towards near and far 
projects, changes with changes in mood. For example, in fear, the scary thing is 
both very near, and yet not certain to occur, ie., it has essential spatial and 
temporal significance.
By taking mood to be prior to cognition and action, Heidegger is equating the 
experience o f  mood with the basic structure o f human existence as being "there" 
in the world.76 First and foremost, human beings find themselves in a world of 
near and far others and things, which draw them in and repel them. Certainly, an 
aspect o f the world one is "thrown" into from the start is one's own vital body. 
But just as one's own physical pain and pleasure is o f immediate significance to
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one, so is the smile o f another person, the threatening thunder and lightening of a 
storm. The key notion is that these things are given to us at a similar level of 
proximity. The world is disclosed expressively, and the different styles of 
expression are what Heidegger means by mood. Thus Heidegger posits that prior 
to any act o f perception or standing over and against the world, being-in-the-world, 
ie. occupying certain configurations of relations with others and projects, with a 
certain style, is what is involved in being-in-a-mood.
Heidegger's conception o f mood undermines the Cartesian visual metaphor s— 
o for emotion, and with it the equation o f emotion in general with "projection." 
The Cartesian s— o model o f cognition presupposes that intuitive knowledge of our 
own ideas is independent o f our knowledge o f the world. One builds from one's 
intuitions, mathematical models o f the external world qua extended substance. As 
the example o f the clockmaker shows, Descartes holds a correspondence theory. 
The way we build our models may not be the way God has actually produced the 
external world, but we can know without doubt the contents o f our own mind and 
thus our mentally constructed models o f nature. This presupposes that there are 
indubitable subjective experiences, ie. clear and distinct perceptions, which are 
transparent to the subject, and thus provide a basis for penetrating the opacity o f 
the external world.
Heidegger's model undermines the primacy o f introspection for encountering 
reality. Heidegger points out that "only because the 'there' has already been
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disclosed in a state-of-mind [mood] can immanent reflection come across 
[psychical] 'experiences' at all."77 Heidegger’s claim that mood is a style o f being- 
in-the-world means precisely that mood cannot be originally a psychical state of 
a subject standing apart from, and looking at, a world.
The strength o f Heidegger's account resides not only in rethinking the notion 
o f subjectivity but even more in rethinking the notion of the world as an affective 
world. Heidegger says:
Having a mood is not related to the psychical in the first instance, and is not 
an inner condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatic way and puts 
its mark on things and persons.78 
Heidegger's use o f the term "enigmatic" is especially important here. The affective 
significance o f things in the world remains mysterious when affects are understood 
according to the s—o model. That is, the Cartesian s—o model presupposes that 
there is a human structural configuration in the world — a practical reality o f being 
"there" that is independent o f affectivity. This assumption, which plays a crucial 
role in the Sartrean account of emotions, given Sartre's adherence to the Cartesian 
s— o visual paradigm, has been labeled by Joseph Fell "the two-world 
hypothesis."79 The idea is that one could negotiate the social world independently 
o f  affectivity.80 For Sartre, emotions are "magical" precisely because they are 
subjective projections in which one remakes the world in one's own terms, rather 
than negotiating the world in a strictly rational, efficacious fashion. Consider the
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background assumption o f a typical Sartrean account o f  an emotion: in fear o f a 
scary face in the window one may faint, thus "removing" the scary threat. The 
background assumption is that whereas one has "acted" in one's emotional "world," 
in the world o f  efficacious relations with objects, one has done nothing to protect 
oneself from the potential assailant. There is a radical discontinuity between the 
two worlds o f affectivity and efficacy.81
We have already indicated a major weakness o f the "two-world hypothesis" in 
our criticism o f  the Sartrean account of emotions. I f  emotional qualities are 
subjective projections onto situations that could be viewed in some non-affective 
way, than it seems there are no reasons for certain qualities to be attributed to 
certain situations. But then how can we account for the typicality o f emotion, for 
the fact that human beings have typical responses to being touched, falling ill, 
having children, etc.? How can we account for the style o f a thunder-storm as 
characteristically scary, and the style o f an infant as characteristically adorable (a 
problem Sartre sought to explain)? If  one retains the Cartesian s—o visual 
metaphor for emotional apperception o f reality, one cannot help but attribute to the 
subject the activity o f bestowing affective meaning on the world. But Heidegger 
contrasts this notion o f bestowing affective qualities onto reality with the notion 
o f an originally affective world structure, prior to egological affectivity. The 
Heideggerian notion that affectivity arises first in the actual style o f human being- 
in-the-world, the way human beings move and respond to each other and things,
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rather than in subjective ideas, helps us escape the "projection" metaphor that is 
at the heart of Descartes' view o f emotions.
In using Heidegger to deepen our understanding of de Sousa's idea that 
emotions determine salience we face the following gaps between the two 
conceptions. De Sousa's analogy o f perception for emotion brings us to envision 
persons as depending upon their emotions to sense the humanly relevant features 
of situations. Heidegger leaves us with the more radical idea that affectivity is the 
material out o f which relevance is built in the first place. Heidegger emphasizes 
that the possibility o f anything mattering at all depends upon the condition o f 
human being as being-in-a-mood. This point is often misunderstood as an overly 
idealistic claim about human experience that ignores the material, bodily facts o f 
human life. But such an interpretation misses the point that Heidegger's argument 
is operating at a  very different level from an account like de Sousa's. De Sousa's 
claim is a teleological claim about the actual species, human being. Heidegger's 
claim is an analytic claim about what is essential to Being, rather than what is 
characteristic o f human beings. Heidegger is not making the unpalatable claim 
that all the material configurations o f beings in the world depend upon affectivity. 
Rather, Heidegger's point is that it is only because human beings find themselves 
in a world rich with expressive meaning that anything can matter at all. The world 
moves us, and we can therefore express emotion.82
Heidegger offers a radical critique o f the Cartesian ideal o f eliding arbitrariness
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from knowledge o f reality. Heidegger's claim is that the very possibility o f 
conceptual knowledge presupposes an affective way o f  being towards things that 
involves directing one's attention. But this should not be interpreted simplistically 
to mean that any singular emotion occurrence could determine salience, as de 
Sousa seems to imply in his account. Rather, determining salience involves not 
only directing one's attention, but maintaining possibilities beyond one's given 
direction, that will be the basis o f future directions. An auditory metaphor is more 
useful than a visual one here: one must not only attend to the theme at hand but 
must anticipate future themes as they are foreshadowed, and must recognize 
patterns o f recurrence. Far from viewing mood as a  mechanistic way of 
encapsulating information, Heidegger views mood as an indication o f  the human 
condition. The problem o f having to determine salience prior to being able to 
define things ostensivelv and know things as matters o f  fact reveals the fact of 
human freedom. Heidegger says that man is the being whose being is in question. 
He means that human beings must determine what matters in the world by what 
they attend to, and what they do.
Thus, while the occurrence of emotions may be considered arbitrary in the 
sense that such occurrences are prior to deliberation, they are not arbitrary in the 
sense o f  meaningless. Rather the very arbitrariness or openness of human attention 
and the necessity o f affect for responding to this openness by "clearing" a space 
for particular projects are necessary conditions for the possibility o f human
0
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know ledge.
Our detour into Heidegger was meant to deepen and substantiate the idea that 
emotions are essential for determining salience, and to undermine the Cartesian 
hope that human knowers could ever overcome the "arbitrariness" o f human 
knowledge. By linking knowledge to interested activity in the world, Heidegger 
undermines the divorce o f representational from adaptive rationality that is the 
basis o f Descartes view of emotions as arational.83
We have rejected the Cartesian goals of eliminating the arbitrariness o f the 
human knower from knowledge of reality, and of divorcing representational from 
adaptive rationality. But this does not entail that emotions yield knowledge of an 
objective state o f affairs. Descartes correctly saw that unlike non-affective 
perception and reasoning, emotional "judgments" could not fit into his scientific 
world-picture. This problem is very significant for physicians, because the 
essential elements o f Descartes world-picture remain the pillars o f current medical 
science -- the assumption that all events can be explained within an efficient causal 
framework, and the assumption that these interactions could be modeled 
mathematically. Now, as then, the scariness o f a tiger cannot be captured by any 
aperspectival representation. Even the most universalizable affective objects, like 
the warmth and security represented by a mother and child, the erotic feelings 
represented by two lovers, the threat represented by an angry face are concepts that 
cannot be divorced from their social origins. Bernard Williams calls moral notions
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like honesty and courage that are semantically embedded in their social origins 
"thick concepts."84 Their meaning cannot be divorced from the specificity of 
human cultures and human values, even though such representations are so 
essential to the idea o f humanity that we cannot think "human being" without 
apprehending these emotional objects. The point is that we cannot speak sensibly 
o f an aperspectival view of such objects, precisely because in a world without 
human values, these emotional objects are meaningless.
If, as Descartes claims, we cannot speak sensibly o f an aperspectival view of 
the objects o f emotional experience, is it rational to exclude emotional evaluations 
as trustworthy sources of knowledge o f reality? I argue in chapter four on 
empathy that our own emotions are essential for revealing other people's emotions 
to us. Descartes' account allows a place for empathy as a kind of pragmatic 
experience, but excludes the possibility that empathy is genuinely revealing. Thus 
Descartes forces us into a peculiar affective solipsism. Instead of accepting this 
bizarre conclusion, w e might say that it is because our empathic emotions reveal 
the affective lives o f  others that they help us function adaptively in the human 
world. The essential role o f our own emotions in revealing the existence and 
nature o f emotions in others entails that emotions are essential to rationality in the 
full-blooded sense o f  openness to things as they really are.
The problem o f explaining emotions reveals a tension between the concepts o f 
rationality and objectivity that Descartes bequeathed us. For Descartes, the only
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way to judge our perceptions of reality as rational is to give objective explanations 
o f  why we see things as we do. For example, the perspectival phenomena of 
vision become trustworthy insofar as there can be an aperspectival account of 
vision that includes an explanation o f  perspective and its limits -- the science o f 
optics.85
We have opposed this tight linkage o f rationality with objectivity by arguing 
that all knowing presupposes human interests/ being-in-a-mood. But this does not 
mean that we can give an alternative conception o f rationality that does not include 
some notion o f transparency — o f openness to all further evidence. Although, as 
I discussed in chapter one, we appraise emotions to some degree the way we 
appraise values, we cannot judge the rationality o f  emotions without also 
considering whether the agent's perspective in the emotion is sufficiently open to 
things as they really are. So for example we cannot assess whether X's fear o f Y 
is rational without considering whether, from some alternative perspective, free o f 
X's biases, there is independent evidence that Y is dangerous. Thus even though 
the representational rationality o f an emotion cannot be grounded in the ideal o f 
objectivity, it is still guided by an ideal o f openness to further evidence that is 
haunted by the wish for transparency.
In summary, the picture o f emotions as pathogens is still influential in medical 
practice today because Descartes' basic assumptions are largely unchallenged: the 
belief that human nature can be understood scientifically and the belief that a
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scientific explanation could be framed in the language o f efficient causality alone. 
Thus the wish to make knowledge o f reality transparent exerts a  totalitarian force 
that excludes important aspects o f reality, like the emotional lives o f other persons. 
But we have seen that this picture o f rationality fails to be guided by an ideal o f 
openness to further evidence, and is thus itself irrational. We can therefore reject 
Descartes' reduction of our knowledge o f reality to what can be modeled 
mechanistically, and with it his conception o f emotions as inessential to rationality. 
I turn now to the other pillar o f the ideal o f "detached concern," the Kantian 
conception of the impartial moral agent.
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Chapter Three: On Kantian Impartiality
In response to the reductionistic approach to patients in current medical 
practice, physicians and patients have turned to ethics to restore what is missing. 
The prevalent ideal in medical ethics discussions is the Kantian concept o f an 
impartial duty to respect patients "as persons," to treat them as "ends-in- 
themselves."86 The idea is that the physician is to have a duty-based commitment 
to act in light o f the patient's "subjective" ends as well as a commitment to the 
objective task o f repairing the body.87
The ideal o f respecting patients' own choices and preferences contrasts with the 
possibility o f using patients for projects that are not their own, ie. treating them 
manipulatively. The suitability o f this ideal for concrete medical practice is 
apparent when one considers the opportunity physicians have to treat patients as 
means to other ends. Physicians are keepers o f esoteric, sought after knowledge 
and skills that give them power in society. And they are trusted to invade bodies 
and minds, and to make life and death decisions for other people. The ideal of 
respecting patients as "ends-in-themselves" directs physicians to promote the 
concrete ends o f patients, and not merely to use patients as "material" for 
physicians' own projects. Given that such projects can range from selfish financial 
gain, to attaining scientific knowledge, to promoting the health o f society, as the 
physician sees it. the ideal o f respecting the ends o f the patient curbs not only
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greed but also benevolent paternalism.
Kant's emphasis on the impartiality of the moral agent, whose duty to respect 
patients is not based in personal ties, has made his views particularly relevant to 
physicians today. However, in equating impartiality with affective detachment, 
physicians both oversimplify Kant's conception of moral agency and overlook the 
particular duties physicians have to recognize and respond to suffering persons. 
In this chapter, I will take a closer look at the Kantian conception in order to 
distinguish the concept o f acting from an impartial sense o f duty from the picture 
o f the detached or impersonal moral agent.88
According to a traditional reading o f Kant, acting from duty requires detaching 
oneself from all affective motives. The commitment to respecting persons as 
persons is taken to follow from principles o f reason, rather than from affective 
responses to particular persons. The traditional Kantian conception supports the 
ideal o f "detached concern" because detachment from affective, historical 
relationships to other persons is taken to be both necessary and sufficient for 
respecting persons as "ends in themselves." But I will show that the idea that 
respect for others is duty-based, hence impartial, does not entail the detachment of 
the moral agent.
The traditional reading o f  Kant is currently being challenged by revisionists 
who aim to show that sympathetic emotions are compatible with, and even valued 
within, Kantian moral theory. In the second part o f this chapter I turn to Barbara
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Herman, Onora O'Neil and Marcia Baron to challenge the traditional idea that 
acting from duty, in a Kantian sense, requires detachment from sympathetic 
emotions. However, the revisionists do not fully overcome the equation o f 
impartiality with impersonality insofar as they retain the idea that rational reflection 
alone is "sufficient" for morality. I argue that to the degree that the revisionist 
account retains this idea o f reason's "sufficiency," it loses its appeal as an account 
o f how moral motivation can be an integrated aspect o f the agent's overall 
personality. But to the degree the revisionists take the agent's formal commitment 
to other persons to be derived from her affective, historical relationships with 
others, they leave behind the core Kantian idea o f pure practical reason: the idea 
that there is one reason with one sets o f  ends (universality and consistency) that 
rules in both the theoretical and practical sphere. I therefore argue that the Kantian 
ideal o f  impartiality is separable from the Kantian notion of pure practical reason, 
and that the former but not the latter is useful for medical practice.
I The Conflation o f  Impartiality and Impersonality in Medicine
The Kantian conception of respect for persons is well-suited to the medical 
profession because it expresses the ideal o f an impartial or duty-based response to 
all persons. Physicians are expected to have a role-related commitment to respect 
anyone who is their patient, even if they do not approve o f his or her behavior or
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attitudes. There are two aspects of this expectation: first, it is presupposed that 
there is some formal property of persons as persons, or as suffering persons 
(patients) that can merit this respect; second, the physician's respect for patients 
is taken to be duty-based, and thus required, rather than an optional, though 
fortunate, occurrence.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "impartiality" as "freedom from 
prejudice or bias; fairness." This definition does not refer to detachment. While 
the ideal o f an impartial judge brings to mind the picture of a detached thinker, this 
follows from certain assumptions of legal theory, rather than from the definition 
o f  impartiality. The concept o f impartiality is also used in contexts w here a 
detached attitude would be inappropriate. For example, a parent can strive to be 
impartial in the treatment o f all o f her children. She may be free o f bias, and fair, 
yet passionately concerned about each o f  them. The parent can be understood as 
caring for her children because they are her children, and thus in virtue o f  a 
formal, duty-based commitment to them. (However, we would have concerns 
about the adequacy o f the moral perspective o f a  parent whose care for her 
children was only out o f a sense o f duty; I address a  case of a  spouse having this 
perspective at the end o f this chapter).
Yet in medical practice, the Kantian ideal of impartial respect for persons is 
equated with detachment because o f the additional Cartesian assumption that 
emotions are sources o f prejudice and compulsion. The kernel o f  truth in this view
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is the fact that overwhelming passions, like lust, greed, and fear o f death can 
interfere with the physician's capacity to care for all o f her patients impartially. 
For example, a physician may perform overly invasive life-extending procedures 
on a dying patient because she identifies with the patient and is very afraid o f her 
own death. She may fail to act respectfully towards a patient who has committed 
an act she finds morally reprehensible, out o f hatred for a parent who did 
something similar. Or she may spend too much time with a patient she is attracted 
to, to the detriment o f other patients.
However, as I discussed in the introduction, it is the fact that physicians are 
increasingly estranged from, rather than too involved with, patients, that makes an 
ethical view that minimizes personal ties so appealing. Physicians narrowly 
construe the ideal o f  impartial respect for the "ends" o f the patient to mean respect 
for the legal "rights" o f the patient.89 However, there are three problems with this 
reduction o f valuing the patient's ends to not interfering with the patient's rights. 
First, whereas the obligation to respect someone's "rights" is definable in terms of 
permissible and impermissible behavior, respect for ends cannot be so defined. 
Physicians show respect for the ends o f patients not only when they give informed 
consent, and share decision-making, but also when they strive to be sensitive to the 
patient in delivering bad news, and when they are careful not to embarrass the 
patient on medical rounds. But it is a poor use o f the term "rights" to speak of the 
patient's right to be touched and comforted, listened to and encouraged.
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Second, the idea o f  respecting "rights" is rooted in a liberal conception of the 
person that sees morality as aiming for non-interference with, rather than 
connection with, other persons. But physicians are expectated to engage with 
patients, and thus cannot have as their overarching principle the ideal o f non­
interference. Katz and others have shown that the adversarial legal paradigm is ill- 
suited to capturing the moral dimensions o f the physician-patient relationship. 
The relevance o f the Kantian ideal o f treating persons as ends-in-themselves for 
medical practice depends upon seeing the sense in which this ideal captures more 
than the principle o f non-interference.
While Kant did not directly address the issue o f "rights" in the Groundwork 
o f  the Metaphysics o f Morals, (hereafter the GMM),90 much o f his discussion of 
the formula of universal law (FUL) does embody a liberal conception o f moral 
obligation as a negative constraint (non-interference): one is not to will in such a 
way that what one wills would prevent others from willing the same. However, 
the formula o f treating humanity as an end-in-itself (FEI) pictures moral obligation 
from a different perspective than the perspective which generates the FUL. Onora 
O'Neil points out that the FUL is a response to the question o f what rational 
agency itself commits the moral agent to; the FEI is a response to the question of 
what rational agents are committed to, given that their acts condition the agency 
o f other persons.91 O'Neil equates the conception o f  non-interference represented 
by the FUL with one aspect o f the FEI: the ideal o f never treating others merely
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as a means. To will a maxim that others could not also will would be to act under 
a  conception that omits the rational agency o f others, and thus treats others merely 
as a  means to one's own agency. O'Neil argues that the FEI has an additional, 
positive sense: one is to promote the concrete ends o f other persons, so that 
rational agency can flourish. I agree with O'Neil, given that Kant does explicitly 
distinguish between a negative and a positive sense o f the FEI:
Now humanity could no doubt subsist if  everybody contributed nothing to 
the happiness o f others but at the same time refrained from deliberately 
impairing their happiness. This is, however, merely to agree negatively and 
not positively with humanity as an end in itself unless every one endeavors 
also, so far as in him lies, to further the ends o f others. For the end of a 
subject who is an end in him self must, if  this conception is to have its full 
effect in me, be also, as far as possible, my ends," (GMM, 430).
Third, whereas "rights" language is better suited for the bureaucratic 
interactions o f  strangers, the Kantian ideal o f respect for persons is meant to guide 
one's personal relationships as well as one's impersonal obligations as a citizen. 
The Kantian project aims at isolating the moral commitment that is to be at the 
heart o f private as well as public morality. Further, in contrast to utilitarian 
thought experiments, Kant's examples are not framed from the viewpoint o f the 
detached policy-maker who expresses a generalized commitment to "humanity", but 
from the standpoint o f ordinary individuals faced with personal dilemmas: whether
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to steal, to help someone, to commit suicide. Through such examples, Kant 
focuses on such personal obligations as the obligation one has to oneself to 
preserve one's own life (the suicide example). In fact, the Kantian conception does 
not divide the moral sphere into personal versus impersonal commitments; and this 
fact makes Kantian morality relevant to physicians, whose special obligation to 
take-up the ends o f patients cannot be so divided. In summary, the usefulness of 
the Kantian picture o f moral agency for physicians depends upon a richer 
translation o f Kant's ideal o f respect for persons than the present version of not 
interfering with patient's rights.
II The Conflation of Impartiality and Impersonality in a Traditional Reading o f 
Kant
I turn now to a traditional reading o f Kant to consider how the impartial 
standpoint o f morality comes to be equated with the impersonal standpoint o f the 
pure rational agent. In this section I consider the core arguments that support the 
traditional Kantian view that detachment is necessary for moral agency, to show 
that there is a gap between the requirement o f impartiality and the requirement o f 
autonomy that leaves room for revisionist readings. I then consider the idea that 
pure reason alone is "sufficient" for moral agency, to show that this idea is what 
leads to the impersonality o f the Kantian moral agent.
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In the GMM, Kant contrasts the case in which a man helps people out of 
sympathetic emotion with the case in which the man lacks all sympathetic emotion, 
yet helps others out o f a sense of duty (GMM 398). Kant says that only in the 
latter case does the action have moral worth. This contrast is traditionally taken 
to show that acts from sympathy cannot have moral worth. The traditional reading 
gains support from Kant's claim that sympathetic feelings cannot be the basis of 
the duty o f beneficence towards others. Kant says that "sympathetic 
sadness...would ... be an insulting kind of beneficence, since it expresses 
benevolence with regard to the unworthy, called pity, which has no place in men's 
relations with one another" (Doctrine of Virtue, section 34)92. And Kant's claims 
that morality is "not the mouthpiece o f laws whispered to her by some implanted 
sense," and that empirical motives are "highly injurious to the purity of morals" 
(GMM 426) are traditionally interpreted to mean that sympathy is at odds with 
morality.
Some interpreters take Kant to see sympathy and duty as essentially 
incompatible because o f his anthropological assumptions. In The Anthropology 
Kant portrays emotions as selfish, corrupting forces that impede one from reflecting 
on one's acts and hence from taking other persons into account.93 According to 
Robin Schott94, Kant's stoic conception of emotions leads him to equate all emotion 
with hedonistic passions that are narrowly self-interested; given this picture o f 
emotions, the sympathetic man is as partial and selfish as the greediest hedonist,
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seeking pleasure rather than acting from duty. According to Schott, Kant's 
preoccupation with pure practical reason follows from his rejection o f the temporal, 
bodily aspects o f human nature. The value o f Schott's reading is that Kant's 
preoccupation with finding a secure, unchangeable, apriori foundation for morality 
is explained in terms of his own aversive response to bodily experience — thus 
deconstructing the purity o f the Kantian project.
Kant's remarks that sympathy "stands on the same footing as other inclinations" 
(GMM 398), and that "sympathia moralis [is] really sensuous feelings o f a 
pleasure or pain at another's state o f happiness or sadness" (DOV, sec.34) show 
that his views of sympathy are rooted in his larger view of sensuous input. 
Schott's reading brings into relief one major tendency in Kant's writing: his idea 
that sensibility, including perception and affect, is "like a mob o f people since it 
does not think" (Anthropology, sec.8), which must stand before the tribunal o f  the 
understanding. At times Kant seems to see the non-judgmentalness he attributes 
to sensibility as dangerous in practical matters and as requiring not only 
"processing" by the understanding, but also stern control. In the GMM. Kant 
conceives o f duty as a constraint against unruly forces. Kant portrays the motive 
o f duty as a counterweight opposing all o f man's "needs and inclinations, whose 
total satisfaction he grasps under the name of 'happiness'." Morality requires that 
Reason "enjoins its commands relentlessly, and therefore, so to speak, with 
disregard and neglect o f these turbulent and seemingly equitable claims" of
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em otion.(GMM 405). Yet in The Anthropology as well as in the moral writings, 
Kant also argues that because sensibility is, by definition, non-judgmental, it cannot 
be responsible for confusing, compelling or deceiving the understanding (sec.'s 9,10 
and 11). He cites Cartesian type examples o f sensory illusion to show that it is not 
sensibility that disrupts the understanding, but the understanding which confuses 
itself, by mistaking "the subjective for the objective" (sec.l 1). In the GMM. Kant 
is not indicting sympathetic emotion, as Schott suggests, but indicting the 
understanding for failing to see in its own sole responsibility for judgm ents the sole 
source o f  justification for morality.
An additional problem with Schott's reading is that Kant did not take the stoic 
dichotomy between sympathetic emotions and moral action to be self-evident to the 
audience he addressed. In Kant's social world, and in the works o f his 
philosophical predecessors including Hume and the moral sense theorists, the 
commitment to value the ends o f  others was presumed to come from sympathetic 
emotions. Kant him self was quite influenced by this view, as is shown by the 
passage following his discussion of beneficence in the Doctrine o f Virtue, where 
Kant discusses the practice o f impartial morality in concrete experience: Kant 
urges that one visit poorhouses and hospitals to develop one's sense o f  sympathy 
in order to be better disposed to do one's duty (DOV.sec.35). In the GM M . Kant 
argues against "common sense" in challenging the notion that the moral obligation 
to take-up the ends o f other persons is rooted in emotion. Like Descartes in The
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Meditations. Kant attempts to purify "common sense" by rationally reconstructing 
ordinary concepts, like duty and respect.
In the GMM. Kant's equation o f impartiality with detachment comes in his 
arguments that only acts done from duty are morally worthy, and that acting from 
duty cannot be heteronomous. Kant's argument is not that sympathy necessarily 
blinds one or disables the person from doing what duty commands, but that 
sympathy is itself blind or indifferent to considerations o f duty. There are two 
senses in which sympathy may be considered indifferent to duty. The man who 
acts because o f sympathetic emotions might help someone whom he should not 
help, if he considered his act from the perspective o f universal law; for example, 
he might assist a murderer escaping from prison. Thus the general motive o f 
sympathy is only contingently related to actions that accord with duty. The second 
sense in which sympathy may be considered indifferent to duty is that one's 
intentional object in a sympathetic act is usually the suffering o f others and not the 
rightness o f one's actions. The traditional reading o f Kant seems to require that the 
moral agent acts because o f her intention to do her duty, and the sympathetic man 
may not have such an intention.
The idea that morally worthy acts must be done from the motive of duty alone 
depends upon the Kantian claim that the moral standpoint is the standpoint o f 
"autonomy," where "autonomy" is taken to require that one have no empirical 
m otive to do what one does. According to a traditional reading, the agent's only
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subjective motive for acting morally is "reverence," which Kant calls a "practical," 
as opposed to a pathological emotion, because it follows upon the moral motive, 
or expresses the moral motive in the empirical world, but does not move the agent 
to act.95 But Kant's definition o f reverence rules out the essential features of 
sympathetic emotion: reverence is self-willed, rather than something that moves the 
agent, either in the sense o f causing the agent to act, or in the sense o f being 
experienced as an involuntary occurrence; reverence is independent o f empirical 
sensation, including ordinary feelings o f pleasure or pain; reverence cannot have 
as its object the weal or woe of another person, but only considers the person 
insofar as they exemplify a law. So despite Kant's use o f the term "emotion," 
reverence is an attitude which lacks the three criteria o f altruistic emotions: first, 
they have motivational force; second, they are felt occurrences, either via bodily 
disturbances, or shifts in consciousness; third, they take as their formal object the 
weal and woe o f other persons.
Under this conception, Kant's definition of duty as involving the ruling o f pure 
reason over empirical inclinations is taken to require the replacement o f empirical 
inclination with a pure interest in morality. This reading is supported by Kant's 
footnote at GMM 413:
the human will can take an interest in something without therefore acting 
from interest. The first expression signifies practical interest in the 
action; the second pathological interest in the object o f the action. The first
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indicates only dependence o f the will on principles o f reason by itself; the 
second its dependence on principles o f reason at the service o f inclination - 
- that is to say, where reason merely supplies a practical rule for meeting 
the need o f inclination.
According to a traditional reading, the sympathetic man acts heteronomously 
because he acts from his empirical interest in the well-being o f other people. This 
means that, by definition, acting from sympathy could not be morally worthy. 
However, it does not mean that sympathy is necessarily partial, and thus that 
feeling sympathy is incompatible with acting impartially. This distinction depends 
upon seeing that since Kant calls all acts with empirical motives "interested" acts, 
he implies a distinction between narrowly self-interested, or partial acts, and 
"interested acts." Narrowly self-interested acts, like stealing, taking one's life, 
failing to be beneficent, will fail the universalizability test; they are ruled out by 
the impartial tribunal o f morality. But many "interested" acts could pass a 
universalizability test, even if  they are not autonomous according to a traditional 
reading. For example, acting because one is moved by the ideal o f perfection is 
heteronomous because one is moved by an empirical concept; but this does not 
entail that acting from the ideal of perfection is narrowly self-interested and could 
not be compatible with impartial morality. The principle "strive for perfection" 
is not like the principle "seek one's own narrow self-interest"; it could pass the 
universalizability test. That is, I could imagine myself as a legislator in a
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Kingdom o f Ends for which the perfection principle holds; in fact, Kant defends 
such a  principle as an imperfect duty to oneself. The point is, Kant does not argue 
either that all empirical motives are partial, or that sympathetic emotions are 
always partial; he only argues that all empirical motives are heteronomous sources 
o f motivation because they are not "derived" from reason alone. There is nothing 
in this argum ent that rules out the possibility that sympathetic emotions could 
(even if  Kant didn't think they did) pass the test o f universalizability. Thus it is 
the traditional conception o f autonomy and not some picture o f emotions as 
essentially partial, that supports the traditional equation o f the moral standpoint 
with detachment.
I l l  Current Arguments Against the Claim that Moral Agency Requires Impartiality
Bernard Williams, Lawrence Blum, Michael Stocker96 and others argue against 
the traditional Kantian view that morality excludes acts that are motivated by one's 
direct interest in the well-being o f another person. Their common tactic has been 
to  show that the detached Kantian agent seriously lacks the kind of commitment 
to others that moral theory is meant to describe. They use examples that involve 
personal relationships to show how unsatisfactory it is to equate morality with 
caring about rules or doing one's duty rather than caring about persons. One often 
discussed example is the "drowning wife case" (herein the drowning spouse case)
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in which the moral agent is pictured as a bizarre rule-fetishist who deliberates 
coolly about whether she ought to save her spouse because it instantiates a 
universalizable principle to do so. As Bernard Williams puts it, this person seems 
to have one thought too many. W e expect a fully developed moral person to be 
moved by concern for his or her spouse rather than by the idea o f following a rule, 
Yet it is misleading to say that what is wrong with the rule-fetishist is that she 
has "one thought too many," as if the very act o f thinking or being reflective rather 
than acting automatically is what is amiss. Although it does seem odd that the 
agent needs to reflect about saving the spouse, the full context Kantians have in 
mind in such examples makes it less strange: usually the choice is between saving 
the spouse and doing some other compelling thing like saving five unknown 
schoolchildren. It is apparent that the alternatives to rescuing one's spouse can be 
made so compelling that some kind of deliberation js in order if  one is to act 
morally, where the standpoint of morality requires some commitment to the ends 
o f other persons in general. And not just in thought experiments, but in everyday 
living, including medical practice, acts done from compassion and love often 
require reflection. Parents must deliberate about how to help an especially needy 
child without deviating from their commitment to care for all o f their children 
impartially. Physicians deliberate on a daily basis about how to give their time and 
energy to their patients in an equitable manner. The problem with the rule-fetishist 
is not the fact that she reflects, but the nature o f her reflection.
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What is so unsatisfactory about the rule-fetishist is the standpoint from which 
she deliberates; given the traditional reading, the moral agent needs to leave all 
affective ties to her spouse aside in order to engage in impersonal calculations. 
Her intentional object in considering what to do cannot be the drowning spouse, 
viewed affectionately, "poor Richard, whom I love", because this would make her 
act an interested and hence heteronomous act. Rather, she must have in mind the 
rules themselves, and a rationalistic reconstruction o f her choice: should I save one 
spouse who I have promised to care for, versus five children who have hardly lived 
yet, etc.
The traditional reading takes any case in which the agent is moved directly by 
the suffering o f another person to be a case o f heteronomous action, o f  no moral 
worth; but there are at least two senses of being moved directly by another that are 
being conflated here. One sense in which one is moved immediately by another, 
which Kant clearly takes to have no moral worth, is for one to be caused to act 
because o f one's psychological response to another, one's feeling state, 
straightaway, without any reflection. But another sense o f being moved directly 
by another's suffering seems to be compatible with at least ordinary moral 
reflection: one deliberates about what to do in light of one's direct concern for 
another's well-being. For example, in the case where one's action may involve 
tragic consequences for others, one may not just save one's spouse instinctively or 
automatically, but may instead consider one's obligation to the drowning group of
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children, etc. However, the intentional object o f such consideration is never the 
rules themselves, but the threatened situation o f one's spouse, and the threatened 
situation o f the children, etc. One thinks: Richard, my love, needs help — but so 
do these children, poor souls -- what do I do immediately? O f course, the fact 
that the parties involved are drowning sets an immediate practical limit on how 
long any "normal" agent would then reflect. In contrast, when one deliberates 
about whether to tell a friend a secret that would relieve her anxiety greatly, but - 
perhaps harm another friend, one might reflect for quite awhile. The point is that 
it is possible to express a commitment to duty and to be moved directly by 
another's suffering in one reflective moment. One need not set aside one's 
feelings to consider what one ought to do. The reason for invoking this possibility 
here is to point out that what is wrong with the rule-fetishist is not that she has one 
thought too many, nor the fact that her act is rule-governed. Rather, what is wrong 
is that her intentional object, in considering a suffering spouse, is stripped of all 
affective qualities that express the importance o f one particular person to another.
It is not what the rule-fetishist has (a commitment to rules), but what she lacks 
that is important.
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IV. The Core Kantian Ideal of Impartiality as Residing in the Autonomy o f the 
Will
The equation o f impartial morality with detachment in Kant is based on a 
picture o f "autonomy" as involving freedom from all empirical interests. This 
conception presupposes as its complementary concept the idea o f "pure practical 
reason": the idea that reason alone is "sufficient" for morality. According to a 
traditional reading of the GMM. reason not only justifies the principles o f  morality, 
but can actually move an agent to act as morality commands. Kant's examples in 
the GMM  accentuate the practical independence o f the moral motive from all 
affective motives for action. In the suicide example at GMM 429, Kant shows that 
the idea o f duty can lead one to preserve one's life even when one lacks any 
affectively based will to live. And in the case o f the unsympathetic man (GMM 
398) who no longer has the goal o f helping others out o f compassion, the idea of 
duty alone is sufficient to supply him with the goal o f helping others. The idea 
that reason alone is "sufficient" in these cases depends upon the idea that pure 
reason can motivate one to view one's own existence impartially, and to take up 
the concrete ends o f others.
There are several steps in Kant's argument for the "sufficiency" o f pure reason 
for morality, spanning discussions in all three sections o f  the GM M . At GMM 400 
Kant moves from the idea o f  a will that is unconditionally good, to the idea o f a
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will determined by "reverence for the law", an attitude that depends upon reason 
alone. This discussion is based on three propositions. The first is that the only 
unconditional good is a good will. A good will is an unconditional good in two 
senses. It is good in all circumstances, whereas good actions and things may be 
bad in some circumstances. Second, it is good in itself, independently o f its 
relation to other things. Whether or not anyone ever valued a  good will, it would 
still be good. This claim about the radical independence of the good will, which 
stretches the idea of something being "good", perhaps beyond recognition, is 
reinvoked in Kant's discussion of the formula o f treating humanity as an end-in- 
itself at GMM 438. Kant calls rational agency an end-in-itself because it is a "self- 
existent" end. The German term here, "selbstandig" means "standing on it's own 
feet," independent o f  all else, o f a context, like a "self-standing" lamp that relies 
on no other furnishings for a ground. Kant's "argument" here comes down to the 
apparently analytic claim that whatever is the source o f  moral worth must be 
radically "selbstandig", and that only a  good will is independent in this sense. 
Kant collapses here the "goodness" o f  the good will with the independence o f that 
goodness.
Kant's next two propositions at GMM 400 specify the structure o f a will that 
is independent and hence morally worthy. Kant's second proposition is that an 
action done from duty has its moral worth, not in its end, but in its maxim. He 
defines the concept of duty as applying to a good will "exposed ... to certain
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subjective limitations and obstacles" (GMM 397). Kant argues that since all moral 
worth comes from the worth o f a good will (he equates moral worth with absolute 
moral worth), and since all inclinations and objects o f the will lack the 
independence o f the "selbstandig" good will, only the principle o f the will is a 
candidate for moral worth. The second proposition focuses on the independence 
o f the will with regard to it's structure: willing can be characterized in terms of its 
principles alone and thus can be abstracted from and hence made independent of, 
an agent's particular aims (intentional objects).
The third proposition outlines the only remaining possible commitment that 
could characterize the good will, given its independence from empirical principles, 
which are held because o f empirical attachments. Kant claims that "duty is the 
necessity to act out o f reverence for the law," (GMM 400). Kant's argument for 
this claim is that "an action done from duty has to set aside altogether the influence 
o f  inclination, and along with inclination every object o f the will; so there is 
nothing left able to determine the will except objectively the jaw and subjectively 
pure reverence for this practical law, and therefore the maxim of obeying this law 
even to the detriment o f all my inclinations," (GMM 400). (It is puzzling why 
Kant does not see subjective reverence for this law as itself a threat to the purity 
o f the will).
Kant's conclusion at GMM 400 is that acting from duty means acting from 
reverence for the law. This claim does not yet entail the claim that rational agents
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could act against all inclinations, from reverence for the law alone. This claim 
about the capacity o f  rational agents requires a conception o f practical reasoning.
Kant specifies his conception o f practical reasoning as the source from which 
the concept o f  duty "springs" at GMM 412. Kant defines the will as the power to 
act in accordance with the idea of laws. Rational beings work in the phenomenal 
world, ju st like things; they are subsumable under causal descriptions, as things 
are. Yet, in addition, rational beings work not only in a way that can be described 
by law; they work in a  way that is derived from law. But what can this mean? 
Here Kant is imputing causal efficacy to the inferential capacity o f reason; reason 
can move the agent from having certain ends to implementing the means necessary 
to achieve those ends, just as it can move thought in an argument from premises 
to conclusions. By guiding the agent to follow what the laws o f nature dictate to 
be necessary for accomplishing her goals, reason can generate a commitment to 
new goals. In the case o f impure practical reasoning, this end-generating capacity 
o f  reason begins with given affective motives. One desires X, and then reasons 
that X requires Y, and this reasoning itself can motivate one to will Y. Kant is 
indebted to Aristotle for this conception o f practical reasoning,97 despite his 
rejection o f Aristotelian ethics.
But Kant then invokes a  picture o f pure practical reason that is not implied by 
this [Aristotelian] conception o f practical reasoning: Kant claims that in the case 
o f a good will, reason "solely by itself' is "sufficient" to determine the will (GMM
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worth (GM M  400). Rather, Kant is making a claim about the efficacy o f reason 
in the case o f the good will. In the case o f God and the angels, who have 
absolutely good wills, their practical reasoning necessarily generates morally 
worthy acts. The term "sufficiency" here is a translation into the practical sphere 
o f the idea o f "entailment" in logic. Kant seems to picture the case o f perfect 
willing as entailing good action in the way correct premises and correct reasoning 
entail the correct conclusion o f an argument. This presupposes not only that the 
pure rational agent's inference capacity would be perfect, but also that she would 
always start with the correct initial premises o f a practical syllogism because she 
would always have the correct ends or goals. The case o f pure practical reasoning 
is distinguished from the case o f impure practical reasoning by the fact that in the 
former case reason sets the agent's ends, independently o f all empirical motives.
Kant extends his picture o f  the "sufficiency" of reason in the case o f the 
absolutely good will to the case o f human beings, with imperfect wills. Kant uses 
the term "sufficiency" in two senses in GMM 412, implying that in the case of 
human beings reason is and is not "sufficient" for morality. He writes: "But if 
reason solely by itself is not sufficient to determine the will; if the will is exposed 
also to subjective conditions (certain impulsions) which do not always harmonize 
with the objective ones" only then does necessitation, and duty arise (GMM 412). 
The point here is that humans beings are subject to necessitation precisely because
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the human will is capable o f  being moved by inclination, and hence not wholly in 
accord with reason. Unlike perfectly rational beings, human beings, and other 
finite rational agents, do not necessarily aim for the correct end or goal. This point 
reveals Kant's presupposition that the correct end o f  moral action is an end that is 
not only endorsed by pure reason, but generated by pure reason: it is reason's own 
goal o f universality. Kant soon specifies this end as the goal of willing only those 
maxims that are universalizable (the categorical imperative). Human reason is 
capable o f  generating this goal, even if  human beings can also generate other goals. 
Thus, the sense in which human reason is "sufficient" is that human reason alone, 
independent o f  all affects or empirical objects, is capable o f  generating the good 
end which the Godly reason necessarily aims for. Human Reason can follow the 
same practical syllogism God follows, even though it may not.
At GMM 448, Kant argues that rational agents must think o f themselves as 
exercising pure practical reason:
And I maintain that to every rational being possessed of a will we must also 
lend the Idea of freedom as the only one under which he can act. For in 
such a being we conceive a reason which is practical — that is, which 
exercises causality in regard to its objects. But we cannot possibly conceive 
o f a  reason as being consciously directed from outside in regard to its 
judgm ents; for in that case the subject would attribute the determination of 
his power o f  judgment, not to his reason, but to an impulsion. Reason must
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look upon itself as the author o f its own principles independently o f alien 
influences (GMM 448).
This passage reveals that Kant's idea that reason, independently o f all input, can 
generate its own ends in the practical sphere, depends upon his presupposition that 
practical reason and theoretical reason are one and the same reason. In the 
Critique o f Pure Reason Kant argues that theoretical reason is capable o f going 
beyond "sensible" input.98 For Kant, the "sensible" includes affectivity, feelings 
o f pleasure and pain, as well as sensation.99 Kant claims that reason can think 
what it cannot know, that it can have ideas without the corresponding intuitions 
necessary for knowledge. Reason is not only capable o f going beyond the 
sensible, but driven to do so by its own commitment to unity and its unlimited 
inference capacity. Theoretical reason is thus spontaneous in two senses: it 
organizes sensible intuition into concepts "spontaneously" (via the understanding); 
and it pushes beyond given input, toward its own goal o f unification. Kant's 
picture o f pure reason as capable o f setting its own ends is an extension into the 
practical sphere o f his picture o f theoretical reason's "spontaneity" in the second 
sense.
But the Kantian idea that reason can move the agent in virtue o f its radical 
spontaneity presupposes that practical reason can work independently o f empirical 
causation. This metaphysical presupposition follows from the divorce of all 
empirical ends from the ends o f reason. Kant seems to have conceived of all
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psychological motives as operating deterministically in the way that physical causes 
operate deterministically. Thus, the independence o f reason in the practical sphere 
requires that reason be capable not only o f justifying moral action, but o f actually 
causing the agent to do the right act. But Kant takes the idea that reason alone 
actually moves the agent to be incomprehensible if  one considers the agent as a 
phenomenal being, since there can be no gap in the causal chains o f nature. 
Rather, he argues that the idea o f an intelligible cause only makes sense when the 
agent is considered as a noumenal being (GMM 452).
Thus, according to a traditional reading, the idea that reason alone is 
"sufficient" for morality is ultimately based in Kantian metaphysical assumptions. 
The "autonomy" o f  the moral agent has both a  practical and a metaphysical sense: 
practically, the agent sets aside all empirical motives to act from the motive o f duty 
alone. This is possible because, metaphysically, the agent is not merely an 
empirical being subject to natural causation, but also a  noumenal being, who can 
initiate causal chains de novo (Critique o f Pure Reason. B566-586). But this 
metaphysical assumption is notoriously problematic. Given the Kantian picture of 
causality as a category o f the understanding, and o f noumenal reality as, by 
definition, what cannot be grasped by the understanding, it would seem to be 
illegitimate to speak of "noumenal causality." Kant says that while such causality 
cannot be understood by human beings in the way the laws of nature can be 
understood, it can be thought (GMM 458). His discussion o f  practical reasoning
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is meant to allow us to "think" this idea o f  moral agency. But we cannot have an 
idea o f  an agent abstracted of all the phenomenal aspects o f the self. As Brian 
O'Shaughnessey, Donald Davidson100 and others have argued, the very concept of 
agency presupposes given desires, beliefs and intentions that are related in the right 
way to a person's movements in the world. Acts are intentional; they do not just 
happen to the agent, but follow from the agent's desires and expectations about the 
world. If  one were not aiming for an empirical object, if  one had no desire to do 
anything, than one's movements could not be grasped as actions rather than mere 
occurrences.
The noumenal self, stripped o f  all desires and intentions, cannot even be 
thought o f as an agent. Thus the Kantian idea o f pure practical reason leads not 
only to the "impersonality" o f the rule-fetishist, but to an ontological condition o f 
"impersonality." The fully detached "agent" cannot be understood as generating 
her own projects and pursuits. I f  the "person" is understood as the locus o f a 
unified set o f projects, then the categorical exclusion of such projects entails the 
exclusion o f the possibility o f being a person.
IV. A  Revisionist Reading of Kant that Does Not Equate Impartiality with 
Detachment
In response to these problematic metaphysical assumptions and the picture o f
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the Kantian moral agent in the moment o f acting from duty as a rule fetishist who 
lacks all affectivity, a revisionist reading o f  Kant has sprung up. Three 
philosophers who represent aspects o f this view are M arcia Baron, Barbara Herman 
and Onora O'Neil. All three argue that morally worthy acts can be overdetermined: 
one can act with more than one motive, so that one can act from duty and yet be 
moved by sympathy. The revisionist reading depends upon making a distinction 
between the moral principles that guide action and what the agent is aiming for in 
acting. According to a traditional reading, the maxim or "subjective principle of 
action" includes a complete description of the agent's intentions. In contrast, the 
revisionists take the agent's maxims to describe only those aspects o f the agent's 
motives that are relevant to the justification o f her act. O 'Neil101 pictures maxims 
to be general principles, like "help a  friend when one can without undue struggle," 
which one decides upon or commits oneself to out of a commitment to morality. 
One uses the categorical imperative as a standard by which to judge the suitability 
o f  one's maxims. O'Neil implies that the agent need not actually go through this 
procedure to derive every maxim, but that it must be the case that her commitment 
to certain maxims in some way tracks her commitment to the standard of 
universalizability. O'Neil takes these maxims to be guiding principles, an almanac 
or road map, which the agent follows in particular cases, by aiming for things that 
are compatible with these principles. The agent would have no reason for using 
the road map if  she did not have ordinary motives, like sympathy, that lead her to
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act in the first place. I take O'Neil's point in using the metaphor o f a road map to 
include the idea that the maxims genuinely direct, rather than simply endorse, what 
the agent does. Perhaps the kinds o f maps O'Neil is familiar with are more like 
travel guides, because she implies that moral principles lead the agent to pursue 
ends which she would not necessarily pursue otherwise.
This interpretation o f O'Neil's is slightly different from, but compatible with 
Barbara Herman's picture o f the relationship between maxims and motives in moral 
action. In "Rules, Motives and Helping Actions"102 Herman argues that while 
"motive" and "end" are sometimes merely reciprocal concepts, this need not be the 
case. According to Herman:
the end, or object o f an action, is that state o f affairs the agent intends his 
actions to bring about. The motive of an action, what moves the agent to 
act for a certain object, is the interest he has in the object.103
By the "interest" the agent has in the action, Herman means a principle or 
commitment that directs the person to do what she does. One can have a variety 
o f concrete ends, like buying an efficient car, going to a simple, self-service 
restaurant, etc. that express one's interest in being economical. Herman gives the 
example o f altering eating habits out o f concern with one's future health (one's 
end), which is a case o f acting from principles of prudence (one's motive). 
Prudence might also direct one to visit the dentist regularly, etc. The motives o f 
economy and prudence are "second-order" commitments which serve as filters and
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sources o f  first order motives like buying an efficient car and eating healthily.
Herman applies the distinction between one's motive for acting, and one's end 
in acting to the case o f  beneficence from the motive of duty. In the case o f helping 
another person, one's end may be to provide help, rather than to instantiate a rule. 
But one may have such an end because one is directed by moral rules that tell one 
to provide help: "The rules direct that in certain circumstances, actions o f a certain 
sort are to be done. A moral rule requires us to help, to provide help, not to follow 
rules".104 Herman can thus distinguish the case in which one acts from duty but 
not as a rule-fetishist, from the case o f the rule-fetishist: in the former case "the 
object [end] o f the action is to save this person; the motive is to provide morally 
called for help"; in the latter case "the object of the action is to do what the moral 
principle (the duty to help) requires; the motive is to act in conformity with 
duty."105
Herman is able to distinguish a case o f  acting from duty that is not rule- 
fetishism, by rejecting what she calls an "externalist" view o f moral rules. In such 
a picture, the acting person aims to instantiate rules, because she is attached to 
such rules as one might be attached to an external authority, out o f a commitment 
to being obedient. She contrasts this picture with:
the fact (and the way) moral rules are learned. We acquire knowledge of 
how, morally speaking, things work, and we employ our knowledge in 
determining what we should do. Moral rules are internalized; when learned
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in the right way, they are a constitutive part o f  the agent's conception o f 
him self as a  person. They are neither memorized (as Ryle pointed out, they 
are not the sort o f thing that can be forgotten), nor are they present as mere 
habits o f response. In knowing such rules, we know how to go on.106
The distinction between the maxim and/or second-order commitment under 
which one acts and the intentional object o f one's action makes it possible to argue 
that affective interest in the object o f one's action does not entail that one is acting 
from interest, or heteronomously. This leads to a reinterpretation o f Kant's 
statement at GMM, 426, that "the proper worth of an absolutely good will ... lies 
precisely in this — that the principle o f action is free from all influence by 
contingent grounds, the only kind that experience can supply." According to a 
traditional reading, this means that if  human acts are to be morally worthy the 
agent must be free o f  all empirical interests. But according to a Hermanian 
reading, Kant is only saying that the moral worth o f the maxim, not the agent's 
actions under the maxim, is independent o f all empirical interest. It cannot be that 
the maxim has moral worth because it goes along with one's sympathetic 
inclinations, since sympathetic inclinations can be indifferent to morality. But 
neither is the moral worth o f  the maxim ruled out by the fact the agent who 
belongs to it has sympathetic inclinations.
It would seem that Herman and O'Neil have given sufficient ammunition to 
argue against the equation of morality with detachment. The distinction between
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acting because one is trying to obey rules, and acting in a  way that expresses one's 
commitment to duty, will permit acting from emotion as long as such action 
expresses a  commitment to duty. The caricature o f  the rule-fetishist pictures the 
agent as segmented between a purely rational will that seeks only the end of being 
rational, and an ordinary will that seeks ordinary ends; the agent acts morally only 
when reason invades and occupies the whole person, putting its own ends of 
consistency and universality in the place of ordinary affective goals. The appeal 
o f the revisionist conception is that acting from duty is pictured as ordinary 
affective activity, which is somehow rule "governed." The commitment to rational 
reflection is taken to be an integrated aspect o f the agent's personality. However, 
the problem is in understanding the sense in which acts may be both ordinary 
affectively motivated acts, and yet rule governed in a Kantian sense.
The core o f the Kantian conception that Herman and Baron attempt to preserve 
is the idea that the rules of morality do not just describe what the moral agent 
does; they direct what she does. This requirement has two aspects. First, the 
moral agent must know that she is acting from maxims that are universalizable. 
Second, she must be motivated by the idea that what she does expresses her 
commitment to duty. I f  she happens to have been brought up to act according to 
rules which all pass the test o f universalizability, but has no commitment to doing 
her duty, than her act has no moral worth. And her commitment to acting dutifully 
cannot be merely an after the fact endorsement o f her actions; rather this
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commitment to acting dutifully must be what actually causes her to do what she 
does. This idea distinguishes the Kantian conception from an Aristotelian picture 
o f moral agency. Even if one has been brought up well, and one has virtuous 
attitudes like bravery and kindness that ordinarily lead to good acts, and one 
endorses such attitudes reflectively, one is not yet acting from duty.
Herman and Baron both take Kant to assert that only acts done from the 
motive o f duty have moral worth, where acting from refers to the causal efficacy 
o f one's sense o f duty. But then we must ask how the moral agent's commitment 
to the rules that ground rational agency can actually direct her action, if  the model 
o f  the obedient rule-fetishist is to be rejected? Herman and Baron characterize 
the person acting from duty as having a counterfactual commitment, such that if 
what she does out o f sympathy were not in accordance with duty, she would not 
do it, and if  duty commands what she would not otherwise do, she would do it.107 
I will refer to this counterfactual description of how duty could preempt other 
motives as "pre-emptive overdetermination."
The revisionist concept o f "pre-emptive overdetermination" provides for a 
deflationary reading of the Kantian notion o f autonomy, which avoids the 
problematic concepts of transcendental freedom and noumenal causation. The 
appeal o f the notion o f "pre-emptive overdetermination" is that the agent's freedom 
comes down to an empirically specifiable freedom to do otherwise; the agent acts 
autonomously if she does what she does because she believes it is morally
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required. However, the picture o f agency embodied in the concept o f  "pre-emptive 
overdetermination" is far from transparent. The idea that the agent's sense o f duty 
can pre-empt her other motives can be interpreted in two ways, one o f which 
retains, in deflationary form, the Kantian idea of pure practical reason (Herman's 
reading), the other o f  which does not.
In "On the Value o f Acting from the Motive o f Duty"108 Herman pictures the 
motive o f duty as a commitment o f the agents which can move her against all o f 
her ordinary affective motives. Herman says that while one's sense o f duty can be 
a second-order commitment that expresses itself through primary motives like 
sympathy, one's sense o f duty is also capable o f being a primary first-order motive, 
which is "sufficient" to lead to moral action all by itself409. She reads the case o f 
the unsympathetic man as a case in which the motive o f  duty alone moves the 
agent toward beneficence. And Herman takes the agent's sense o f duty in this case 
to be based solely on his impersonal commitment to act in a way that is 
universalizable. She notes that it is only because the unsympathetic man lacks any 
personal reason to do what he does that his action is a case o f beneficence in the 
sense that Kant uses that term in the DOV: "it [an action] is beneficent only if the 
agent conceives o f what he is doing as an instance of what any moral agent is 
required to do when he can help another, and acts to help for that reason. For 
Kant, only the motive o f duty [alone] could prompt someone to act on a maxim 
with such content —for no other motive responds to a conception o f action that
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regards the agent him self impersonally or is impartial in its application."110 It 
seems that Herman envisions the apathetic man as generating his beneficent motive 
solely from detached reflection about what universal morality commands. But this 
reinvokes the traditional idea that reason alone is "sufficient" for moral action. 
Herman concludes this article with the statement that "at the heart o f Kant's 
account o f moral worth" is the idea that the moral motive "expresses a kind of 
independence from circumstances and need, such that in acting from the motive of 
duty, we are, as Kant saw it, free"111.
Herman never explains how rational reflection alone could move the apathetic 
agent to help others. In the absence o f any new picture o f what rational reflection 
involves, Herman seems to rely on the traditional Kantian picture o f the 
"sufficiency" o f practical reason as grounded in the spontaneity o f theoretical 
reason, but without the traditional assumption of noumenal causality. But Bernard 
W illiams points out the problem in presupposing that ordinary (ie. phenomenal) 
rational reflection is "sufficient" for generating a commitment to valuing the ends 
o f  others. According to W illiams112, reflection about truth brings in an impartial 
standpoint because it is concerned with how the world really is, and how the world 
really is presupposes convergence of all knowledge about the world. But reflection 
about how to act does not presuppose any such convergence. Even if reflection 
takes me from seeing that my own ends should be promoted to seeing that you too 
will be committed to the idea that your ends should be promoted, it cannot move
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me to promote your ends. The additional step o f reciprocity is not a bare logical 
inference.
The force o f Williams argument against Kant depends upon seeing that the 
"drive" toward unity and consistency o f  theoretical reason is insufficient for the 
moral commitment to universalizability o f practical reason. One can recognize 
that one's ends are rooted in some general feature o f one's make-up and that other 
tokens o f  one's type have the same ends; but this cognitive grasp o f analogous ends 
cannot move one to value the other's ends as-if they were one's own.
If  one holds on to the core Kantian idea that impartiality requires the agent to 
be "free" of all affective motives in the sense that she can act in the absence of all 
affective motives, than one winds up with the following reading o f the case of the 
apathetic man: His aim in helping cannot be to relieve so and so's suffering,
because this would mean he was moved directly by the suffering o f another person, 
and thus in Kantian terms moved by pathological emotion rather than practical 
reverence for the moral law. Rather, his aim must be to help a person because it 
is w hat duty commands. But his commitment to duty in this case cannot be 
derived from his own reasoning, because, as W illiams has shown, detached 
reflection cannot commit one to take-up the ends o f other persons. But if his 
commitment to help others does not arise from within his own reasoning processes 
or from within his own ordinary motives, then it rests on no reason o f his own. 
It is simply an arbitrary choice. But this leads to a picture o f the apathetic man
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as arbitrarily following an external authority; he has become the rule-fetishist.
The revisionists must leave behind the Kantian idea of pure reason's 
"sufficiency" in order to develop an account o f how the agent's commitment to 
reflection is internally related to, and capable o f directing, her other commitments 
and motives. In their more recent articles, both Herman and Baron do seem to be 
moving away from the core Kantian presupposition that one kind of reflection is 
"sufficient" for both theoretical and practical reasoning. In "The Practice o f  Moral 
Judgment"113 Herman discusses the importance o f "perceptions of moral salience," 
which may include affective responses, for the practice of morality. She argues 
that the ideal of treating persons as ends in themselves commits moral agents to 
discerning who are persons, and what is owed to such persons, and that such 
discerning may involve affectivity.
Herman strives to balance her conception o f morality as a situated practice 
with affective, historical components, with the demands of Kantian theory for an 
ahistorical, unsituated reflective consciousness as the source o f moral commitment. 
Her solution is to conceive o f the "fact o f reason," which is the agent's 
consciousness of her moral independence, or autonomy, as the source o f the agent's 
commitment to take-up the ends o f other persons. But the kind of reflection that 
gives rise to a commitment to others involves role-reversal, in which one sees 
oneself as-if in the position o f others. This implies that Herman takes the fact o f 
reason to already involve role-reversal. But how could consciousness o f  one's
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radical independence from one's own affective situation motivate one to put oneself 
in another's position? In the next chapter, I will address this question in light o f 
the related phenomenological concept of empathy as projection from one's own 
situation imaginatively into someone else's, thus "freeing" oneself from one's own 
situation. I will argue that radical detachment from one's own situation is 
incompatible with empathy, and that awareness o f one's own affective ties and 
needs is constitutive o f understanding other persons. At this point it is sufficient 
to note that if  Herman reads the "fact of reason" as involving empathic projection, 
she has already left behind the Kantian picture o f the unity o f practical and 
theoretical reason.
M arcia Baron conceives o f the power o f duty to pre-empt other motives as 
rooted in the agent's capacity to redirect her ordinary, affective motives from 
within. In "The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting from Duty"114 she argues, 
as Herman does, that one's sense o f duty is "sufficient" ground for moral action; 
but Baron does not see this sense o f duty as ultimately grounded in pure practical 
reason. It is not the agent's ahistorical, unsituated rationality or "freedom" that 
Baron appeals to as an explanation of how a commitment to duty alone can 
generate beneficence. Rather, Baron argues that the commitment to duty is 
necessarily historical and affectively situated. Rather than picturing the 
commitment to duty as immediately efficacious in a discrete moment o f action, 
Baron sees the efficacy of duty as mediated by the deliberate re-education o f one's
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character over time. She writes that acting from duty "must be thought o f not in 
term s o f isolated actions, but as conduct viewed over a stretch o f time, and 
governed by a commitment which unifies and directs the self."115
Baron's emphasis on "conduct" rather than discrete acts, represents an 
important difference between her conception of duty and Herman's conception. 
Herman explicitly states that only a small subset o f an agent's acts will be done 
from duty, because only acts that are morally required can be done from duty; 
helping acts that are not strictly required are not credited to the agent's sense of 
duty, except in the tenuous sense that if  such acts were impermissible, the agent 
would not do them. In contrast, Baron sees one's sense o f duty as "a concern to 
do the morally recommended as well as the morally required."116 Her view of a 
sense o f duty as informing one's conduct over time identifies the agent's sense of 
duty with the unity o f the agent's projects, and the development o f the agent's 
character, rather than just with the performing of right action. The identification 
of the sense of duty with the agent's capacity to develop her own character implies 
that the agent's feelings and ideas, and not just her behavior, will be influenced by 
her sense o f duty.
This leads to the question o f what kind of reflection constitutes a 
developmental commitment to acting from duty, and how does such reflection 
generate a commitment to role-reversal? Baron says she cannot yet give a full 
account o f such reflection, but she gives the following suggestion:
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One who acts from duty will reflect on her conduct and not be left cold by 
thoughts about how she acted — nor will she feel only the retrospective 
emotions (e.g. regret, unlike remorse) which enable one to evade moral 
responsibility for the conduct in question.117 
Baron thus envisions a non-detached kind of practical reasoning, which relies on 
the agent's capacity to feel remorse, among other things.
Extrapolating from Baron's comments, I picture the unsympathetic man not as 
a rule-fetishist, but as a depressed person of good character who feels remorse over 
his failure to care much about others. His sense o f duty includes a commitment 
to taking-up the ends o f others, even when he lacks spontaneous feelings of 
sympathy. In order to make the ends o f  others "as far as possible, [his] own" he 
reflects on the situation of others to find elements o f  their situations which are able 
to move him, perhaps because he feels that these problems are like his own in 
some way. There is a sense in which this reflection involves consciousness of 
"freedom." This man will have to struggle to free himself from the pathology of 
his depression, the pervasiveness of his feelings o f  hopelessness, to adequately 
grasp what is salient about another person's situation. The personal insights that 
enable him to recover from his depression sufficiently to care for others can be 
pictured as "freeing" him from the pathology of his own situation; but these 
insights themselves will not follow from detached reasoning, but only from 
emotionally engaged reflection. This man's sense o f duty expresses itself in his
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painstaking commitment to recover from his apathy, in order to adequately care for 
other persons. In the final chapter o f this thesis I give an account o f what such 
emotional self-regulation without detachment involves.
The model o f "detached concern" in medical practice presupposes that a 
detached commitment to rational reflection is sufficient for the physician's moral 
responses to patients. This presupposition is rooted in a Kantian conception o f 
morality that is most often expressed in medicine as the duty-based commitment 
to respect patients as "ends-in-themselves." The professional commitment o f the 
physician to respect all patients, regardless o f her own personal preferences, 
requires striving for impartiality. Yet this chapter has shown the inadequacy of the 
Kantian conception o f pure rational reflection as the ground of the impartial 
commitment to respect the ends of other persons. The traditional presupposition 
that impartiality requires detachment from one's affective, historical situation 
reduces the moral agent to a rule-fetishist who lacks the moral sensitivity that 
medicine requires.
The revisionist reading of Kant shows that one can act from duty and also be 
affectively engaged. Yet the revisionist reading has retained in part the traditional 
idea that one's commitment to respect others as ends is rooted in one's ahistorical, 
unsituated rationality alone. But, as Bernard Williams points out, there is nothing 
about reflection so conceived that could generate a commitment to take up the ends 
o f others. Rather, the kind of reflection that grounds one's sense of duty to others
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must involve "role-reversal." Having used Descartes and Kant to show the 
inadequacy o f detachment for understanding and valuing the subjective experiences 
o f patients, we can now explore the affective basis o f "role-reversal" by rethinking 
the concept o f clinical empathy.
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Chapter Four: The Concept o f  Clinical Empathy
There are numerous articles by doctors claiming that empathy is essential for 
diagnosis and for developing a therapeutic alliance with patients that facilitates 
treatm ent.118 Yet despite this agreement over the need for empathy, physicians 
have varied, even contradictory conceptions o f what the term "empathy" means. 
Michael Basch describes the widespread disagreement by clinicians over whether 
empathy should be considered...
An end result, a tool, a skill, a kind of communication, a listening stance, 
a type o f  introspection, a capacity, a power, a  form o f perception or 
observation, a disposition, an activity, or a feeling.119
The confusion over what "clinical empathy" involves is in part a result o f the 
ambiguity and vagueness that adheres to the general concept o f "empathy." The 
O.E.D. defines "empathy" exactly as Theodor Lipps120 defined the term 
"Einfiihlung" in 1903: "The power o f  projecting one's personality into (and so fully 
comprehending) the object o f contemplation."121
Lipps' emphasis is not quite right for physicians in that physicians are not 
seeking to contemplate their own personalities in their patients, but rather to learn 
something about their patients' experiences. (The term contemplation reflects 
L ipps' interest in aesthetics). However Lipps' description of "projecting" oneself
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into an object to more fully comprehend it is central to the concept o f empathy 
used in clinical discussions, even though there is little clarity about what such 
"projection" involves.
Despite the confusion over the definition o f empathy, there are certain 
observations that any conception of clinical empathy must fit. First, although the 
original concept o f empathy as "feeling into" another person's experience has led 
some theorists to equate empathy with direct perception or telepathy,122 physicians 
today reject this view. There is no organ for empathy, and no discrete form of 
energy transmission involved in communicating emotion, as there is in the case of 
visual, auditory, olfactory, and tactile perception. Rather, most clinicians take 
empathy to be like but not identical with sense perception in that empathic 
understanding involves pre-reflective receptivity to messages that another person 
communicates, voluntarily and involuntarily.
Second, while many physicians note that there are momentary "flashes" of 
empathy, they also note that the accuracy o f  empathy increases with time, effort, 
and increasing familiarity with the patient.123 Such flashes may be similar to the 
flashes o f discovery one has after long periods o f working through one's ideas. 
They do not in and o f themselves contradict the claim that empathic understanding 
requires reflection and effort.
Third, physicians have observed that empathic understanding depends not only 
on their own capacities, which will be the focus o f much of this chapter, but upon
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interpersonal dynamics, including the degree to which physicians and patients can 
understand each other's language, style and values. Given that such understanding 
depends upon communication, empathy is both an intrapsychic and an interpersonal 
activity.124
Fourth, clinical empathy involves building a conception o f another's situation- 
as-lived. Hence there is a sense in which empathy is best understood as 
constructing a model o f the patient's situation, as Buie describes it.125 However, 
the term "model" is misleading in that it implies that the physician's imaginative 
creation is an entity that can stand apart from the physician's experiences. This 
reification of the content o f empathic imagining is perhaps invited by the fact that 
historically the concept of empathy originally referred to contemplation of a work 
o f art. But I will argue that in the case o f clinical empathy, there is no separable 
mental model o f  the patient's world that the physician holds in mind without 
participating emotionally in the patient's experience. Rather than mistakenly 
searching for a product of empathy, it is better to think of empathy as a capacity 
to follow the patient's story affectively and imaginatively.126
However, even though empathy does not yield an "inner model" o f the patient 
that can be extracted from the empathizer, one can generate descriptions about the 
information one has gathered through empathic imagining, and these descriptions 
can be used to build models that can be contemplated theoretically. For example, 
the empathic discovery that a patient with anorexia nervosa actually sees herself
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
134
as fat, can be conveyed (I have just done so), and used in a description o f what 
anorexia is like. The reader can understand and use the idea that the anoretic 
patient sees herself as fat without empathizing. Alternatively, one could convey, 
in a  concrete case history rich with the affective imagery o f the real patient, how 
it feels to be anoretic, inviting the reader to empathize.
The observations that empathy involves communication, improves with 
increasing familiarity with the patient, and involves both pre-reflective receptivity 
and conceptualization, must all be accounted for by an adequate conception o f 
clinical empathy. These observations suggest that empathy cannot be easily fit into 
a  faculty psychology that divorces cognition from affect. Our account o f empathy 
must explain how the interaction o f cognition and affect enables the physician to 
learn something new about the patient's experience, which cannot be provided by 
the physician's other ways of understanding the patient.
In the first part o f this essay I argue against the predominant medical model of 
clinical empathy as detached insight. In part two I return to Lipps' definition of 
"Einfiihlung" as a kind o f cognition that is essentially affective. In part three I turn 
to some psychoanalytic models o f empathy that take affective engagement to be 
essential, but still do not explain how the physician can learn something new about 
the patient via affective engagement. In the final part o f this essay I give my own 
non-inferential account o f how the physician's emotions can be informative about 
the patient's situation.
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I The Conception o f Empathy as Detached "Insight"
The definition o f empathy as "feeling into" suggests a conflict between the 
standpoint o f empathy and the standpoint o f detachment. Yet many physicians 
today presuppose that the detached standpoint is sufficient for empathy. For 
example, Renee Fox and Howard L ief state that it is only after medical students 
go through a period o f alienation in which they overcome their personal responses 
to patients in the way they overcome their fear and disgust at dissecting a cadaver, 
that they can develop the skill to listen empathically to patients without becoming 
emotionally involved.127
Charles Aring's "Sympathy and Empathy," Journal o f the American Medical 
Association. 1958, and Herrman Blumgart's "Caring for the Patient," New England 
Journal o f Medicine. 1964 are two classic articles by physicians about "detached" 
em pathy.128 Aring and Blumgart argue that empathy involves making correct 
inferences about the patient's condition rather than feeling anything in response to 
the patient. Both physicians argue that for the physician to respond affectively to 
the patient's situation would not only make the physician unhappy, but would also 
prevent him from making correct diagnoses, and hamper his judgm ents about 
therapy. Aring conceives o f "detached" empathy as the use o f one's own 
knowledge o f  emotional experience to make inferences about the patient's 
condition. Blumgart conceives o f "neutral empathy" as the careful observation of
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the habits, and attitudes o f the patient so that one can predict how the patient will 
respond to her illness and to treatment.
The core thesis put forth by Aring and adopted by Blumgart is that empathy 
can be and should be fully distinguished from sympathy. Their point is not just 
that one can best empathize with the patient if one does not "sympathize" with her 
in the sense o f pitying her. Rather, they claim that the physician can best 
empathize with the patient if  he refrains from "feeling with" the patient in any way. 
Aring defines the term "sympathy" as "an affinity, association or relation between 
things so that whatever affects one similarly affects the other. The act or capacity 
o f  entering into or sharing the feelings o f another..."129 And Blumgart adopts 
Aring's definition o f "sympathy."
Aring argues that the emotionally moved physician will become hostile in 
response to a patient who is very dependent.130 And Blumgart argues that 
sympathy is destructive because the sympathetic physician will grieve for patients, 
and regret his limitations, whereas the "neutral empathetic" physician will simply 
do what needs to be done without such reactions.131 These examples suggest that 
Aring and Blumgart picture sympathetic feeling as stirring up the physician's (often 
unconscious) personal conflicts. But this shows that Aring and Blumgart take the 
notion o f  "participating in another's situation" quite literally to mean taking on 
another's problems as burdens o f  one's own.
Aring and Blumgart show that when the physician reacts to the patient's
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situation by taking on the patient's conflicts, this disturbs her capacity to listen well 
to the patient. But such reactivity, in which one actually experiences a need to 
solve another's problems as if  they were one's own, is only one form o f emotional 
responsivity.132 It is the way an older sibling might respond to the problems of 
a younger1 sibling -- by wanting to fight by their side against the bully in the 
schoolyard. In contrast, a parent interested in guiding her child's development, 
m ight experience the child's fear empathically, but with a concurrent awareness that 
the bully is not really such a threat. By not taking on her child's need to fight the 
bully the parent might then enable the child to deal with the bully from an entirely 
different emotional standpoint, using humor or curiosity.133 But while I reject 
Aring and Blumgart's assumption that responding emotionally coincides with 
reactivity, I accept their observation that the former can invite the latter. It takes 
work for the mother not to respond childishly to the bully. In chapter five I show 
how the physician caught in emotional conflict can, like the parent, learn to 
regulate her emotional reactivity while maintaining emotional involvement with the 
patient.
I also agree with Aring and Blumgart that empathy can be utterly devoid of 
sympathetic advocacy. Consider how one can say something particularly hurtful 
to someone whose vulnerability one grasps empathically. But this difference 
between empathy and sympathy does not show that empathy can occur in the 
absence o f "feeling with" another. For it is not unimaginable that in one's cruelty
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one vicariously experiences the suffering o f another, and yet enjoys this experience. 
(There are compelling psychoanalytic theories about how one could develop an 
eroticized response to the experience o f suffering, either in others or oneself).134
The idea that empathy is independent o f  emotional engagement involves 
additional assumptions beyond the observation that empathy does not require 
advocacy. Empathy is pictured as an ordinary form of inferential reasoning that 
simply has a special subject matter. Recall the words o f Osier: the physician 
capacity to neutralize his emotions allows him to "see into" and hence "study" the 
patient's "inner life."135 This claim presupposes that the physician can "project" 
before his "mind's eye" the patient's "inner life" as if  it were "an image, as from 
a transparent slide, upon a screen."136 A related assumption by Osier is that the 
physician can also "see into" his own "inner life," in order to recognize what he 
has in common with the patient. Osier thinks that imagining how another feels 
depends upon producing relevant images from one's knowledge o f what typical 
emotions are like, and then applying this knowledge to the patient inferentially.
Osier, Aring and Blumgart presuppose that "knowing how" the patient feels 
depends on the working o f the same cognitive faculty involved in knowing how 
the patient's body is functioning. When used to refer to third personal or 
impersonal knowledge about a state o f  affairs, such as the workings o f  bodies, the 
term "knowing how" is interchangeable with the term "knowing that." That is, 
knowing how the stomach puts out gastric acid is a matter o f knowing that the
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histamine cells stimulate the release o f  certain hormones. According to the 
paradigm o f "detached concern," knowing how the patient feels also is a matter 
o f  knowing that the patient is depressed, or reexperiencing a childhood fear. Such 
knowledge depends on careful observation and making correct inferences.
But while careful observation o f another's words and gestures contributes to 
empathic understanding, it is not another's observable movements, but what they 
signify that is the "object" o f empathy. And one cannot directly inspect the 
patient's feelings toward the world in the way one can directly inspect an entity. 
In observing an entity o f complex structure, one encounters hidden aspects that 
cannot all be presented at once; but these aspects can in some form be made 
present to sense perception, either through dissection, magnification, radioisotope 
labeling, etc. But, as we discussed in chapter two, one cannot make the person's 
inner feelings apparent, and measurable, in this sense.137
To make sense o f  the concept o f empathy, knowing how a depressed patient 
feels must differ in some way from knowing that, as a  matter o f fact, the patient 
meets the statistical criteria for depression given in The Diagnostic and Statistical 
M anual o f  Mental Disorders.138 Lipps introduced the term "Einfiihlung" to describe 
a  way o f understanding experientially what it is like to be in another person's 
position, as opposed to observing another person's responses as "matters o f fact."
Eric Cassel points out that in order to understand illness as it is lived, the 
physician must get beyond objectifying the patient's condition:
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Injuries to the integrity o f the person may be expressed by sadness, anger, 
loneliness, depression, grief, unhappiness, melancholy, rage, withdrawal, or 
yearning. W e acknowledge the person's right to have and express such 
feelings. But we often forget that the affect is merely the outward 
expression of the injury, not the injury itself.139
Cassel's point is that the damage a person experiences includes an entire way 
o f being in the world which cannot be grasped only by considering the attitudes 
the person displays. For example, the depressed person is not only visibly sad (and 
not always visibly sad), but also experiences loss o f  confidence, feelings of guilt, 
difficulty thinking about things. And each individual will be guilty, worried, and 
confused about different concrete issues, and these concrete issues will be what 
largely characterizes her personal experience. The personal and concrete is not yet 
understood when one simply recognizes that the patient is depressed. For example, 
the physician needs to know how difficult it is for the patient to walk with this 
cane, whether suggesting another treatment o f chemotherapy makes this patient feel 
hopeless, etc. In empathy, one is directed toward another person's particular 
intentional objects.
I take it that Aring and Blumgart, and Fox and Lief, would not be opposed to 
Cassell's portrayal o f the goal o f empathy as understanding the particular aspects 
o f the patient's emotional experience. Nor do they entirely reject the idea that the 
physician must make use o f her own past emotional experiences to come to such
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an understanding. Their thesis is that it is possible to come to a cognitive grasp 
o f the patient's position by making use o f  one's knowledge o f  past emotional 
experience, without actually re-experiencing occurrent emotional resonance with 
the patient.
But what kind o f cognition allows us to use our past emotional experiences to 
understand another's particular emotional experiences? Can we make literal sense 
o f the idea that the physician has a capacity to "introspect" and then apply her 
emotional knowledge to the patient inferentially, without actually experiencing 
shared emotion? The term "introspection," which literally means "to look into 
one's own mind,"140 has a narrower and wider use. The narrower use refers to first- 
personal awareness o f bodily feelings, sense perception, and states of 
consciousness. However, the information gained from introspection in the narrow 
sense could not provide an adequate basis for empathy, given that the focus of 
empathy is the patient's attitudes towards her situation. Rather, what is needed is 
a model o f a kind of "introspection" and inference-making that would yield 
awareness o f motives and judgments as well as 'interior' feelings.
One influential model o f empathy as detached insight comes from the picture 
o f the psychoanalyst as able to grasp the analysand's internal world while 
remaining emotionally neutral. But it is a mistake to posit that the insight that 
enables the psychoanalyst to make inferences about the analysand involves a 
discrete act o f "detached" "introspection." First of all, psychoanalysis uses
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heterogeneous methods to lead to increased self-knowledge, including free- 
association, reliving of past experiences, transference, and dialogue. And these 
methods rely on heterogeneous modes o f response from the patient, including 
strong feeling, recollection, and fantasy. And although there is active controversy 
among psychoanalysts about the level o f emotional engagement that is appropriate 
for the analyst, there is consensus that the analyst's own free associations will 
involve experiencing affects.141
Further, the term "introspection" suggests a privileged first-personal awareness 
o f one's condition, in which the reflecting subject and the object o f reflection are 
identical. But there is no such identity in psychoanalytic introspection. As 
Tugendhat has shown, we can only attribute motives to ourselves in the way we 
attribute such attitudes to others — by considering our own actions, retrospectively, 
as they fit into relevant patterns.142 And, as Edith Stein argues, when we consider 
ourselves retrospectively, through recollection, the 'I ' that is recollecting is non­
identical with the 'I' that is remembered.143 She gives as an example the case in 
which I can recollect my past fear over something I then believed, without feeling 
afraid anymore given that I now no longer hold that belief. Thus when the term 
"introspection" is used to indicate awareness o f one's own complex emotional 
attitudes, it cannot be understood as referring to a discrete mental act o f an T  
turning in upon itself reflectively. But since the term "introspection" is used as a 
metaphor for some unspecified reflective experience, it does not help us give a
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specific explanation o f  how empathy is possible.
The model o f empathy based on introspection and inference lacks an adequate 
conception o f  how the physician can detach herself emotionally and yet "see into" 
her own mind to produce the relevant images. But even if we allow that such 
insight is somehow obtainable, we face the deeper problem of explaining how the 
physician can use such insight to infer something new about the patient.144 
Diagnosing disease usually involves making predictions about something not 
present and observable, for example, the causes o f and future course of a 
pulmonary infection, based on something present and observable, for example, the 
chest X-ray and sputum sample o f the patient. The idea that empathy involves 
making inferences is modeled on this picture o f inference in science: one "predicts" 
the qualitative experience o f the patient, based upon one's insight about emotional 
experiences in general and one's careful observation o f the patient's words and 
gestures.
The idea that the empathic physician is like a weather forecaster noting the 
changing conditions o f  the patient and predicting the shifts in "weather" is so 
appealing because it captures part o f the truth. Empathic understanding involves 
trial and error, in that the physician needs to test her grasp o f  the patient's feelings 
out and modify her views according to the patient's feedback. But all knowledge 
must be susceptible to confirmation or rejection by some criteria, in order to be 
meaningful in the first place. This includes practical knowledge, like knowing how
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to folk dance. Folk dancers can learn by trial and error because only certain kinds 
o f  gestures count as proper folk-dancing. But knowing how to folk dance is not 
a matter o f making inferences -- a  dancer whose knowledge is based on predicting 
where her feet might go next would certainly be a sight to see! Hence the fact that 
empathy involves trial and error does not entail that the work the empathizer does 
involves making predictions.145
The error involved in equating empathy with prediction can be seen by taking 
a slight detour: Consider the two very different attitudes one can take up toward 
an action. One can either take up the attitude of the agent, or the attitude o f an 
observer. In the first case, one intends to do something, call it Y. When one 
commences to will Y, one is committed to the proposition: "I will do Y now." At 
this point, one has a special grasp o f the fact that Y is about to occur. One already 
lives in the world in which Y is on the way, in the sense that events are organized 
in one's field o f  interests around the happening of Y. In contrast, an observer can 
only predict that Y may occur, based on inferences from prior events, theory, etc. 
Now, the difference between the observer and the agent is not that the agent is 
right more often. It may be that the agent thinks she can lift 1,000 pounds, and 
the observer finds this extremely unlikely, so that the agent is less likely to be right 
than the observer about the actual lifting. The point is that the observer can only 
make predictions about the agent. But the agent does not need to make predictions 
to anticipate her own acts. She can anticipate her acts directly through forming
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intentions that lead to striving and, when physically possible, successful action.
The picture o f  empathy as detached inference likens the empathizer to an 
observer, whose only way to anticipate the other's acts is through prediction. This 
would involve remaining equidistant from various possibilities in a field of 
unrealized possibilities. If the empathizer were like the observer in this sense, 
then she could simultaneously entertain the possibilities that the patient's tears 
express excited joy or hopeless despair. But the empathizer cannot simultaneously 
grasp despair and joy from a quasi first-personal perspective. The object of 
empathy — the features o f emotional experience from a first-personal perspective - 
- sets constraints on the mode of empathic understanding. To understand another 
person's despair empathically is to grasp their despair, not as a possibility, but as-if 
it is actually present. (The "as-if' aspect o f  empathy will be analyzed later in this 
chapter). Empathic understanding is more like the first-personal experiential 
knowledge o f the agent anticipating her own acts than it is like the third-personal 
predictions o f the observer. Therefore, it is mistaken to picture empathy as just 
another use the physician makes of her capacity to make scientific inferences about 
the patient.
So far my argument against equating empathy with observation, introspection, 
and inference has focused on the intrapsychic component o f empathy. But the 
"cognitive insight" model of empathy is especially inadequate at explaining the 
interpersonal, or communicative aspect o f clinical empathy. If the physician relies
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strictly on detached observation and conceptual generalizations about affective 
experience she will disserve the patient in several ways. First, she will miss 
important features o f the patient's individual experience that are not contained in 
her previous generalizations; and she will expect typical reactions that may not be 
this person's reactions. Second, like the awkward folk-dancer relying on 
predictions , she will be unable to follow the patient's story experientially, and not 
know when or how to say or do the right thing. The clinician would be like 
someone who goes to the theater but only notices those aspects o f  the drama that 
correspond to what is in the written program synopsis. She would have no clue 
about how to gasp, sigh, and cry appropriately with the audience. Third, the 
patient is likely to notice that she is alone in her dramatic moments, and that her 
situation is being seen as a typical instance o f such and such. Most likely this will 
make the patient feel that the physician is not really sufficiently interested in or 
open to her experiences to merit the trust needed to openly reveal her history, and 
to build a therapeutic alliance.
It impoverishes the concept o f clinical empathy to reduce it, as Osier, Aring 
and Blumgart do, to weather forecasting. Rather, the empathizer must be 
sufficiently involved in the patient's "weather" to be able to recognize and 
appreciate in some quasi first-personal way, how the rain and sun feel. And we 
have seen that Osier's hope that by detaching himself emotionally the physician 
could clearly introspect and infer what such experiences are like is untenable.
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Sawyier, a philosopher o f science, notes that: "When we fill in the concept of 
empathy, part o f what we imply is that the empathizer has him self had something 
happen to him right then; it is not just that he has thought hard, or tried to figure
something out."146 This leads us to reject the insight model o f empathy because
it denies the two experiential poles o f empathic understanding: in empathy one 
grasps, more or less, how the other person experiences her situation; and at the 
sam e time the empathizer herself experiences the other's attitudes as presences, 
rather than as mere possibilities.147
II The Original Meaning o f the Concept o f Empathy
To clarify the sense in which knowing how another feels necessarily involves 
the knower as an experiencing subject, and hence precludes detachment, let us 
return to the origin o f  the concept o f empathy.148 First, it is notable that Lipps' 
concern is primarily with aesthetics, although at that time aesthetics was considered 
a branch o f  psychology. He invokes the concept o f Einfiihlung primarily to 
describe a mode o f comprehending works o f art, and secondarily to refer to a way 
o f comprehending the psychological life o f other persons. He says, for example, 
that the appreciation o f  music is the paradigm o f Einfiihlung. Lipps defines this 
form o f aesthetic comprehension as follows:
Einfiihlung is inherent in something perceived by me or in an element truly
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belonging to me and me only, i.e. something subjective, understood by me 
in the subject or in the spiritually corresponding object, but in the object for 
me or the object as it "looks" to the perceiving subject.149
Lipps emphasis here is on the essentially experiential nature o f Einfiihlung. 
By "subjective" he means "experiential," where experience has the sense of 
"Erlebnis" or lived, first-hand experience. The contrast term for experiencing 
something in this sense is thinking about something. By "feeling into" Lipps has 
in mind a mode o f  perception that is essentially affective and thus different from 
sense perception as conceived by traditional faculty psychology. Einfiihlung is 
characterized by the essential connection between the affective feelings o f the 
empathizer and the perceptual object o f empathy. Thus for Lipps the phrase 
"projecting one's personality" refers most generally to the experience o f a 
connection between one's own affective condition and the object one is trying to 
understand.
Lipps gives a more specific description o f Einfiihlung that is directed towards 
understanding another person. He says o f the gestures and expressions of other 
persons:
These sensuous manifestations are not the "man," they are not the strange 
personality with his psychological equipment, his ideas, his feelings, his 
will, etc. All the same, to us, the man is linked to these manifestations. 
The imaginative, feeling, willing, individual is immediately apparent to us
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through his sensuous appearances, i.e. his manifestations o f life. In a 
movement, grief, spite, etc. is perhaps apparent to us. This connection is 
created through Einfiihlung.150 
Here Lipps further specifies a concrete sense in which Einfiihlung requires a kind 
o f  "projection." The experiencing subject must reach beyond what is apparent to 
grasp the psychological life of another person. And this reaching must direct her 
attention from the start, if  she is to actually perceive the movements o f another as 
meaningful expressions o f emotion. Thus her attention must be directed by certain 
interpretive expectations.
But this contradicts the model of clinical empathy as detached "insight." If  an 
interpretive act is necessary even to experience the other's gestures and words as 
announcements o f affective experience, then the goal o f ridding oneself o f  one's 
own affects in order to receive affective input from the patient without any 
prejudice or distortion, is no longer comprehensible. Rather, empathy involves 
framing the input that one receives from another person in terms o f one's own 
emotional experiences. To receive another's experience as meaningful requires 
that one have pre-reflective expectations about what it is like to be angry, sad, etc. 
Hence, empathy cannot be a kind of detached cognition free from all perspectives 
and prejudice.
Lipps' view immediately resonates with Heidegger's view, discussed in chapter 
two, that "moods" are not discrete reactions to independent input, but unified ways
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in the first place.151 For Heidegger, what makes it possible to understand 
something is the prior possibility o f being in relation to that thing, where being 
means existing — with the full range o f affective and volitional activities. We can 
apply this to the empathizer, who recognizes the significance o f another person's 
experiences because they are related to her own concerns. The point is not just 
that the empathizer must be in some mood or other, for this is true o f all being-in- 
the-world. For example, Heidegger takes the theoretical observer to be in a mood, 
but one that excludes receiving affective input. In contrast, the empathizer must 
be in a mood that is interested in the affectivity o f another.
However, by extending Heidegger's idea that all knowing involves pre-reflective 
interest to the concept o f empathy, I do not mean to assert that one can only 
understand emotionally that which serves one's self-interest in the narrow sense. 
To see in others only what was relevant to one's own particular needs or wishes 
would be extremely stifling and isolating; one could never learn anything new 
about others if  one referenced all o f their experiences in terms o f one's narrow self- 
interest.152 Rather, the empathizer cares about another's particular feelings because 
they are relevant to her own existence as an affective being. It is only because we 
are interested, qua persons, in a broader range o f experiences than those that serve 
our narrow self-interests that we can be emotionally responsive to others without 
being reactive advocates, as I argued above.
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In summary, by rethinking Lipps' discussion of Einfiihlung, we can replace 
the vague phrase "projection o f one's personality" with the following description: 
Einfiihlung is an essentially experiential understanding o f another person, which 
involves an active, yet not necessarily voluntary, creation o f an interpretive context. 
One's capacity to respond as another person is what provides content for this 
interpretive act; this is the fact emphasized by the term "personality" in the O.E.D. 
definition o f empathy as "projection o f one's personality." This act o f 
experiencing-interpreting allows one to understand aspects o f reality that could not 
be grasped by a detached entity who could receive sensory input, but who lacked 
personality.
Ill Three Models o f  Clinical Empathy as Affective Understanding
How, specifically, can the physician's affectivity be the basis o f an interpretive 
understanding o f  the patient's situation? There are various responses to this 
question, but all of them share a general theme. The empathizer is somehow able 
to grasp the subjective dimension o f the patient's situation by experiencing 
something representative o f the patient's situation. Whereas "projection" is taken 
to refer to a pure cognitive capacity in the "insight" model o f empathy, Kohut, 
Basch, and Buie take "projection o f one's personality" to refer to an affective and 
imaginative capacity to feel "as-if' one were in the other person's situation. I use
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"as-if1 here to indicate that empathy does not require actual involvement in 
another's relationships and projects, but only imaginative involvement.153 For 
Kohut, Basch, and Buie this specifically means that the physician uses her 
occurrent emotions as imaginative representations o f the patient's feelings. These 
clinicians offer three different views of how the physician's feelings serve as 
imaginative representations o f the patient's feelings: Kohut presupposes that the 
physician's capacity to feel what the patient feels allows her to identify with the 
patient to the degree that she can momentarily experience the world as-if she and 
the patient were one person; Basch takes the physician's emotional responses to 
be direct indicators or signs o f the patient's own emotions; Buie presupposes that 
the physician constructs a mental model o f the patient's attitudes by re-experiencing 
her own similar emotions.
The first view, which I will refer to as the "merging" model o f empathy, has 
early roots in the work o f Freud154, Deutsch (1926)155, Fliess (1942)156, Fenichel 
(1953)157, and is fully explicated by Kohut (1959).158 I consider here a generalized 
picture representing the key assumptions they hold in common, without being able 
to do justice to the complexity o f any one version. These psychoanalysts 
presuppose that empathy requires that the physician experience a "merging" of 
herself and the patient such that she seemingly feels the patient's emotions along 
with the patient. Helene Deutsch hypothesized in 1926 that empathy involves an 
unconscious identification between therapist and patient in which the therapist feels
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the patient's experiences to be her own, and only on reflection recognizes that the 
source o f  the feeling is the patient.159 Fenichel talks about the therapist's 
"narcissistic identification" with the patient which involves the "taking over by the 
subject o f  the object's inner state."160 Fliess talks about the therapist regressing to 
a state in which he has weakened ego boundaries and can experience the patient's 
inner state from within.161 Similarly, Kohut equates empathic feeling with the 
bracketing from consciousness o f  a distinction between self and other. Kohut 
posits that when one's critical faculties are not operative, one can experience a 
boundariless continuum between another's feelings and one's own.162 By sharing 
emotion with another in this sense, one gains access to how it feels to be in her 
concrete situation.
But what exactly does such "merging" involve? First, the term "merging" is 
a physical metaphor for a psychological experience that requires definition. Many 
writers speak o f  the psychological process as one o f "identifying" with another 
person.163 But the concept o f "identification" is itself in need of clarification. The 
term "identification" is not used here in the strict sense to indicate a phenomenon 
in which one actually develops structural features o f one's personality as a result 
o f imitating an admired (or feared) other. The most ubiquitous example o f strict 
identification is the child's identification with the parent. Rather, the claim is that 
in empathy one identifies "not with the other person per se, but with what he is 
experiencing."164 The "merging model" presupposes that the physician identifies
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not with the patient's character, but with the experience of being in the patient's 
situation.
The idea that emotions could be shared in this sense depends upon a conception 
o f emotions as intentional attitudes with corresponding typical objects. That is, 
there must be typical ways of seeing, and typical images, that go along with 
particular emotional attitudes. Only if  this is the case can it make sense to think 
that in taking on an attitude, one can also take on a way of "perceiving" a 
situation. However, this conception of emotions, which we argued for in chapter 
one, does not lend particular support to the merging model; as we will see, the 
typicality o f emotional objects underlies the other models o f affectivity that we 
consider next.
In addition to this background conception of emotions, the merging model of 
empathy involves at least three specific presuppositions: first, that there is a kind 
o f affective communication in which one responds to another's emotions with 
similar emotions; second, one's feelings will be similar not only in the sense o f 
being the same type o f feeling, but also in being directed toward the same type o f 
situation; third, that it is possible to feel the same way another feels towards her 
situation because empathy involves bracketing from consciousness ordinary 
awareness o f the distinction between self and other, so that one seems to be in 
another's identical situation.
First, the "merging model" relies on the idea that feelings can be "contagious."
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Almost every account o f clinical empathy since Freud describes a component in 
which the physician finds herself just feeling sad or happy with the patient 
"automatically" without relying on any effort o f thought.165 Buie, following Freud 
(1892) uses the term "resonance feelings" to refer to those experiences in which 
one person's mood seems to be directly transmitted to another.166 Basch argues that 
such responses are based on an innate capacity to respond to another's expressed 
feeling with the corresponding affects.167 He posits that infants respond not only 
to  parental smiles with smiles and tears with tears, but also with the precursors of 
joy  and sadness. Basch bases his argument on the extensive research of the 
psychologist Silvan Tomkins,168 which shows that emotional responses originate as 
innate capacities, conforming to stereotypical patterns.
The idea that we have an innate capacity for resonant proto-emotions was 
foreshadowed in chapter one, where I argued that children learn how to respond 
to typical situations by having typical emotional responses. The missing piece of 
that argument is the idea that children must have a capacity to resonate emotionally 
with their elders in order to follow their elders in attaching to paradigm scenarios 
their appropriate experiential component.
But resonance occurs not only in childhood, but throughout life. The reader 
has most likely experienced a situation in which he or she has responded to another 
person's tears with "automatic" tears or to her laughter with laughter. Often, such 
responses are referred to as "natural sympathy." Rhetoricians depend upon this
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phenomenon when they deliberately use exaggerated expressions o f anger and 
enthusiasm to incite a crowd. The reason for calling such responses "automatic," 
"direct," or "natural" is that they do not seem to rely on recollection, imagination, 
or any other mental act other than noticing how another person feels. Buie 
describes sitting with a patient who was sobbing out of intense sadness and feeling 
"also purely sad; tears often rolled freely down his cheeks".169 According to Buie, 
this response differed from other experiences in which he recollected related 
experiences of his own, or tried to imagine how he would feel if he were in the 
patient's situation. In this case, he felt that this "was not a sadness of his [the 
clinician's] own."170 I take Buie's point to be that the feelings o f sadness had no 
personal referent because they were not attached to a recollected or imagined 
experience o f  the clinician himself.
But in affirming the existence o f resonance emotion, we need not affirm the 
second assumption o f the merging model, that one's resonant emotions will be 
directed tow ards another's intentional objects. In the example above, Buie feels 
resonant sadness, but his sadness does not have as its initial focus the image of 
having been abandoned by one's parents as a young child (the patient's situation). 
One can have resonant feelings, without seeing the world the way another sees the 
world. The physician can experience "resonant" grief with a person whose spouse 
has died, without actually grieving for a spouse. Similarly, if a patient feels 
persecuted by the hospital staff, the physician does not need to feel persecuted by
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the hospital staff to "resonate" with the patient's feeling o f  fear. Consider the 
classic case o f "resonance" as the spread of feeling in a mob. Even if, for 
example, an angry mob shares a general scapegoat (blacks, Jews, etc.) the 
individual members o f the mob will be angry at different, individual fictional or 
real blacks or Jews, rather than directed towards one object. One person may be 
thinking o f the boss she hates, another of the lover who rejected her. I f  they have 
been manipulated by the same hate literature, their intentional objects may happen 
to share some o f the same general features (such as shiftlessness or pushiness), but 
this is certainly not necessary. So resonance is insufficient for merging, in the 
sense o f sharing the same attitude towards the same typical object. But then 
resonant feelings in and of themselves cannot be the basis o f grasping how, in 
particular, another person feels about her situation.
Third, the "merging model" presupposes that resonance must occur in the 
context o f setting aside one's critical awareness o f the distinction between oneself 
and another. This idea has its roots in Lipps' account o f  empathy. Lipps 
associated the capacity to forget oneself with the ability to take on the concrete 
feelings o f the "object" o f  contemplation. For example, Lipps says that one can 
be so absorbed in watching an acrobat that one actually feels his excitement as one 
imaginatively goes through his moves with him.171 Deutsch, Fliess, Fenichel, and 
Kohut are using the concept o f empathy in the way Lipps intended when they posit 
that the physician can actually experience the patient's concrete feelings through
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an attitude o f emotional absorption characterized by the suppression o f the 
distinction between herself and the patient.
These psychoanalysts are aware that the concept o f empathy as "feeling into" 
another's situation includes awareness o f  the distinction between self and other. 
But the issue is not whether the physician is aware that she is not actually the 
patient, but whether this awareness is internal or external to the experiential 
moment o f feeling with the patient. Kohut's claim is that empathy involves two 
steps: First, in order to directly experience what the patient's concrete feelings are 
like, one must set aside awareness o f the distinction between oneself and the 
patient; second, the clinician must reflectively distance herself from the patient to 
consider whether her experiential grasp o f the patient fits with other data, including 
the patient's responses to her empathic communication.172
W e emphasized earlier that empathy cannot be divided into a pre-interpretative 
experiential moment and a subsequent meaning bestowing reflective act: the 
experiential pole o f empathy is itself an interpretive act. Kohut's contention is 
consistent with this idea. I take his point to be that in empathy one's own 
feelings are pre-reflectively informed by the project o f understanding another, so 
that they actually seem to have as their source a "we" subject that unites oneself 
with another. But it is mistaken to presuppose that one must seemingly merge 
with another in this experiential sense in order to understand what her feelings are 
like. Edith Stein offers a persuasive criticism against this idea as it was presented
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by Lipps. She questions Lipps claim that in the experiential moment o f empathy 
"there is no distinction between our own and the foreign 'I,' that they are one. For 
example, I am one with the acrobat and go through his motions innerly. A 
distinction only arises when I step out o f complete empathy and reflect on my "real 
'I '."173 Stein agrees with Lipps that actually experiencing the foreign 'I' as a 
subject, rather, than just thinking about the 'I ' as an object, is essential to empathy. 
But unlike Lipps, she emphasizes that this experience is an imaginative 
"announcement" and fulfilling explication o f another 'I ' rather than an imaginative 
merging with another 'I.'
Stein's point is that even within the moment o f feeling with another, one does 
not take oneself to be in another's here and now situation. Following Husserl, 
Stein refers to the "here and now" situation as the "primordial" situation. Stein 
compares empathy with recollection, given that both are imaginative experiences 
that "announce" the presence o f a real 'I ' that is not actually "primordial." Thus, 
these experiences differ from pure fantasy, in which one creates an unreal subject. 
She describes recollection o f a past experience as a detailed imaginative reliving 
o f the past. Recollection thus differs from mere recall in that in recollection, one 
re-experiences an imaginative connection to the past event rather than just positing 
that a certain event occurred which is causally related to one's present experience. 
But, Stein says, this filling-out experience o f the past...
does not make the remembered experience primordial. The present
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viewpoint o f the remembered state o f affairs is completely independent of 
the remembered viewpoint. I can remember a perception and now be 
convinced that I was formerly under a delusion. I remember my discomfort 
in an embarrassing situation and now think it was very funny. In this case 
the memory is no more incomplete than if  I again take the former 
viewpoint.174
The same gap exists between the 'I' who is the subject of the imaginative act 
o f  empathy, and the 'I ' who is being empathized with. Stein points out that even 
i f  I am so absorbed in empathizing with the acrobat that I entirely forget myself, 
and pick up a dropped program without even "knowing" I did so, this does not 
show that I have merged with the acrobat. For if  I reflect on the experience of 
dropping my program, it is apparent that this experience was given to me directly 
in the here and now (this experience had the quality o f primordiality), even though 
this here and now is now past, and only given non-primordially in memory. 
However, i f  I reflect on the acrobats acts, it is apparent that the other's action was 
only announced, but never given directly, in a past here and now o f mine.
As a  result o f Stein's analysis, we can now clarify the essential "as-if character 
o f  empathy. Stein shows that the "as-if' cannot be dissolved by the listener's self- 
forgetfulness. W e misspeak when we describe self-forgetful empathic absorption 
as a total immersion in, or merging with another, because the inner quality o f  the 
act o f empathy is never one of total merging.175 That is, it is not just the fact that
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we must imagine what the other feels that makes empathy an as-if, rather than a 
directly intuitive experience. Even if one brackets the third-personal awareness that 
one is not really in another's situation and considers only what seems to be 
happening within the imaginative world o f empathy, one does not get to a 
"merging" experience. It is the internal structure o f empathy that requires an 
awareness that another's experiences are not actually presented within my own 
sphere o f  experience. This relates to a point made by Husserl, that an essential 
aspect o f  empathy is the awareness o f the absence o f the other in one's own 
"primordial" situation.176
The kernel o f  truth in the merging model o f empathy is that the physician's 
capacity to resonate with the patient's feelings contributes to clinical empathy. We 
will turn to this issue next. However, we saw that such resonance does not explain 
how one can understand another's concrete experience. And we have argued 
against the idea that such resonance, in the context o f bracketing one's critical 
faculties, leads to a merging of self and other in which one samples the other's 
attitudes in concreto. Thus the "merging model" does not give an adequate 
explanation o f how the physician's emotional responses can represent the patient's 
concrete situation. It is interesting that Kohut, whose theory o f empathic "merging" 
is worked out most extensively, ultimately reinvokes the old assumption that the 
physician must use her "merging" experiences as a first step in making inferences 
about the patient.177
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The conclusion that empathy cannot be explained on the basis o f a merging 
identification o f physician and patient serves our project o f coming up with a 
useful model for clinical distance. For medically oriented physicians who work 
under the pressures described in the introduction o f this dissertation, the equation 
o f empathy with merging would mean that empathy could only constitute a small 
fraction o f their practice. Most o f the time, they need more distance from their 
patients than the merging model permits.
The importance o f maintaining an awareness that one is not actually in the 
patient's situation arises not only during invasive procedures and in the operating 
room, but even when the physician's primary task is to listen to and comfort a 
patient. For example, consider the physician caring for a  victim o f domestic 
violence. While it would probably help the patient for the physician to grasp the 
nature o f  her feelings o f fear and mistrustfulness, it would most likely be disruptive 
if  the physician actually felt herself to be a co-victim, surrounded by a frightening 
and hostile environment.
In addition, when the physician sets aside awareness that she is not actually in 
the same boat with the patient, there is a great risk o f imposing the physician's 
preferences on the patient. Here, the act o f "projecting one's personality" into the 
"object" of one's regard becomes the psychological defense mechanism of 
"projection" which is defined as "the unconscious act or process o f  ascribing to 
others one's own ideas or impulses or emotions."178 Consider, for example, the
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transplant surgeon Christiaan Barnard, who identified his desire to pioneer the 
technology o f heart transplants with his patient's desire to survive. After his first 
transplant patient died, he felt so disappointed that he ran to the next patient on his 
list, and pressured this ill man into a procedure no one had survived. He said to 
the patient: "I feel like a  pilot who has just crashed...Now I want you, Dr. Blaiberg, 
to help me by taking up another plane as soon as possible to get back my 
confidence."179 Jay Katz shows how Barnard overlooked the meaning of 
undergoing a transplant for the patient by conflating his own goals with those of 
the patient.180 Even in the cases where a merging identification does not lead to 
paternalism or physical harm to the patient, it conflicts with the basic goal of 
empathy, which is to learn something about the patient's feelings. When one 
projects one's own feelings onto another one does not learn anything new about 
her.
A second theory o f how the physician's emotions contribute to her 
understanding o f the patient's emotional situation comes from Michael Basch, who 
was trained by Kohut.181 I will briefly summarize what I take to be the key 
conceptual steps o f Basch's theory: First, Basch takes the position that infants have 
an inborn capacity to respond to their caregiver's feelings with "resonance" 
feelings. Basch's theoretical claim is that the infant's responsive joy is a way of 
perceiving her parent's joy. Basch's second claim is that as the person develops 
and learns, these originally stereotypical perceptual patterns become enriched and
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individuated by the associative context they become embedded in. That is, because 
they have a psychological significance from the start, these responses can be 
connected to other experiential phenomena: happy feelings may come to be 
connected with being in certain places, being touched lovingly, etc. Basch's point, 
which originates with Freud182, is that the perceptual content of one's affective 
attitudes is essentially connected to one's associations. He argues against the idea 
that the physician must regress and experience a kind o f  infantile resonance in 
order to empathize with the patient. Rather, as an adult, the physician responds 
with differentiated emotions with particular foci.183
Furthermore, Basch claims that the physician can apply her own images to the 
patient's situation through a process o f "generalization" in which one attributes 
feelings to another person while maintaining awareness o f the process o f attribution 
and the distance between self and other.184 But this only explains how one's own 
images may be made relevant to the other person, not how one can receive new 
information from listening to the other. Extrapolating from Basch's model, one 
could argue that the physician is able to learn something new from the patient 
because her associations are expanded by the story the patient tells. But note that 
this still does not explain how another person's imagery can take on experiential 
import for the listener, and become incorporated in the listener's own associative 
context. Ultimately, Basch (like Kohut) relies on the traditional model o f 
introspection and inference to explain how the empathizer's affective-cognitive
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responses can be moved along from their own prior content to new content that is 
informative about the patient. First the physician observes the patient; then she 
feels resonance emotion; then she infers from her own feelings and her general 
understanding o f emotional experience some tentative ideas about the patient's 
experience. But this does not explain how the physician's own emotions can be 
directed towards the patient's concrete situation, as they must be if  they are to be 
sources o f information rather than mere repetitions. Thus, while Basch's 
developmental view o f emotional communication is quite interesting, it still does 
not explain how one's feelings can be in dynamic communication with another's 
experience such that they can represent her attitudes in new and informative ways.
A third view, that o f  Daniel Buie185, takes heterogeneous modes o f cognition, 
including resonance feelings, recollection, fantasy and conceptual knowledge, to 
contribute to empathy. These diverse experiences allow the physician to build a 
progressing model o f the patient's world. Buie is not the first to describe empathy 
as involving the building of a mental model o f the patient.186 However, the 
innovative, feature o f  Buie's conception is his emphasis on the physician's affective 
responses to the patient as essential resources for the construction of this model. 
The physician can only develop and fill-out a model o f the patient's situation-as- 
lived by experiencing an affective relationship with the patient over time. 
According to Buie, the landmarks o f this map are the physician's imagined, 
recollected, and resonance feelings, which are organized around a guiding thread
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o f  conceptual knowledge about the patient.
Here is Buie's example o f how recollected feelings contribute to the therapist's 
understanding of a patient. While listening to a patient who discussed feeling sad 
about an upcoming interruption o f  her treatment, the psychotherapist...
noted feeling mildly sad also and spontaneously asked 'three-year old 
sadness?1 The patient grew sadder but relaxed as she engaged in working 
through her residual feelings about a traumatic separation from her mother 
at age three...the therapist realized that his empathic sadness was his own, 
arising from a similar enough experience in his childhood.187
In this example, the physician's capacity to imaginatively relive the sad feelings 
he connects with his childhood abandonment contributes to his understanding of 
how the patient feels. Yet Buie points out that the physician's own experience of 
abandonment had importantly different concrete features from that o f the patient, 
and it is exactly these concrete features that the physician needs to grasp in order 
to understand how a particular patient is feeling. How did reliving an emotion 
from his own, only typically related experience, contribute to the physician's grasp 
o f the patient's concrete situation? Buie gives a hint in this passage. Without an 
additional cognitive act o f inference, the psychotherapist felt that his recollected 
sadness mapped on to a three-year old's experience, even though he was actually 
about five when his own traumatic separation from his parents occurred. Buie 
takes this to follow from the fact that the working model o f  the patient already
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included as a salient feature an upsetting separation from the mother at age three. 
The physician's model o f the patient's world directed his own affective responses 
to the appropriate aspect o f the patient's situation.
A similar point is made in Buie's description o f the use o f  imaginative 
imitation to understand how a woman patient feels about her sexuality, given her 
recollected experience o f being molested by some boys as a little girl. The boys, 
who she had been playing with "pushed dirt and pebbles into her vagina. Her 
excitement and exhibitionistic pleasure turned to vengeful rage and shame when, 
in the process, the boys hurt her genitally and made fun o f her." While the 
physician relied on some recollections from his own childhood experiences to elicit 
some similar feelings to those of the patient, "he became aware that his empathic 
understanding was limited." He then imagined him self "anatomically and 
emotionally as a little girl going through all the details o f her excitement, trauma, 
humiliation, and rage."188 Buie tells us that this imaginative experience enabled the 
physician to communicate better with the patient about her sexuality.
Here Buie again illustrates the fact that the concrete features o f the patient's 
situation directs the type and content o f the affective experiences the physician uses 
to understand the patient. In this case, the physician made a deliberate effort to 
fantasize those aspects o f the patient's experience that were not available to him 
through recollection and resonance. But while the decision to imagine himself as 
a little girl was voluntary, and the result o f reflection, the fantasy that ensued was
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not reducible to a deliberate act o f thought. Rather, Buie implies that by moving 
imaginatively through the experiences of humiliation and rage, he was led to 
unexpected thoughts that contributed to his understanding o f the patient.
But how can it be possible for one to experience feelings o f abandonment as 
referring to a three year old whose mother was unavailable, when one actually felt 
similar feelings as a five year old whose father was rejecting? And how can a 
man evoke feelings in himself that pertain to a little girl's experience o f being 
sexually molested? That is, how can one's own experiential responses be directed 
by one's appreciation o f the feature's o f another person's situation? Buie never 
addresses this point directly. Instead, he too ultimately invokes the idea that the 
physician connects her feelings to the patient's situation via non-affective 
inferences. Thus, despite the richness o f his analysis, he still does not explain the 
mode of representation that allows the physician to see new, affective features of 
the patient's situation.
IV A  Non-Inferential Model o f Clinical Empathy
My explanation o f how one's own affects can refer to the features o f another's 
situation centers around the idea that the physician's modeling o f the patient's 
situation is essentially an act o f imagining how it feels to be in the patient's
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situation, rather than an act o f making inferences about the patient's situation or an 
experience o f  merging with the patient. I turn to some work by Edward Casey and 
Richard Wollheim on imagining how another feels, to bring out the key features 
o f the imaginative representation of another's experience.
In Imagining.189 Casey describes "imagining how" as follows:
W e are capable not only o f imaging (objects and events) and imagining that 
(states o f affairs obtain), but also o f imagining how to do, think, or feel 
certain things, as well as how to move, behave, or speak in certain ways.190 
There is a  sense o f personal agency, or the imaginer's own involvement in 
what is being imagined, which is lacking or at least muted in instances o f 
sheer imagining-that. To imagine how is to project not merely a state of 
affairs simpliciter (ie. one in which the imaginer is not a  participant) but a 
state o f  affairs into which the imaginer has also projected him self (or a 
surrogate)191 as an active192 being who is experiencing how it is to do, feel, 
think, move. etc. in a certain manner.193
The distinguishing feature o f the "imagining-how" in the case o f empathy is 
that the images and relations in the imagined world are organized from the 
perspective o f  an agent rather than for an external observer. For example, Casey 
says that in imagining how to lace up a boot one would imagine the kinesthetic 
sensations involved in the action of boot-lacing.194 The reader might challenge this 
point by invoking those fantasies in which one imagines how two persons do
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something together; it might seem that in such cases one need not organize one's 
imaginings from the viewpoint o f an agent. Consider, for example, that I imagine 
how person A gives person B a flower. I f  what I imagine could be described 
either from the perspective o f the flower giver or the flower receiver, then the 
imaginative portrayal must itself be multivalent — it must be open to more than one 
perspective rather than categorically organized from an agent's perspective. But, 
as Richard Wollheim points out, it is different to imagine how A gives B a flower 
than it is to imagine how B receives a flower from A .195 It may be possible to 
imagine both things, but only sequentially, never in one act. According to 
W ollheim, when one imagines how A experiences something, one "liberally and 
systematically intersperses imagining his doing certain things with imagining his 
feeling and thinking certain things."196 I take Wollheim's point to be that in 
imaging how A feels I follow the flow o f A's feelings and thoughts as they would 
flow in life for the experiencing subject.197 If  B's feelings are noticed, it is as they 
are expressed for A. For example, if I imagine B scowling at A, this scowl is felt 
as a rejection, which is its meaning for A, rather than as whatever it felt like for 
B. I f  more "interior" awareness o f B's feelings intervenes, then one is now 
imagining how it feels for B to receive flowers from A, and A will only be noticed 
as B would notice A.
From my own experience I can identify several levels of "interiority" that 
characterize imagining another's experience from the inside out rather than the
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outside in. First o f all, there is the level o f bodily experience, including kinesthetic 
sensations— one imagines how it feels to walk on crutches, to try to lift one's body 
out o f  bed when one is exhausted; one imagines pains, feelings o f nausea, 
dizziness, etc. Second, there is the level o f  environment-as-lived — not the 
geometric description o f a room, but the room as it surrounds one who lives in it, 
how it looks, smells, sounds. Thirdly, there are the feelings and attitudes the agent 
has towards visible and invisible others and events in her world. Some o f these 
attitudes will have a concrete focus -- for example, anger at a parent. Others will 
provide an overall atmosphere — for example, being in a depressed mood. 
Looking back at the definition o f empathy, we can now replace the metaphor o f 
"projecting" oneself imaginatively into another's situation with the concrete activity 
o f focusing one's imaginative productions on the various "interior" features of 
another person's experience.
To illustrate these levels o f "interiority" here are some first hand examples 
from my experiences with clinical empathy. The first level, imagining bodily 
sensations, is one which occurred when patients were experiencing overwhelming 
pain and discomfort. For example, while caring for women in labor and assisting 
in deliveries, I watched women go through waves o f contractions and release. I 
imagined how such contractions might feel — the pressure in one's abdomen and 
pelvis, the pain that accompanies stretching of muscle wall, as in bowel discomfort 
-- and the feeling o f comfort and exhaustion as each contraction waned. The
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environment — is one with which I am most familiar. During a two year period 
I gave regular, primary care to a group o f patients. In retrospect I find that I have 
vivid pictures o f the bedrooms, offices, etc. of these patients, even though I never 
visited these places. These pictures developed while I listened to particular stories. 
For example, in the case o f Ms.D, who suffered from insomnia, I pictured her 
bedroom on the top floor o f her house. I pictured the room as stifling, with no 
breeze, and high humidity, with one small window with dusty curtains, and utter 
silence and darkness. I pictured how exhausting and lonely it felt to drag oneself 
all the way downstairs, trying not to wake up her daughter and grandchildren, who 
would only reprimand her. I imagined mixing a drink and sitting in front o f the 
television, trying to relax. Corresponding to a time when Ms.D. was recovering 
from her underlying problem (a major depression) and starting to be active and 
engaged with her family, I imagined her cooking macaroni and tomato sauce in her 
kitchen, with her grandchildren there. I did not actually "image" her grandchildren, 
but felt a nice feeling o f having company and being part o f a lively family. I did 
"image" the kitchen — it looked much like my own kitchen, and was sunny and 
breezy. I even imagined the smell o f the tomato sauce.
As for the third level of "interiority" — the patient's attitudes towards others 
and specific issues, or her generalized moods — the two aspects require separate 
examples. In the case o f an attitude towards something, I will again use the patient
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Ms.D. Ms.D had a divorced daughter, with children, who wanted very much to 
remarry. The daughter had recently come to live with Ms.D for economic reasons, 
and Ms.D had started to recover from her depression as her loneliness was 
alleviated. When she told me the "good" news that her daughter had become 
engaged, and was planning to move to another city, I imagined how it would feel 
to receive this news. I imaginatively experienced not only the expected feelings 
o f  fear at being alone, but also feelings o f guilt for not feeling happy for "my" 
daughter. As an example o f taking on the generalized mood of a patient, I recall 
my experience with a patient who was experiencing the rapid onset o f senility. 
Mr. D described recent experiences in which he got lost going to work, and could 
not locate everyday objects at home. While listening to him I imagined how it 
would feel to discover such gaps in one's own abilities, and experienced feelings 
o f  embarrassment and shame. In a later conversation with Mr.D, he revealed that 
he felt ashamed, and that a desire to cover-up his mistakes was motivating his 
social withdrawal.
These examples, like Buie's examples, bring home the basic fact that the 
features or images that give content to the imagined subject's world are feature's 
o f  the patient's situation. That is, they are features o f the patient's situation as the 
physician grasps and portrays this situation. This helps explain why empathy takes 
time, and is essentially dependent on communication. In the first encounters with 
a patient, a physician will depend largely on her generalized concepts of what
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children, or older men, or people with cancer, are like. Hopefully, these concepts 
will be rich ones, derived not only from medical texts, but from personal 
relationships, previous interactions with patients, reading literature, etc. But it is 
only after the particular patient supplies the physician with image-laden stories that 
the physician can begin to fill-in the specific features o f the imagined subject's 
world.198
In describing the levels at which one can imagine how it feels to be the agent 
in the patient's drama, I stumbled over the difficulty o f identifying our imaginary 
protagonist — for example, did I imagine that I now had a daughter, or that I was 
embarrassed, or was the subject of my imagining-how some representation of the 
patient, and not myself? It is not insignificant that I was able to say "she" or "I" 
or to leave this unspecified in the above examples. Casey199 points out that in 
imagining how an experience feels, the imagined subject can easily be left 
unspecified. Wollheim and Casey both argue that just because the features of an 
imagined situation are features o f a real person's experience, it does not follow that 
one must imagine the experience as happening to that real individual.200 Both 
authors also imply that just because the affective elements o f the imaginative 
experience have as their source the person who is doing the imagining, this does 
not entail that the imaginer must imagine that she herself is the agent. The general 
point here is that the knowledge one has o f someone's concrete situation need not 
enter into the imaginative portrayal as descriptive aspects o f the imagined subject
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to provide the content o f that subject's experience. One need not specify that the 
imagined agent is a three-year old to imagine the world as viewed from a three- 
year old's perspective. The "spontaneity" o f imaginative experience seems to rest 
on ju st this power to landscape the scene with images from disparate sources 
without having to explain their occurrence, or apparent unity, by the ordinary rules 
o f empirical experience.
This helps us see more clearly the error in the "merging" model o f  empathy. 
The "merging" model presupposes that the fact that empathy involves an 
integration o f the physician's own affects and the patient's images entails that the 
physician must imagine herself in the patient's situation.201 But the examples above 
show that one need not specify that it is oneself that is in the imagined situation 
in order to imagine from an agent-centered perspective.
But this leads us back to a more precise form o f the question that we asked 
previously: How can the physician's own affects refer to the concrete features of 
the patient's situation in an informative way, via imagining how? That is, how can 
one's knowledge o f the concrete features o f another's situation — for example, the 
fact that another was three when her mother left -- lead one to feel emotions that 
are appropriate to these concrete circumstances? And, going in the other direction, 
how can these feelings lead one to understand and perceive new concrete aspects 
o f  her situation that one has no prior first-hand experience of?
The difficulty w e face in answering these questions is that our models of
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cognition presuppose that the event o f imaginatively portraying another's 
experience is in principle independent of the event o f  responding affectively to 
another's experience. The assumption is that the spontaneity to see things 
differently resides in a cognitive act o f imagining, which is somehow causally 
related to, but independent of, the emotional experience o f feeling with another 
person. The underlying assumption here is that emotions are generalized pre­
programmed reactions to typical situations that cannot in and of themselves 
incorporate new features.
If  emotions are ingrained responses, as Descartes thought, then we need to find 
a mediating pure cognitive act that explains how a non-specific experience can be 
made into material for building a mental model o f another's world. But this forces 
us (like Basch and Kohut) to reinvoke the same problematic conception o f empathy 
as inference that we rejected earlier. For what is to guarantee that one's 
imaginative portrayal and one's affective responses will be appropriately linked? 
W e must posit an additional act of inner cognition that attunes the picture thought 
has painted in the imagination to one's typical emotional responses. But this search 
for an inner translator leads to an endless regress.202
The feelings that contribute to one's understanding o f another are not 
independent events that result from imagining another's situation. Rather, they are 
an essential aspect o f the event of imagining how another feels. This distinction 
is elaborated by Wollheim. He says that there are cases in which an event of
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imagining how something feels causes an independent event o f affective response: 
For example, imagining how some forbidden sexual act feels, when I reflect on it 
from outside the fantasy experience, causes me to feel shame. But Wollheim 
contrasts this with the kind of feeling that characterizes the act o f fantasizing itself: 
while imagining how the act feels, I feel erotic pleasure. Wollheim's point is that 
there are affective experiences that occur in imagining how this or that feels. 
These feelings are an integral part of imagining how something feels. Given that 
the affect is an aspect o f the event of imagining how, it makes no sense to ask for 
a chain o f causes between the event o f  imagining and the event o f feeling. Since 
they are not separate events, they can have no mediating causes.
Returning to our problem, we see that it makes no sense to look for a mediator 
between the imaginative portrayal o f  another's experience and the emotional 
response to that portrayal. Rather, one's feelings are constitutive o f the 
imaginative portrayal of another person's experience. In empathy the physician's 
concepts and feelings work together as they do in her own first-hand experience. 
In one's first-hand experience, one's thoughts and feelings are aspects o f a unified 
"totality" that comprises the experience o f being in a  "world" (Heidegger's 
concept). In empathy one uses one's imagination to produce a world that also has 
the character o f  an experiential "totality."
The picture of the empathizer as moving "from" perceptual images created by 
active mind to passive affective responses, and from passive affective responses to
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the creation o f new perceptual images, is misleading. The "from" does not pertain 
to moving through time in the sense of a chain o f efficient causes, but to moving 
through depths o f  experience, in which one fills in the affective elements implicit 
in the patient's story via one's own affective responses. But this shows that 
empathic "imagining how" is radically different from other cognitive acts that 
depend upon moving from one idea to another via inference. There is no 
comprehensible chain o f ideas that can be detached from the affective experience 
o f the empathizer, and presented as a logically complete chain of ideas. The 
movement o f ideas in empathic understanding is essentially affective and 
experiential. In this sense the thinking involved in empathy is more like the 
thinking involved in dreaming, in that one image is often connected to the next 
because both images, however different they might appear to a detached observer, 
express similar feelings.203 Hence the standpoint o f detachment is incompatible 
with empathic imagining how.
The idea that emotional resonance is possible because humans share typical 
emotional responses, need not be taken to imply that emotions lack the spontaneity 
to take on new objects. In chapter two we argued against Descartes that the 
typicality o f  emotions does not imply that they are like blind reflexes. Rather, 
emotions are typical because humans share not only biological traits, but 
paradigmatic ways o f  encapsulating the dramatic features o f  experience. We can 
respond with the appropriate affect to another's concrete situation because we share
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common paradigm scenarios. But, on the other hand, we can imagine new 
concrete aspects o f another's situation because each emotional experience o f our 
own spontaneously incorporates new features o f experience. I f  emotional learning 
did not occur continuously throughout our lives, then we could only love others 
who were exactly like our first love objects, only be interested in activities exactly 
like our first activities, etc. But even in cases of psychological disturbance such 
rigidity can only be approximated, given the natural mutability o f the foci of 
emotions (hence the instability o f the fetishist who can never really relive the 
fantasized scenario). Normally, the paradigm scenarios defining emotion types are 
general and flexible enough to allow for the incorporation o f new emotional 
experiences as somehow already familiar. (As we mentioned earlier, one example 
o f  this kind o f mutability without an awareness o f strangeness is the "primary 
process" associations that occur in dreams).
The normal mutability o f emotional objects explains much of the spontaneity 
o f  clinical empathy, but not all o f it. As Osier and Hooker recognize, physicians 
are often asked to understand experiences that are normally kept out o f awareness. 
In order to empathize with "abnormal" experiences physicians need a way to 
cultivate unusual emotional flexibility. Buie shows the flexibility to go beyond his 
"natural" scope when he imagines what it would feel like to have the body of a 
young girl. Once started on this new path, the images o f being molested as a little 
girl become the target o f Buie's own familiar (presumably childhood) fears of
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bodily harm by strong, cruel others. I hypothesize that the variance in physicians' 
capacities for empathy relates to the degree to which different physicians are free 
to expand their emotional focus beyond the range of their previous paradigm 
scenarios. This would support the notion that empathy can be enhanced over time, 
since processes like consciousness-raising and psychoanalytic exploration 
(including in time efficient intensive seminars and groups) seem to greatly enhance 
this kind o f  flexibility. In chapter five I will focus on the capacity for moving 
oneself beyond familiar experience, which I see as rooted in the affect o f curiosity.
V Some Limitations o f Clinical Empathy
The capacity to understand the patient experientially enables the physician to 
take a better history, to communicate with the patient more accurately, and to form 
the kind o f  alliance with the patient that is needed for treatment to be efficacious. 
In the next chapter I begin with a clinical case to illustrate some of the practical 
features o f  clinical empathy. However, there are several limits to clinical empathy 
that we also need to consider in chapter five.
First, given that the physician's goal is to accurately understand the patient's 
situation for the purposes of diagnosis and treatment, what she learns about the 
patient must lead to working hypotheses that can be refined, rejected or approved
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through dialogue with the patient; and her imaginings must be guided by concepts 
and even abstract theories. Hence whereas the activity of "imagining how" cannot 
be reduced to an act of reflective thought, this activity must be responsive to the 
physician's reflective thought about the patient.204
Second, the fact that in empathy the physician can never actually experience 
the patient's here and now situation, but can only grasp it approximately sets 
important limits on the accuracy, completeness, and efficacy o f her imaginative 
understanding o f the patient. As a  result, physicians need to be aware o f the gap 
between their empathic creations and their patients' experiences, and to recognize 
their patients' expertise with regard to their own attitudes. And they need to be 
aware that empathy is only one mode o f understanding a patient, and that even 
with regard to emotional matters it may not be the best source o f diagnostic and 
prognostic information. For example, psychiatrists assessing patients for the 
seriousness o f their suicidal or homicidal intentions are sometimes mislead by their 
empathic grasp o f the patient's attitudes, and would find a better source o f 
information in looking at the patient epidemiologically.
Finally, empathy does invite strong emotions at times that may influence the 
physician to behave out o f role. But less empathic physicians also experience 
many other invitations to react emotionally to patients at the expense o f their 
doctoring. Consider, for example, how lust or anger can disturb one's capacity to 
listen and express ideas. With these issues in mind, I now give, in the final
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chapter, an account o f emotional regulation that is compatible with emotional 
involvement and aims for empathy and respect for patients. By criticizing the 
pictures o f clinical empathy as detached insight and sympathetic merging, I have 
laid the foundation for a more realistic account o f  emotional regulation necessary 
for medical practice. We can leave behind the demand that the physician split off 
her cognitive capacities from her affective capacities, and consider how she can 
better serve patients by using all o f the elements o f her personality.
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Chapter Five: Regulating Emotions in Caring for Patients
I disliked him immediately. He was one o f the last patients I worked 
up during my internship, a seemingly interminable year that was finally 
coming to a close. His diagnosis was inoperable lung cancer, the deadly 
seed o f  which had already blossomed in his liver and bones. He had 
refused chemotherapy in the past, consenting only to local radiation therapy. 
Concerned about his increasing confusion, hostility, and disorientation, his 
family had brought him that night to the emergency room for evaluation.
As I approached him, I could sense his hostility. He looked older than 
his 72 years; the ravages o f cancer were obvious in his pasty complexion 
and marked muscle wasting. His eyes sat deep in their sockets, and the 
sparse white tufts o f hair on his head reminded me of dead trees on a 
mountain ridge.
"I don't like doctors and I don't want to stay," he began. "Who are you 
anyway? You'd better not be a medical student! The last time, a student 
tried for an hour just to get some blood from me!" [So begins an 
interaction in which the patient continually vents anger towards the 
physician, but submits to an evaluation which shows no physical cause of 
his agitation and combativeness.]
I decided to look for emotional or psychological reasons for his 
hostility. With trepidation I approached his bed, sat down beside him, and 
asked, "Would you mind telling me a bit more about what you've got wrong 
with you?" He said he knew he had metastatic lung cancer, that it was 
going to kill him, and that he was willing to accept his fate; it was his 
family that kept bringing him for evaluation "at the drop o f a hat."
"Makes you sort o f mad, doesn't it?"
"I just want to die at home," he said. "Save your fancy technology 
for someone else. I don't want your tubes and catheters; I want to go while 
I'm still in charge o f my life."
When I admitted that tubes and catheters wouldn't help him get well, 
he relaxed and much of his hostility disappeared.
"When I first found out I had cancer," he said, "I denied it, like 
anyone would. Then I became angry — with my family, my friends, my 
doctor; I blamed them all for what was happening to me...I was mad as 
hell, too, because they were all telling me what to do. I was the one with 
the cancer, they were the ones making the decisions. I read up on cancer
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and talked with people who had had chemotherapy. I decided I had lived 
a good life and the doctors could keep their chemotherapy and its side 
effects. I had done all I wanted to do in this world and it was time to leave 
it my way." A certain belligerent set came back to his jaw, and he said, "I 
can honestly say I'm at peace with m yself and my decision. Tell my family 
that," he said, tapping my chest with his finger. "Tell them there's nothing 
you can do -- and nothing I would let you do even if you could!"
W e spoke for a while longer ..."I'm in pain most o f the time now, but 
I was brought up not to show suffering -- to be stoic. Lord knows if my 
family learns about the pain, they'll hover over me like I'm a helpless baby. 
I know I'm giving them a hard time, but fighting is all I have left — all I 
have to remind them that I'm still capable o f running my life." I asked if 
he could talk about all this with his family, and he said, "No, it's my 
problem, and I'm going to stay in control."
I admired his courage, and I wondered if I would be as brave in the 
same situation. I learned more about the complexities o f cancer from him 
than from any textbook I had read. And when I left that day, I found that 
my hostility, like his, had disappeared.
I had mixed emotions when he was discharged the next morning. He 
had his wish to go home. For that I was glad and I hoped that he wouldn't 
have to come back, but I knew that I would miss a man I had come to 
like.205
In this final chapter I offer an account o f how physicians can regulate their 
emotions in order to meet the demands of medical practice for objectivity and 
efficacy as well as for empathy and respect for patients. In this clinical vignette, 
Dr. Linett (herein Dr. L) faces the double task o f regulating his anger and disdain, 
as well as developing empathy and respect. One result o f my analyses o f empathy 
and respect is that I no longer find the phrase "clinical distance" adequate for what 
physicians need to develop. Being too distant (i.e. failing to respond affectively 
to patients, and thus failing to understand them and to have adequate moral 
relationships with them) is as problematic as failing to contain difficult emotions.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
185
I choose instead to talk about "regulating" emotions to refer to the process of 
responding appropriately to patients.
This vignette brings to the fore the following philosophical problems. First, 
how can physicians' emotions involve being genuinely moved by circumstances 
and still be in some sense under their control?206 Dr. L is moved by the patient's 
threats, sadness, and courage, sequentially. Once the patient is seen as scary, or 
pathetic, or brave, Dr. L's emotions are already part o f these portrayals, in the way 
fear is already part o f the portrayal o f the scary tiger. But if  Dr. L cannot choose 
how to feel about the scary, pathetic or brave patient at any moment in time, how 
can he steer his own emotional course?
Second, as we concluded in chapter two, detached thought alone is insufficient 
to direct attention, so Dr. L's shifts in attention must themselves be affectively 
mediated. Does this mean that the shifts in emotion that Dr. L undergoes are 
determined by the situation Dr. L happens to find himself in and how things in that 
situation happen to move him? If  so, there would be no room for freedom or 
control o f the sort Dr. L apparently demonstrates.
The error in taking Dr. L to be passively moved by external circumstances from 
one emotion to another is to conflate the idea o f the focus o f an emotion, which 
logically determines the emotion one is in, with the actual situation o f the agent 
in the world, which plays an important but not all determining causal role in what 
emotion the agent will experience. The focus o f the emotion does logically define
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the emotion one is in, but a focus is not just what is happening in the world -- the 
person's actual situation as viewable from multiple perspectives. Rather a  focus 
portrays an aspect o f being in the world that the person holds in mind in a 
concernful manner.207 What is deceptive about examples like seeing a scary tiger, 
is that the agent's situation appears to determine the focus o f her emotion because 
almost anyone being charged by a tiger will focus on the tiger as scary. But this 
is an empirical fact, not a logical argument linking situation and foci o f emotions 
in general. We can contrast this with a  case o f sitting next to someone on a bus, 
where the situation so little constrains one's focus that different people will have 
very different responses. One person may be curious about the person's book, 
another lustful towards the person qua sexual object, another annoyed at his taking 
up so much o f the seat. In general what moves us in any situation we are in is not 
predictable by describing the "external" situation —the view that ignores our 
biography— without saying something about us, our thoughts and values.
The real difficulty we have in seeing how Dr. L's emotional shifts could be 
determined by his own agency is that we lack a picture o f how Dr. L could 
"reflect" on and deliberately shift his own emotions without taking "time o f f  from 
being genuinely moved by circumstances. I will argue that such time o ff is not 
needed, by showing that the agent's shifts in emotion are themselves emotionally 
mediated, yet directed by the agent's deliberately maintained role.
My account o f the kind o f "practical reasoning" involved in emotional control
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in this clinical encounter. In the second part o f this chapter I develop a causal 
account o f  how physicians can make themselves shift emotions on the model of 
interpersonal persuasion. In the third part, I argue that in addition to acting on 
them selves persuasively, physicians need curiosity, which provides imaginative 
freedom to invoke alternative conceptions o f their situation. In the fourth part, I 
consider whether or not physicians need to forsake a realistic appreciation of 
patient's suffering for their other goals o f respecting patients and maintaining 
therapeutic efficacy; this leads to an account o f courage as an emotion that allows 
physicians to face suffering without detachment.
I Emotional Transitions in a Clinical Encounter
Let us begin by tracing Dr. L's shifts in emotion. In the first paragraph Dr. 
L shows that he is immediately aware o f his dislike for the patient, and o f how this 
dislike is fanned into hateful feelings in the context o f his exhaustion and 
resentm ent at the end o f  a long year o f overwork (his internship). In describing 
the focus o f his dislike he mentions first not the patient's orneriness, but the fact 
that his lung cancer is "inoperable" and that the patient refused chemotherapy. The 
nature o f the patient's illness and the patient's reactions are viewed together as a 
threat to Dr. L's own confidence in medicine. Dr. L then thematizes the patient's
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provoking behavior, his "hostility" as the "chief complaint," the initial description 
o f  the problem that brings the patient to need medical attention. This makes it 
clear that Dr. L  sees it as essential to his role as a physician to address and manage 
the patient's hostility.
In the next paragraph Dr. L meets the patient for the first time with a 
reluctance based on his preconception that this will be a difficult man to encounter 
—"as I approached him, I could sense his hostility." He first attempts to focus on 
the aesthetic presentation o f the patient, rather than on how disturbed the patient's 
morbid appearance makes him feel. He does not feel chilled at seeing the wasted 
face o f this man but rather experiences a kind of aesthetic pleasure, like a painter 
or poet, in noticing the "sparse white tufts of hair" like "dead trees on a mountain 
ridge."
However, the patient resists this distancing, aesthetic view o f his situation, and 
immediately engages Dr. L humanly by telling him that he doesn't like doctors, 
doesn't want to stay, and further that he senses the youth and inexperience o f Dr. 
L and doubts he is an adequate physician. Dr. L carefully plays down his 
inexperience (omitted section), suggesting that he feels inadequate before this 
patient. Through the night he attempts to curtail arguments with the patient by 
keeping their discussions short, aware o f his own increasing hostility towards this 
angry patient and towards his responsibilities as a physician. He does a brain scan 
to look for physical causes o f the "problem" (the patient's hostility) and then rather
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than attempting to engage in further discussion with the patient, given his own 
condition, he catches the few available hours left for sleep.
In the morning Dr.L feels ready to try to do his job, which includes 
understanding the emotional causes o f the patient's hostility from the patient's point 
o f view . Despite his trepidation he makes himself sit down beside the patient, a 
literal enactment o f his verbal invitation to the patient to tell his doctor about his 
first-hand experience o f his illness. The patient rises to the occasion, and conveys 
his understanding of his illness and his sense o f being abandoned by his family. 
Dr. L is sufficiently affectively attuned to the patient at this point to see how being 
dumped in the emergency room "at the drop of a hat" would be angering, and to 
acknowledge honestly and without the insecurity he felt the night before, that no 
medical interventions could really help the patient get well at this point. I infer 
that this kind o f confession on Linett's part follows from an empathic appreciation 
o f the patient's longing to have someone else face with him the hopelessness of 
medical treatment and the inevitability o f  his death, rather than warding off such 
experiences with optimistic therapeutic statements. Dr. L's deliberate act o f  sitting 
and listening to this disliked patient, as well as the patient's gift o f sharing his 
experience, make it possible for Dr. L to shift into an empathic stance.
The patient becomes much less hostile in response to this shift in Dr. L. He 
shows for the first time an eagerness to communicate. He identifies his anger and 
owns it, finding increasing vitality in affirming his need to be in charge o f his own
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care. His sense o f him self is solidified by being able to reprimand his family via 
reprimanding his non-abandoning, non-judgmental doctor "tell them there's nothing 
you can do — and nothing I would let you do even if you could!"
W e see in this vignette that empathic listening can be directly therapeutic. The 
patient is able to speak at a level that goes beyond ordinary conversation, involving 
the articulation o f feelings and concerns that he was probably not even aware of. 
He identifies as the cause o f his fighting with his family the need to protect 
him self from being a helpless baby. His recognition o f his own denial is apparent 
when he says "fighting is all I have left." This is an ironic statement infused not 
with defensive anger but with grief and pathos, which however, are still partially 
disavowed. If  Dr. L were doing psychotherapy he would have the opportunity here 
for a mutative interpretation, a  statement addressed to the patient's unconscious that 
would attempt to unlink the idea that to fight is to protect against feelings of 
helplessness; such an interpretation might radically alter the patient's assumption 
that he needs to keep his family at a distance. Instead, under the pressure o f time 
and also with an impending feeling o f grief that this patient will soon die, Dr. L 
does not thematize for the patient the ironic use o f his orneriness, but rather 
accepts the need for it with admiration for the patient's courage.
Dr.L shifts here from an empathic stance to a feeling o f  admiration which has 
as its focus not what the world feels like to the patient (it feels threatening) but the 
patient as viewed from outside as the hero o f a narrative. He talks about admiring
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the patient's courage and wondering if he could be as brave. In chapter four, I 
argued that this kind o f identification in which one thinks about one's actual self 
in another's situation is not empathy, although it certainly builds attachment. Dr. 
L's felt reverence for the patient is also revealed in his statement that he learned 
more from this patient then from any textbook about cancer. Moved by 
admiration, Dr. L does not interfere with the patient's decision to leave the hospital 
and refuse further care, nor does he pressure the patient to talk more openly with 
his family. Dr. L thus apparently fulfills his moral obligation to respect the patient 
in the context o f a feeling o f admiration for the patient as a particular person who 
has a  particular way of coping with his illness. I will consider later in this chapter 
whether such admiration is a necessary aspect o f respecting the patient, and also 
how such admiration interferes with understanding the patient's situation fully.
Finally, Dr. L notes that he will miss the patient, whose discharge represents 
to Dr. L his ultimate parting. This brief but intense encounter touched Dr. L at 
a personal level; he feels a kinship with this patient. We could easily imagine Dr. 
L feeling emotional pain if  the patient were to break down his defenses and show 
terror or a dissolution o f self, or if he were to be mistreated by his family. By the 
end o f  their encounter, Dr. L's natural reactions to "bad" news about this patient 
would probably be more similar to those of a friend or family member than they 
would be to the deliberately non-judgmental listener who sat next to the patient on 
his bed and got him to start talking. In part three I consider what kind of
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emotional perspective is needed for physicians to face the suffering and loss of 
patients who, as Dr. L puts it, they have "come to like" over time.
II Emotional Regulation Involves Self-Persuasion
Dr. L regulates his emotions in this encounter by shifting his affective focus 
in a way that enables him to be a better physician. He begins with a sense o f the 
patient in the emergency room as an enormous burden to the overworked, abused 
intern he feels himself to be, and ends with a view o f  the patient as a kind of 
spiritual teacher to the receptive, maturing physician he feels him self to be. This 
does not necessarily imply a shift in beliefs, as our discussion of emotional inertia 
in chapter two made clear. Dr. L may have throughout the entire interaction the 
unwavering belief that he is a dedicated doctor trying to help an ornery man whose 
orneriness is a  defense against his fear of helplessness. How can we make sense 
o f  the observation that Dr. L directs his emotions by directing what he focuses on, 
given that we have argued earlier that the focus is itself not a detached thought but 
a construct with built-in affect? How can Dr. L deliberately move towards the 
affective experience of feeling admiration for the courageous aspect o f  the patient?
Robert Roberts208 gives an account of shifts in how one construes something 
that allow for emotional control and redirection. He defines "construing" as 
"bringing some perceived paradigm, or some concept or image or thought to
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seeing the current scenario in terms of some other thought or image. Roberts 
gives the following example. He imagines standing on a tall, wobbly ladder in 
order to rescue his daughter from a fire.
I do not need to cease judging the situation to be dangerous to cease feeling 
afraid. To cease feeling afraid (or start feeling less afraid), I need to refocus 
the situation in some appropriate way...Instead o f construing the situation 
as a threat to mv well-being -- say in terms of an image o f myself 
plummeting 25 feet to the pavement — I construe it as a rescue task — say 
in terms of an image o f walking down that ladder with my daughter safely 
in my arms.201
The point of Roberts' example is to show that even in the heat o f  a very strong 
emotion like fear o f falling to one's death, one has the capacity to imaginatively 
invoke alternative images that will change one's occurrent emotions. But what 
Roberts assumes but does not explain, is first, that one has the freedom to imagine 
another portrayal o f  one's situation, and second, that one can make the alternative 
affectively charged images -- about saving one's daughter -- efficacious in 
dampening (or exacerbating) the pre-existing emotion. In the third part o f this 
chapter I show how the affective attitude o f curiosity allows one the freedom to 
imagine things otherwise. But the discussion o f curiosity presupposes that we can 
make sense o f the causal claim that an imaginative reconstrual o f  one's situation
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could be efficacious in redirecting one's emotions. I therefore begin by analyzing 
the idea that one can move oneself, ie. that one's imaginative reconstrual could 
have causal impact on an occurrent emotion.
Like the person on the wobbly ladder, Dr. L  faces a situation that upsets him 
by invoking an alternative construal o f his situation. He approaches the patient 
with trepidation, and sits down by his bedside, asking him to tell his story. At 
that moment Dr. L was still feeling a kind o f  frustrated anger towards this 
devaluing patient (emotion A), and did not yet feel sufficient empathy or respect 
for the patient. Yet, he was motivated to be a good listener, out of a duty to be 
a  caring and thorough physician. In part three o f this chapter we will consider 
what enabled Dr. L to imagine his situation otherwise and to invoke his goal of 
being a good physician. But our present question is how an imaginative 
reconstrual o f  one's situation, whether o f being a good physician, or o f rescuing 
one's daughter, can cause one to shift away from anger or fear?
Given the holistic model of affect, image and motive that we argued for in 
chapter one, let us assume that the tacit thought about being a good physician was 
embedded in a particular emotion, such as pride, guilt or some other self-relational 
emotion. W e do not know enough details from the vignette to say which o f these 
emotions was in fact strongest for Dr. L, but let us say that it was pride that 
imbued his construal, so that he was happily motivated towards his idealizing 
thought o f him self as an excellent physician who listens well even to difficult
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patients. Let us call this prideful construal o f his interaction with the patient 
emotion B. With this reconstrual o f his situation, and an actual shift in his 
situation brought on by sitting down next to the patient,202 the patient begins to talk 
to Dr. L. From the vantage point o f pridefully construing him self as a  composed 
listener who can get into the patient's world, he is able to be moved by what it 
feels like to be impotent and abandoned by a worn-out family; he experiences the 
patient's sadness empathically (emotion C).
The Dr. L example brings out a point about the causality o f emotions that is 
not obvious in the wobbly ladder example, but that I take to be crucial for showing 
how reconstruals can be efficacious. In this example it is not ju st an image or a 
thought, but a  full fledged emotion B (pride) that is brought to bear on pre-existing 
emotion A (anger), and that shifts the agent out o f A, so that he can go on to 
emotion C (empathic sadness), rather then A' (ongoing anger). The fact that B has 
causal efficacy can be expressed by a counterfactual statement — without B acting 
on emotion A, Dr. L would have responded otherwise, with A'.
W hat Roberts fails to explain, and what we must explain, is what meaning of 
"cause" we have in mind in positing that one emotional construal has causal impact 
on another. I f  we cannot make sense o f Dr. L's pride as causing the remission of 
his anger, then we cannot say that Dr. L is steering his own emotional 
transitions 203 But how does emotion B move the agent out o f A?
In particular, what we need is a conception o f B as a "psychological cause"
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since it is in virtue o f the psychological event of B that the agent moves from A 
to C. Donald Davidson says that to say that one mental event causes another 
involves the linking of two events under a reason explanation in which event A 
provides a justification o f the occurrence o f event B; in addition the two events 
must also fit under some type-type physical description (inaccessible by translation 
from the psychological) that explains how the former can be a physical cause of 
the latter.204
Fam iliar models o f practical reasoning involving beliefs, desires and actions, fit 
this conception of psychological causation. Beliefs and desires are reasons for the 
beliefs and desires they cause, and beliefs and desire complexes are reasons for the 
actions they cause. However, while Dr. L's prideful thoughts about being a good 
physician may explain why he doesn't want to be angry, they are not reasons 
against his angry construal of the patient.
W e are thus faced with the particular problem of accounting for how a mental 
occurrence can be a  psychological cause without being a reason for what it causes. 
Donald Davidson considers this problem, which on the face o f it presents a 
contradiction, in his article "Paradoxes o f Irrationality."205 He is trying to explain 
akratic action, in which an agent's desires/beliefs can be mental causes o f her 
action without rationalizing her action. He concludes that in such cases there must 
be a kind o f boundary between the cause and the effect o f the sort that occurs 
when one person's desires/beliefs influence anothe. person's action. The idea of
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a boundary presupposes that there will be more rationality or internal consistency 
to separating the aspects o f the agents behavior and explaining them as causally 
interacting sub-systems than there is to unifying all aspects o f the agent's behavior. 
Such a separation allows one to invoke dual perspectives on the reason explanation 
o f the action. As Davidson explains, using the example o f  someone whose wish 
to have a well-turned calf causes his belief that he has a well-turned calf: "What 
his wish to have this belief makes rational is that this proposition should be true: 
He believes that he has a well-turned calf. This does not rationalize his believing: 
I have a well-turned calf."206
The idea that Dr. L's construal of the world via emotion B acts as an external, 
persuasive influence on his pre-existing emotion A takes an explanatory step 
beyond our observation that B is a reason for the remission of A that is not 
included in the agent's first personal reasons for/against A. Consider how a person 
may be moved by another's interested approval from an angry to a listening stance. 
Dr. L is moved by his own pride in the same way, as a  persuasive conception o f 
him self that invites certain attitudes and makes others unlikely. The idea o f an 
intrapsychic equivalent o f  interpersonal persuasion does not depend upon the idea 
o f an unconscious influence, in that one may be quite aware that one is being 
affected by a non-reason and still be affected.207 Rather, the key point is that 
within one person there can be two independent forms o f thought determining 
attention, which influence each other in the way that two separate persons may
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influence each other.
I f  the breakdown o f reason-relations defines the boundary o f  a subdivision o f 
emotions, there is a close link between the possibility o f emotional irrationality and 
emotional self-control. In chapter one we discussed how emotions can be wish- 
fulfilling — the agent can construe situations in ways that serve her yearnings. This 
possibility is inherent in the idea that emotions are not just responses to the 
situation one is in, but rather involve the agent's construing her situation in one 
way rather than another. What is not obvious in our discussion of wish-fulfilling 
emotion is where the locus o f the capacity to be irrational lies. Given that there 
is no "space" between the emotion and the construal that is its focus, there is no 
sense in asking whether it is rational or irrational for the agent in love, in fear, in 
anger, to see things as they do. Rather, what such questions presuppose is a 
perspective that is on the other side o f a boundary o f the sort Davidson describes. 
To ask (as I did in chapter two) if  a physician's fear o f the schizophrenic patient 
is rational, is to ask whether we can place a wedge between the psychological 
cause o f the fear and what rationalizes the fear. If  we can place such a wedge then 
the possibility that the fear is irrational must be considered.
By positing a boundary between emotion B and emotions A and C so that 
emotion B serves as a mental cause o f the ending o f  A and contributes to the 
occurrence o f C, we raise the possibility of emotional irrationality. The same 
capacity to influence ourselves irrationally makes it possible to influence ourselves
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in a role-directed fashion.208
However, the model o f interpersonal persuasion being invoked here excludes 
the idea that the link between the causally interacting emotions will be arational. 
That is, there is an important difference between pride causing a shift from anger 
to empathy, and a toothache causing a shift from empathy to anger. The 
toothache, which has a psychological component because it includes the experience 
o f  pain, does not meet the criteria o f "psychological cause" that we have in mind. 
Bodily feelings like pain, cold, or fatigue acting on one's occurrent emotions 
cannot be analogized to another person deliberately influencing one's imagination. 
The way they cause feeling states is more like the way physical events like being 
rained on, or hit over the head, cause feeling states. We cannot say that a 
toothache persuades one to feel angry, even though toothache's make people angry, 
and o f course, someone may give a particular symbolic meaning to having a 
toothache.
In summary, we can now explain how the idea that emotions involve being 
moved by circumstances is compatible with the idea that the agent can reconstrue 
circumstances and hence direct her emotions. The idea of a partitioning of 
emotional experience allows us to posit that Dr. L's prideful reconstrual o f his 
situation (emotion B) acts on him from the outside in the way that other people act 
on him emotionally. This could lead to irrational, wish-fulfilling emotions, but it 
need not necessarily do so. The causal connection between particular emotion
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instances is itself insufficient to determine whether an agent is deceiving herself 
or directing her emotional responses towards greater understanding o f things as 
they really are.
Ill Curiosity and the Freedom to Imaginatively Reconstrue One's Situation
Returning to our clinical vignette, consider how Dr. L's shift from anger to 
empathy is revealing of the patient's situation, whereas his shift into admiration is 
concealing. From the standpoint o f admiration, Dr. L does not himself see, never 
mind point out to the patient, that the patient's attempt to keep his family from 
recognizing his pain by fighting with them about his care is futile. That is, the 
patient is vulnerable and suffering, and his family is bound to recognize this. Yet 
Dr. L's response is so strongly admiring that he is not cognizant o f the pitiable 
aspect o f the patient, o f the way in which the patient is not brave but cowardly, in 
his inability to face the pain in his family's eyes.
Ironically, having persuaded himself into the standpoint o f admiration, Dr. L 
seems to lack something like "freedom" to imagine the patient's situation otherwise. 
The idea o f  such a "freedom" includes more than the capacity to act on oneself 
persuasively that we have just accounted for by positing a boundary within mental 
life. For one can act on oneself in a way that shifts one to an idealizing emotion 
that invites no further imaginative exploration. For example, it is probable that
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during the risky exit, the man on the wobbly ladder fixed his imagination on the 
idealized image of rescuing his daughter to the exclusion o f  subsequent 
reconstruals.
In such cases o f holding in mind an idealized image in order to keep out other 
images, the lack o f freedom does not reside simply in the agent's inflexibility. We 
can imagine a situation in which one carefully maintains a prideful feeling about 
one's work, or an affectionate feeling towards a friend, despite experiences that 
might lead a more "flexible" person to feel differently. Maintaining these 
emotions may require acting on oneself persuasively. For example, one may 
temper one's anger at an inconsiderate act by a friend by invoking loving thoughts 
about how caring she was in some other circumstances. In such cases of 
maintaining a chosen emotional attitude over time we speak of the agent as 
committed. But in the case o f Dr. L's admiring view o f  the patient, it is not his 
commitment to finding something admirable about the patient (an issue we turn to 
later) that is problematic. Rather, it is the observation that Dr. L's admiration 
involves missing important aspects o f the patient's situation. His idealizing 
admiration is thus more like pride in work that overlooks the shoddy or weak 
aspects o f the work, or blind loyalty that leads one not to see that one's friend is 
disappointing one. These cases involve boot-strapping, or wish-fulfilling
emotions, in which one "whistles a happy tune" to avoid shifting into other 
perspectives that would involve less comfortable emotions. These examples
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suggest that the idea o f an agent being free to imaginatively reconstrue her 
situation already includes in it the idea that one can shift one's emotions in ways 
that reveal rather than conceal things as they really are.
W hat standpoint allows physicians to move themselves out o f reality- 
concealing emotions like some instances o f admiration, fear and anger? Given our 
arguments against the concept o f the detached observer, we need to avoid 
reinvoking a model o f "reflection" that detaches judgment about one's emotions 
from the realm o f emotional experience. Thus I begin with the question o f what 
kind o f affective attitude helps one's regulate one's other emotions towards the goal 
o f being realistic? I think the attitude o f the physician necessary to enhance her 
openness to things as they really are is curiosity about her own and her patient's 
emotional reactions. The term "curious" comes from the latin "curiosus" which 
means careful, diligent; this term is akin to "cura", which means care, concern, and 
is closest in english to the word "cure."209 However, I take it that the physician's 
curiosity acts also as a way of distancing her from an overly involved concern. To 
show how, paradoxically, curiosity involves carefulness that can be therapeutic or 
curative, precisely because it is an emotion that liberates one's affective focus, I 
want to consider an example o f the use o f curiosity in clinical practice in some 
depth.
Because the physician needs to be curious about conflicting emotions, whether 
within herself or between herself and the patient, or within the patient, the clinical
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
203
example I choose is o f a couple therapist functioning as a  participant-observer.210 
The efficacy o f  the couple therapist resides in her capacity to combine an empathic 
grasp o f both partners positions with imaginative reconstruals o f their situation that 
are outside o f their joint view of reality. For example, consider a case in which 
a husband feels he must bear the responsibility for the finances and feels used by 
his wife, and the wife feels guilty but also resents not having a say in their 
decisions because the husband is so controlling. The therapist's empathic 
participation in each o f their points o f view, invites each o f them to get 
empathically involved with each other. Once the husband and wife can recognize 
each other's independent emotional construals o f their shared situation, they are 
liberated to manage conflict safely for the first time because they have the tools to 
make-up after an argument. For example, the husband can then genuinely 
understand why his wife feels controlled by his making the budget decisions, while 
still feeling his own concern that she would put her needs first and take advantage 
o f  him if  she did the budget.
However, this empathic recognition in no way challenges the couple's shared 
assumptions about their situation. The more difficult, subtle and powerful aspect 
o f the therapist's job is to recognize the collusive way the two members o f the 
couple construe reality so that both of them can avoid certain risks and 
responsibilities in the relationship. (Often, it is not what the couple argues about, 
but what they are compelled to agree about that most constricts their relationship).
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In this example it may be that both husband and wife construe their gender roles 
as requiring a conception o f him as strong and able and o f her as weak and 
dependent, and both members may believe that if she earned money, this 
interaction would be threatened. The therapist must be able to raise their 
consciousness about the way their joint affective construals o f reality creates a kind 
o f  ideology that conceals as well as reveals what is at stake in their relationship.
In order to challenge their collusive construal o f reality the therapist needs to 
m ove from an empathic grasp o f their emotions to a non-empathic curiosity about 
the taken-for-granted scenarios that are the foci o f their emotions. As we argued 
in chapter four, empathic portrayals are not hypothetical. In contrast, curiosity is 
hypothetical — the therapist becomes curious about whether or not it makes sense 
fo r the husband to see his wife as frivolous, when she may be capable o f more 
responsibility than he gives her credit for.
The therapist's curiosity differs from empathy not only in that it takes up the 
couple's emotional judgments hypothetically, but also in that it considers the way 
their emotions function instrumentally. The curious therapist sees the couple's 
em otions from "outside," and posits teleological causal connections between their 
emotions. For example, the therapist will begin to wonder about how the 
husband's view o f his wife as irresponsible and helpless relates to his own self­
esteem. In chapter one, we argued (against Sartre and Solomon) that emotions 
can function strategically and still represent things as they really are. This is
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because emotions are always partial grasps o f things as they really are that conceal 
as well as reveal. In considering the strategic interplay o f  the couple's emotions, 
the therapist need not consider the couple's emotional construals to be lies or 
illusions. Rather, she abstains from taking any particular emotional construal to 
be an adequate portrayal of things as they really are.
It is only when the therapist engages the couple to become curious about their 
own collusive emotions and how they function strategically, that the possibility 
o f  real emotional change arises. I think there are two forces that effect change. 
First, by negating the all or nothing quality o f  their emotional construals, and 
accepting that there are new, as yet unknown ways o f responding to their situation, 
the couple is freed to experiment with trial reconstruals o f their situation. This 
openness is necessary but not sufficient for change, since the trial reconstruals will 
not move the couple unless they fit with things as they really are. For example 
the trial reconstrual o f their situation as involving a wish to rely on each other 
more and risk overcoming sexual stereotypes would fall flat if  in fact the husband 
did not yearn to be taken care of and the wife yearn for more responsibility and 
respect.
A second force for change comes from recognizing the strategic nature o f 
particular emotional responses, because such recognition in and o f  itself shifts the 
locus o f  responsibility for, and control over the emotions. Much o f the irrationality 
o f  emotions — their power to influence one against one's all considered judgments,
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and to conceal aspects o f reality — depends upon their strategic function remaining 
hidden. For example, Melvin Lansky argues that flirtation and intimidation are 
efficacious only insofar as they keep the seductive or threatening message as a kind 
o f disowned backbeat to an emotionally benign foreground communication. If one 
recognizes and calls the person on their disowned seductiveness or threat, they can 
no longer flirt or intimidate, even if  they retain their sexual longing or anger and 
reexpress it in some other way. In this example o f couple therapy, consider how 
the husband may use feelings o f victimization to invoke guilt in the wife in order 
to control her behavior. By recognizing the strategic function o f the husband's 
feelings o f being used, the couple loses their usual modus operandi. The wife who 
recognizes that she is being made to feel guilty shifts the locus o f responsibility for 
the husband's suffering from her shoulders to their interaction; this alone may 
dissolve her guilt and with it her capacity to be covertly controlled by her husband. 
The husband's recognition of his own covert power in using guilt to control his 
wife contradicts his feared conception o f himself as ineffective in influencing his 
wife; this recognition alone may empower him to use his influence overtly and ask 
his wife to share responsibility for the finances.
These examples rely on a point made in chapter one, that just because 
emotions involve actually being moved by circumstances does not entail that one 
is by definition at the mercy of one's emotions rather than a shaper of one's 
emotional responses. However, from within any particular emotional response,
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
207
which involves experiencing oneself as moved by circumstances, there is 
necessarily a blindness to the way one's emotion functions strategically in 
constituting one's situation. The therapist's capacity to stand outside any particular 
emotional construal, and to engage the couple in imagining how their emotions 
may function strategically, is her most powerful tool to effect change.
How can we apply all this to the example o f Dr. L? The metaphor o f  the 
couple therapist is meant to relate to both Dr. L's work on his own emotional 
conflicts, and to Dr. L's work with the "couple" consisting o f himself and the 
patient.211 Dr. L becomes curious about the patient's particular experience of being 
ill, dumped in the hospital, and faced with one doctor after another. Yet Dr. L's 
curiosity involves a distinct shift away from a purely empathic standpoint in that 
he keeps one foot outside the construals that the patient takes to coincide with 
reality. Dr. L wonders whether it is really the case that the patient will inevitably 
be dehumanized by the medical situation, and wonders whether the patient is 
unaware of, or has not yet been offered, the opportunity to connect with a caring 
physician, and to feel like an active participant in his medical care. Dr. L is 
curious about what particular meaning seeing himself as the passive victim of 
medical interventions has for this patient.
Dr. L also turns his curious gaze onto his own threatening emotions. He 
notices that his initial aversive feeling towards the patient, which includes a 
concrete sense that the patient is impossible to communicate with, is a defense
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against underlying feelings o f helplessness about the patient's illness. Apparently 
this awareness lessens his sense that it is hopeless to try to talk with the patient, 
and makes it possible for him to invoke a prideful and hopeful reconstrual of 
him self as a dedicated physician who can help this man. With hope, pride and 
courage, he sits with the patient and asks him to tell his story.212
In Dr. L's case, the use o f curiosity to decenter from his own hopelessness and 
anger facilitates his capacity to listen to the patient empathically.213 Dr. L no 
longer focuses on his own experience as the object o f the patient's hostility, as he 
decenters his attention from responding to the patients accusatory remarks to 
considering what it feels like to be this particular patient. This focusing o f his 
attention on the patient's emotions invites, but cannot guarantee, empathic
214resonance.
Although his curiosity about the patient's hostility decenters Dr. L from his 
own anger and helplessness, and enables him to move himself with pride and 
courage to listen to the patient, there is a danger in such decentering. Dr. L 
focuses on the patient's anger and the response it invokes in others as itself a 
"curiosity" — a reified problem requiring the attention o f a physician who can 
transcend such reactions. In saying: "I decided to look for emotional or 
psychological reasons for his hostility," Dr. L is using a kind o f role-legitimized 
curiosity to  avoid looking at an intense human encounter that implicates himself 
as well as the patient. This would be patronizing and incomplete if  it did not
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
209
include attention to his own vulnerability to overreacting to such a patient. That 
he is also curious about his own reasons for reacting to such a patient is clear from 
his writing a story about his interaction with the patient in which he must portray 
his own character as well as the patients. He describes him self in the story as 
tired, overworked and insecure about his own role. One way to teach medical 
students to become curious about their own emotional responses to patients is to 
invite them to write stories about their interactions with "difficult" patients.
How is the affective standpoint o f  curiosity different from the standpoint o f the 
detached observer? First, there is no affective "truth" that is the object o f the 
curious physician on the model o f aperspectival truth for the detached observer. 
That is why, for example, couple therapy requires behavioral interventions in which 
the therapist asks the couple to try out some new behaviors to see what new ways 
they can relate. The therapist cannot know from some process o f  "reflection" that 
the husband's and wife's construals of each other are "wrong." Rather, the 
therapist can only question their conviction that their construals coincide with 
reality. The basis o f this skepticism is not a  concern for truth, which is irrelevant 
here, but an interest in seeing what is concealed behind the sincerity o f their 
emotions. This is not to say that the therapist thinks they are lying, but rather, 
that she questions their apparent lack of ambivalence, and their conviction that 
their being fully coincides with their assigned roles in the relationship.215 
Similarly, Dr. L gives his patient and himself the opportunity to "try on" a new
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interaction, after a night's sleep, given his awareness that his original, angry 
reaction to the patient's hostility conceals other reactions the two might have 
towards each other.
The second way the curiosity o f the physician differs from a detached 
standpoint is that curiosity is not disinterested; it is profoundly interested but not 
driven by the need to secure oneself. The affect o f  curiosity is characterized by 
an unburdened or playful absorption in one's thoughts that allows one to forget 
oneself; one is not worried or concerned about securing oneself. Plato's and 
Aristotle's image for curiosity is the stargazer, whose mind is on the heavens rather 
than his own steps.216
However, the image of the stargazer, which is the origin o f  the theoretical 
standpoint o f the scientist as well as the philosopher, is not quite proper for the 
curiosity o f the physician, because the doctor is not contemplating something 
distant, but something close to home, which he is suddenly able to see as strange, 
uncanny. Just as the family therapist must experience an empathic resonance with 
each member o f the couple to be effective, the physician must have as the focus 
o f his curiosity the particular emotional construals that he and the patient have. 
And as we argued in the empathy chapter, there is no road to understanding the 
particular affective construals o f others except through empathic imaginative 
involvement.
However, there is an important way in which curiosity about emotions
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dampens emotions. The physician's curiosity about the patient's and his own 
reactions decreases the compelling quality o f their construals; it decreases the 
degree to which he will be actually moved by their plight, since part o f what is 
moving is the idea that what is being depicted is exactly how things really are. 
But the physician wonders if this is the case. The standpoint o f wondering, o f 
entertaining hypothetical construals o f their situation, involves a departure from an 
empathic to a non-empathic stance. Curiosity require suspending judgment in 
order to allow oneself to be uncertain about how things are; this standpoint departs 
sharply from the engaged believing quality o f empathy, in which one is for 
example, saddened by that which saddens the patient.217
Dr. L's awareness that the patient's occurrent emotions do not capture every 
aspect o f reality does not lead to the kind o f skepticism about the patient's 
subjective experience inherent in the disease model of medicine. Dr. L is not like 
the accusatory detective who knows the suspect will kill again. This is because Dr. 
L refrains from reducing the patient's emotions to a causal explanation which seeks 
to predict the patient's future. He respects the patient's capacity to author his own 
future. By acknowledging his uncertainty about the patient's future, he gives the 
patient a  kind o f unconditional or non-judgmental regard.218
However, the fact that curiosity lessens one's ties to any particular construal 
o f one's situation is what is behind the ubiquitous association of curiosity with 
danger. We say "curiosity killed the cat," and Thales' star-gazing ends with him
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
212
falling into a well, injured and subject to scorn. The point is not that curiosity is 
in and o f itself destructive, but rather that it involves the risk o f setting out to sea 
without guarantee o f a safe journey. We can imagine how dangerous a physician 
would be if  she were moved only by endless curiosity, untempered by empathy. 
In part four o f this chapter I consider what overarching attitudes serve as the 
physician's road-map over time and assure that her curiosity will be tethered and 
put to good use.
This image of curiosity as involving a non-collusive, freely moving interest in 
the patient is resonant with Freud's image of the ideal analyst as having "evenly 
suspended attention."219 Freud tells the analyst to teach his patient how to associate 
freely by invoking the image o f being on a train looking out the window.220 I 
think this image is meant not only for the analysand, but for the analyst, since the 
source o f data in analysis is the patient's free associations, and the therapist's 
attunement with the movement o f these associations requires freedom to move with 
the patient from one focus to the next. When riding a train, one's gaze is not on 
one place but moves with the landscape. It is this kind o f freedom, and not 
affective detachment, that I have in mind by invoking the affect o f curiosity.221
In summary, we have seen that Dr. L's capacity for emotional self-regulation 
is complex. The capacity to act on himself persuasively is a necessary condition 
for directing his affects. This is illustrated by the man on the wobbly ladder who 
dampens his fear by holding in mind a courageous construal o f his task. But if
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self-regulation depended only on the degree to which one could move oneself 
persuasively, then there would be no distinction between Dr. L's use o f pride to 
shift from anger into empathy, and his use o f admiration to cover over his feelings 
o f  disappointment. The difference between these two instances is that only in the 
former case does Dr. L show an ongoing capacity to imaginatively invoke 
alternative construals o f his situation that broaden his understanding o f reality. 
This capacity resides in an overarching affective stance o f curiosity.
So far, our account o f emotional self-regulation has two tiers. Dr. L's curiosity 
enables him to decenter from his own anger and hopelessness about the patient. 
This decentering creates the opportunity for him to alight upon a prideful 
reconstrual o f  his situation. His pride then moves him further from his anger, by 
focusing him on his goal o f being a  good physician who listens to the patient. All 
o f this made it possible for him to sit and listen to the patient, which made possible 
but did not guarantee, his subsequent empathic response to the patient.
I have used the contrast between curiosity and idealizing admiration to identify 
a kind o f "freedom" to invoke alternative construals o f one's situation that get 
beyond wish-fulfilling depictions o f  reality. Yet I would still maintain that Dr. L 
is moved to wonder about the patient early in his encounter, and yet moved to 
idealize the patient later. This suggests that the freedom to imaginatively shift 
gears is not radical. The view o f emotions we have defended, as involving being 
moved by circumstances and determining salience prior to any act o f will, entails
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that Dr. L's capacity for self-regulation will itself be subject to the conditions o f 
his situation, his bodily condition and habits. For example, Dr. L regulates himself 
by getting some sleep prior to continuing his discussion with the patient. Dr. L's 
emotional dispositions will also depend a  great deal on his acculturation into the 
"world" o f medicine over time, so that directing his own emotional course will 
require indirect action via transforming that "world". For example, Dr. L 
influences the conditions o f his socialization into his professional role by sharing 
stories with other physicians about emotional interactions with patients, rather than 
ju s t reporting statistics about procedures.222
IV W hat Affective Standpoint is Needed for Physicians to Maintain Their Integrity 
Over Time?
Our account o f how Dr. L acts on him self persuasively has left us with two 
questions about what is required for such self-regulation to be in the service o f Dr. 
L's goals as a physician. First, does respecting the patient require idealizing 
admiration? Second, does the goal o f understanding the patient accurately cohere 
with the goals o f  respecting the patient and being an efficacious healer?
First o f all, it might be argued that Dr. L needs to admire his patients in order 
to respect them as persons. In this vignette, it may appear that pitying the patient 
would be devaluing, and would therefore do harm to the patient. Further, if one
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favors the Kantian value of respecting patients as end-setters over beneficently 
protecting the well-being of patients, than admiration might appear to be more 
appropriate than pity. Dr. L's admiration for the patient leads him to see the 
patient's choice o f refusing care and refusing discussion with his family as rightful. 
In contrast, a pitying view of the patient as fighting a futile battle to deny his pain 
and his need for familial support might have lead to questioning the 
appropriateness o f the patient's decision. Does this mean that in order to honor the 
patient's own preferences with regard to his health care the physician needs to 
admire some aspect o f the patient and to avoid seeing the patient as pathetic? That 
is, does respecting the patient as an end-setter depend upon feeling admiration for 
the patient, so that what one is obligated to do is to drum up admiration in every 
case?
The idea that the proper Kantian physician has an obligation to reconstrue until 
she can admire all patients is in fact a perversion of our attempt to root Kantian 
morality in affectivity. The core o f the Kantian conception is the idea that the 
moral value o f actions is independent from the particular affects that motivate the 
actions. The revisionist version we argued for in chapter three suggests that 
affective ties are needed to draw one's attention to actions that are capable of being 
morally valuable; if  one then acts according to maxims that are universalizable, one 
is acting morally. What may not have been obvious in our discussion o f Kantian 
ethics is that the claim that affects are necessary to perceive what is morally salient
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is not a  defense o f a kind of moral relativism in which the feeling o f respect, 
wherever it can be generated, bestows moral value on the situation. I f  this were 
true, than the moral value o f a situation could be amplified by self-deceptive 
admiration. W hat is morally valuable is not having a certain experience of 
sentiment, but rather being genuinely moved by worthy aspects o f another person's 
situation. Only the agent who is sensitive to what situations actually are morally 
salient, and then acts in such instances in a way that is generalizable, can be a 
moral agent.
Further, being sensitive to what is morally relevant in human life depends upon 
seeing things as they really are. The claim that an adequate moral perspective 
requires perceptiveness and judgment about what is more or less significant in the 
human world, entails that the moral agent ought to strive to see things as they 
really are. In our example, Dr. L's final admiring view of the patient prevents 
several morally relevant connections from occurring. Dr. L misses the chance of 
caring for the patient without idealizing him, recognizing his cowardice as well as 
his bravery and still maintaining his connection to the patient. And the patient 
misses the opportunity of having his feelings acknowledged by a realistic, caring 
physician. Such recognition from another might have enabled the patient to 
recognize that his unspeakable fear about exposing him self to his family could be 
dealt with as a manageable problem. This might have led to a third moral 
opportunity, the opportunity for the patient to value honest self-disclosure at the
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risk o f disappointing his family.
Finally, there is no reason to assume that either experiencing the affect of 
respect, nor following the rule o f respecting the capacity o f others to determine 
their fate should require idealizing their actions. One can feel respect for someone 
in light o f his or her foibles as well as his or her strengths; Dr. L could respect 
the patient for trying his best given his particular fears. Consider, for example, 
how women involved in consciousness-raising in the seventies and eighties found 
that it was only when their male companions removed them from the pedestal of 
feminine goodness and acknowledged them realistically in light o f  their strengths 
and weaknesses that they felt respected as peers. Finally, the Kantian commitment 
to respect the patient as an end-setter involves supporting the patient's capacity for 
self-determination, even when the patient's choices are not admired by the 
physician. (In the last section o f this chapter I argue against the idea that 
physicians ought to direct patients to make choices that physicans consider 
admirable). In summary, respecting the patient as a person does not require self- 
deceptive admiration for the patient, nor does it require coerceing the patient to 
behave admirably.
But this problem is part o f a more general problem of whether the functioning 
o f physicians over time is best served by emotions that are revealing or concealing 
o f things as they really are, given that much of the reality o f medical practice is 
painful and depressing. For example is it better for physicians to feel realistic
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worry about their patient's outcomes so that their hopefulness is guarded, or would 
they have a more hope-generating effect on patients by feeling unqualifiedly 
hopeful and optimistic even in situations where there is a low probability of 
recovery? Is it better for physicians to realistically feel grief at the loss o f a patient 
and to feel realistically guarded at attaching to the next patient, or would a self- 
deluding feeling o f buoyancy leading to an intense interest in attaching to each and 
every patient be better for meeting the goals o f medical practice?
Rene Fox describes the way physicians use magical thinking, which covers 
over things as they really are, to defend themselves in the face o f  therapeutic 
limitation, uncertainty, and existential concerns about the meaningfulness o f their 
work. Fox quotes the anthropologist Malinowski, who said that physicians 
"ritualize their optimism." They maintain confidence about the effectiveness of 
their procedures even in the face o f strong evidence to the contrary. This helps 
them to endure and persist and to encourage patients to do so, and thus helps 
stabilize some patients who otherwise would never have made it, yet also leads to 
"the nonrational inability to desist, at great physical and psychic, as well as 
economic, cost to both health professionals and those for whom they care."223 Fox 
wrote this in 1980, but in 1993, with the overriding impact o f economic concerns 
on medical practice leading to rationing, I think physicians are just as likely to use 
magical thinking to ritualize their pessimism, and predict the futility o f care in 
order to desist from care without experiencing their uncertainty.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
219
W hile we cannot address here these empirical questions about how magical 
thinking effects medical care, we can return to our clinical example to see how 
idealizing the patient effects the physician's efficacy over time. Certainly Dr. L's 
admiration for the patient made the patient feel special, and made Dr. L feel special 
about his interaction with this otherwise very demoralizing patient. But consider 
what would happen if  the patient returned to Dr. L's service in some overtly 
regressed condition, with a decline in his health related to non-adherence to 
medications, and with uncontrollable rage at his family and at Dr. L for his 
condition. Most likely Dr. L's idealization would be crushed and he would 
experience disappointment. Often it is just this repetitive feeling of disappointment 
in patients who do not fare well, that motivates an attitude o f detachment in 
physicians who cannot bear feeling their efforts to be futile. In this vignette, we 
might speculate that the nurse and others who have repetitively cared for this 
patient treat him with avoidance and resentment out o f such disappointment, which 
is the flip side o f idealization.
This suggests that where there is a continuing physician-patient relationship 
over time, the efficacy of the physician is best served by a realistic rather than a 
deceptive appraisal o f the patient. However, this needs to be fit into an emotional 
perspective that allows physicians to endure the losses and disappointments 
inherent in medical practice over time.
After an intense, but only two day interaction, Dr. L says that he felt attached
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to the patient, and that he would miss him. Imagine how much more intense this 
attachment is, and how much more pressure there is to idealize, when one grows 
close to a chronically ill patient over many years? We have already mentioned 
above one risk o f such idealization, which is the subsequent devaluation that occurs 
when the patient disappoints the physician. But an equally big risk is that in order 
to maintain an idealized relationship with a  patient unto the time of her death, the 
physician simply does not notice the fears, anger, or worry of the patient 
undergoing heroic therapies. This not noticing guarantees that opportunities to be 
empathic, efficacious and genuinely respectful of the real individual will be lost.
The affective attitude of facing the pain of another, or o f  one's own loss 
unflinchingly, is courage. Aristotle writes "it is for facing what is painful... that 
men are called 'courageous.'"224 It may at first seem that what "facing" pain means 
for Aristotle can have little relevance to my model of the emotionally courageous 
physician, since Aristotle's courageous man is not psychologically minded but 
oriented towards action on the battlefield. And I have in mind a courage that is 
apparently much more passive, which involves not physical action but an emotional 
alignment with the suffering of the patient. But there is an essential link between 
Aristotle's conception of courage in action and my conception o f the courage to 
endure emotions honestly. In both types o f courage, one knows that what one 
faces in the pain and loss o f another is the possibility o f one's own pain and loss. 
Aristotle's courageous man has an unflinching sense o f his own mortality that
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gives the character o f  courage to his risking his own body to save other bodies. 
Courage thus contains in it a kind of grief, a sobering realization o f one's own 
finitude. W hen Dr.L sits down by the bedside o f his patient, and experiences 
trepidation, he is poignantly aware o f  his own vulnerability and yet committed to 
taking on the pain o f  the patient; this double awareness, in which one knows that 
one is afraid but does not thematize one's fear out of concern for another, is a 
courageous stance.
In current discussions o f  medical ethics the issue of whether a good physician 
needs to be courageous is raised in discussions o f risk in caring for patients whose 
illnesses may physically endanger physicians, most notably, hepatitis B, 
tuberculosis and HIV infection. Most often courage is seen as a supererogatory 
virtue that is not necessary for providing good day to day medical care. This 
ignores the importance of courage in the day to day enduring of the most tragic 
aspects o f human life. Idealization and detachment are strategies for facing these 
tragedies when courage fails or wears thin, as it inevitably does.
The question o f how, practically, to cultivate courage in physicians is a topic 
for another work, but a  few points follow directly from the idea that courage 
requires a capacity for grief. First o f all, one needs time off from the battlefield 
in order to grieve and repair oneself, and most physicians do not get the time off 
to grieve and renew themselves in a way that will allow them to face rather than 
shrink from, each and every patient's suffering. One wonders, for example,
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whether another night's rest might have enabled Dr. L to face his patient's 
discharge with a realistic appreciation o f both the patient's fear and o f his own fear 
for the patient's future.
Second, one needs rituals that acknowledge death and renewal in the context 
o f a community. But physicians are extraordinarily emotionally isolated and do 
not have rituals to grieve. The closest physicians come to breaking their isolation 
and sharing their painful emotions with each other is through the use o f "black 
humor," which I think is analogous to the use of humor at a wake.225 Imagine if 
physicians had communal gatherings to acknowledge the uncanniness o f such 
routine experiences as turning off the respirator o f a patient in a coma.226 Most 
importantly, physicians often lack any system o f faith that might place in 
perspective their hubristic belief that they are responsible for whether patients live 
or die, so that deaths, especially unexplained deaths, are personal failures.
In summary, the physician's goals o f understanding the patient realistically, 
treating the patient efficaciously, and respecting the patient as a person require 
emotional self-regulation. In this chapter, I presented a three tiered model o f  
emotional self-regulation: first, one uses concurrent emotional attitudes to move 
oneself persuasively out o f other emotions; second, curiosity frees one to imagine 
alternative construals o f one's own and the patient's situation, so that one can play 
a  creative role in generating the attitudes that will move one persuasively; third, 
courage allows one to face the suffering of one's fellow human beings without
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having to split-off awareness o f one's own vulnerability, thus allowing for maximal 
awareness o f one's emotional attitudes. The "tiers" here are not necessarily 
consciously experienced as at different levels o f reflection. And there is no reason 
to call curiosity or courage "second-order" emotions, since they have as their focus 
an aspect o f the agent's situation in the world. Rather, these three attitudes work 
together in apparently simple emotional experiences. When Dr. L sits down beside 
his patient, despite his trepidation, and asks him to tell in his own words what is 
wrong with him, he displays all three aspects o f emotional self-regulation.
V Prospective Conclusions for Future Work on the Physician-Patient Relationship
How does this model o f emotional self-regulation change our reading o f Osier's 
description o f the physician striving for "equanimity?" Osier says that the 
physician's recognition that he has something essential in common with the patient 
is intolerable, and moves him to forgetfulness. Given our account o f emotions as 
determining salience, it becomes clear that Osier's physician is suffering along with 
the patient; for to experience something as intolerable, and yet unavoidable, and 
to desire to flee it, is to suffer. We have come full circle to find that it is not by 
detaching him self but by resonating in his own being with the patient's suffering 
that Osier's physician "sees" the "weakness" he has in common with the patient.227
Yet Osier says that the physician's recognition o f the pathos o f his own being
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is resisted by a "happy egotism" that drives him to forgetfulness. This 
forgetfulness distinguishes his standpoint from that o f Dr. L. Osier's physician 
does not become curious about his own or the patient's suffering, or invoke pride 
to  dampen his pain, or face the patient's pain with courage. Rather, he forgets the 
patient's suffering by forgetting its significance for his own being. He strives to 
segregate his emotional responses from his conscious thought processes, so that he 
is unaware o f any feelings, including compassion for the patient.
This kind of splitting o f the self, in which the mind does not consider what the 
feelings recognize, is commonly experienced by physicians who justify their 
experience under the ideal o f "detached concern." But to treat patients in a rote 
fashion, without consulting one's compassion, makes all kinds o f cruelty possible. 
This dangerous side o f detachment explains why Osier says that the forgetful 
physician needs self-control and charity. He is like the Kantian rule-fetishist who 
acts out o f an external commitment to behave charitably towards the patient, but 
is not moved to genuinely respect the patient. If, instead, he could use curiosity 
and courage to remain affectively engaged, he would be less likely to treat the 
patient as a thing rather than as a person.228
In concluding this dissertation it is notable that once the "happy egotism" 
expressed in the ideal o f "detached concern" is seen through, physicians face 
inevitable conflict. The goals o f understanding and respecting patients require
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affective connections that are endangered by the structure o f current medical 
practice. This leads to some final questions about the implications o f this 
dissertation for the future o f the doctor-patient relationship in a time of massive 
change in the institutional practice o f medicine.
Although analyzing the socioeconomic structure o f medical practice is beyond 
the scope of this work, this dissertation has socioeconomic implications given that 
it argues for enriching rather than impoverishing the affective ties between 
physicians and patients. Currently the physician-patient relationship is severely 
fragmented. Fewer Americans have one primary internist coordinating their care. 
Physicians are increasingly expected to take on a  gate-keeper function in which 
they have a primary obligation to distributing limited health care goods in an 
economically feasible way, which competes with their obligation to care for the 
best interests o f patients. Given these two factors, as well as the increasing 
bureaucratic pressure to spend less time with patients noted in the introduction, 
physicians are often not sufficiently available and unencumbered to engage with 
patients in making serious health care decisions.
The idea that physicians are guided by a "detached concern" for their patients 
provides security to those who do not want to consider the impact o f the 
fragmentation o f medical care on patients. The results o f this dissertation disturb 
that security, and provide guidance for reconsidering these issues. First, the issue 
o f whether patients benefit from a primary, continuing relationship with an internist
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is clarified by our arguments. We have shown that understanding the patient's 
illness requires empathy, and that empathy requires building a working model o f 
the patient's world over time and multiple interactions. Thus continuity o f care is 
important not just for comforting patients but for making accurate diagnoses and 
treating the patient efficaciously.
Second, we have provided an argument against using physicians simultaneously 
as care providers and gate-keepers by arguing against the picture o f Kantian 
impartiality as involving an impersonal interest in others segregated from one’s 
affective ties. Physicians under direct economic and professional pressures to 
withhold medical care as institutional gate-keepers may not be able to put the 
patient's interests at the center of their attention. This would depend somewhat on 
where the locus of responsibility for limiting care resides. If, as in increasingly 
numerous health maintenance corporations, the physician's own monthly bonus 
depends upon not referring the patient to expensive consultants, then it seems that 
the need to steel oneself from being moved by the suffering o f the patient in order 
to avoid guilt at denying him care would inhibit respect, empathy and curiosity. 
If, however, the physician is not a directly interested party who benefits from the 
patient's sacrifices, but rather is rationing care according to guidelines that 
physicians and patients have previously agreed are ethical, then perhaps the 
physicians role as an advocate can be preserved.229 In such cases, the physician 
would be more like a  parent sharing scarce resources as fairly as possible among
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many children. However, this parental metaphor, which appeared benign when 
describing the physician's fiduciary obligations to patients in an expanding health 
care system, takes on a different tone when used to convey the physician's power 
to control a scarce resource. A question for future work is what impact on the 
affective and ethical nature o f the physician-patient relationship is posed by 
rationing medical care?
Third, the question o f what role physicians ought to play in patients' health 
care decisions looks very different once one appreciates the time and mental 
freedom necessary for empathy, curiosity and respect. In a recent article, Ezekiel 
and Linda Emanuel230 proposed that physicians should offer expert moral guidance 
based on their professional values, regardless o f the patient's own values, rather 
than striving to help patients clarify their own particular health care values. For 
example, the physician should use arguments to persuade patients to care about the 
health o f  others and to therefore volunteer to be research subjects. The Emanuels 
believe that physicians accrue moral wisdom about dealing with illness as they 
carry out their other functions, and thus are appropriate moral guides. What is 
appealing about their view is the idea that there are professional values, such as 
promoting the well-being o f each patient, implicit in medical practice. I argue 
elsewhere that it is these shared professional values that provide the essential 
boundaries o f the physician's activities. When physicians operate outside o f  certain 
guidelines on their behavior -- including the principle o f being first and foremost
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an advocate o f the individual patient -- they lose their moral mandate.
But the Emanuels' idea is that the physician has an obligation to influence the 
patient's behavior to conform to a set o f health values that exist independently of 
the particular patient's experiences. To some degree, physicians already do this in 
order to preserve the health o f other people besides the patient. For example, 
physicians are compelled to recommend that people protect their own health and 
the health o f  others by practicing "safe" sex. Yet, this extension of the physician's 
role when patients are likely to endanger others does not entail that it is best for 
physicians to give moral advice to patients making serious decisions about their 
own futures, rather than to empathically and respectfully assist the patient in 
articulating his or her own values.
An important assumption of the Emanuels' article is that physicians in current 
medical practice can adequately intuit what is o f moral significance for patients. 
But physicians cannot adequately perceive what is morally salient for patients from 
a detached standpoint. Rather, empathy and respect are necessary to appreciate 
what is significant for suffering patients. In addition, sensitivity to the moral 
dimension o f patients' situations depends upon a capacity to think reflectively about 
difficult moral dilemmas over time.231 I picture moral reflectiveness as a kind of 
meta-curiosity that loosens the hold of one's own and one's patients' "natural" 
attitudes. Such curiosity is essential if  one is to free oneself sufficiently from 
primary allegiances to both persons and principles to reconsider their value in light
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o f new experiences with patients. Finally, by involving oneself empathically in 
these new experiences with patients the physician can develop moral wisdom that 
is rooted in the actual practice o f medicine, rather than in abstractions. Physicians 
who do not have the time or support to cultivate their own capacities for empathy, 
respect, or curiosity are unlikely to accrue moral wisdom. Even if one favors the 
kind o f  paternalism supported by the Emanuel's (which I do not), one must 
question whether physicians under present conditions are suitable moral guides for 
patients.
In concluding this dissertation it is apparent that the physician's situation in our 
present society is a  tragic one, given that to understand and respect patients 
requires affective connections that are at best infrequently supported by our current 
institutions. But the ideal o f "detached concern" reifies and excuses the 
socioeconomic and political limitations o f our health care system by idealizing 
affective disengagement as the truth-seeking, impartial, courageous approach to 
patients. I have shown that it is none of these, and that physicians can only fulfill 
their obligations to patients by empathizing with them, and genuinely feeling 
respect for them. When these attitudes are accompanied by curiosity and courage, 
both of which require institutional support, physicians can regulate their affective 
engagement with patients sufficiently to care for patients over a lifetime without 
losing their compassion.
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End Notes
1. The reflexivity o f the term "detach" -- which m eans detach oneself — may be 
misleading if  it is taken to require a  conscious act o f  struggling against occurrent 
emotion. Rather, the goal o f detachment is embedded in the very structure o f 
medical interactions, so that physicians need not deliberately try to be unemotional. 
Rather, they learn to pre-reflectively repress, deny or otherwise divorce themselves 
from their own emotions.
2. From the AM A Code o f Ethics adopted in 1957, reprinted in Beauchamp, Tom and 
Childress, James, Principles o f Biomedical Ethics. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1979.
3. However, the goal o f  basing one's diagnoses and prognoses on scientific principles 
does not in and o f itself justify the notion that physicians should detach themselves 
from patients. There is no scientific evidence that emotional engagement disrupts 
medical care. To the contrary, research on the placebo effect suggests that some 
emotional engagement between physician and patient may be therapeutic. See 
Spiro, Howard, Doctors. Patients and Placebos. N ew  Haven: Yale University Press, 
1986.
4. In hospitals and HMO's physicians are forced by the institutional emphasis on 
economic efficiency to take an assembly line approach to patients. Hospitals train 
physicians to minimize their time with patients by hiring too few  residents to work 
inhumane hours. Physicians are encouraged to be superficially pleasant but not to 
waste "unproductive" energy by responding emotionally to patients. By the time 
doctors are out in private practice, they have internalized the value o f  minimizing 
time with patients in order to maximize efficiency.
Physicians are thus not only instruments but commodities. W hile they are in other 
ways a privileged group, they fit Marx's description of alienated labor if one 
considers how their sympathetic emotions, to paraphrase Marx, are most their own 
yet most taken away from them in their professionalization. See Marx, Karl, The 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts o f 1844. New York: International 
Publishers, 1964.
5. Adopted by the American Medical Association in 1957 and printed in Beauchamp 
and Childress, op.cit.
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6. Adopted in 1973, and printed in Beauchamp and Childress, op.cit.
7. American legal cases since the turn of the century have censured physicians for 
performing surgery against patients' wishes (Schloendorff v. The Society of New 
York Hospital.19141. However, the idea that physicians actually need to seek the 
informed consent o f patients before starting invasive treatment is a  very new idea, 
which is explicitly stated for the first time in the 1957 American legal case o f 
Salgo v. Leland Sanford Jr.. University Board o f Trustees (1957). See Jay Katz, 
The Silent World o f Doctor and Patient. New York: The Free Press, 1984.
8. Engelhardt, H. Tristam, The Foundations of Bioethics. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986.
9. Fox, Renee and Howard Lief, "Training for 'Detached Concern1," in The
Psychological Basis o f Medical Practice. L ief and Lief, eds., New York: Harper 
and Row, 1963, 12-35.
10. From the Littre edition of Corpus Hippocraticum. (l.VI,90) and (L.II,634), cited in 
P. Lain Entralgo, Doctor and Patient. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969, p.46.
11. Entralgo, p.46, op. cit.
12. "Evaluation o f Humanistic Qualities in the Internist," Beauchamp and Childress, 
op. cit.
13. Entralgo, Doctor and Patient, op. cit.
14. Hooker, W orthington, Physician and Patient. A Practical View of Medical Ethics.
New York: Arno Press, 1849.
15. Osier, Sir William, Aeauanimitas. New York: Norton, 1963.
16. Osier, op.cit., p.29.
17. See Baron, R.J., "Bridging Clinical Distance, an Empathic Rediscovery o f the
Known," Journal o f  Medicine and Philosophy, vol.6, 1982, pp. 5-23.
18. There is a striking similarity between Osier’s talk o f learning to control one's 
disruptive emotions emanating from one's "medullary center" and Descartes talk 
about controlling the disruptive emotions emanating from the pineal gland in The 
Passions o f the Soul. See Descartes. The Philosophical Works. E. Haldane and 
G.R.T. Ross, trans., New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp 336-356.
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19. However, it is an additional assumption to link the obligation to overcome 
prejudice with the goal o f emotional detachment. It is not clear that prejudices, for 
example, towards cancer or AIDS patients, are essentially related to the 
emotionality o f  the physician's response to the patient. On the one hand, one may 
be both tolerant and emotionally involved with patients. On the other hand, one 
may have rigid beliefs and habitual avoidance patterns that restrict one's care for 
certain types o f  patients regardless o f one's occurrent emotion. Hence, it is not 
clear how detaching themselves would enable physicians to impartially value those 
persons they are otherwise prejudiced against.
20. This ideal is not to be confused with the ideal that health care ought to be 
distributed to all in an equitable manner. Kantian impartiality does not address 
issues o f distributive justice, even though strong arguments can be made for 
fairness o f this sort using Kantian ideas. Rather, the common thought behind the 
Kantian ideal o f  valuing others as persons and the medical ideal o f respecting all 
patients as persons, is the idea o f responding to others out o f a sense o f duty 
regardless o f  one's personal inclinations.
21. Jackson, Stanley, "The Listening Healer and the History o f Psychological Healing," 
The American Journal o f Psychiatry, vol. 149, no. 12, 1992.
22. The concepts o f  empathy and o f clinical listening are not identical despite their 
overlap in clinical discussions. First, as Jackson shows, the idea o f listening in 
medicine is older, and much broader than the idea o f "empathic listening." Second, 
as Jackson also points out, the term "listening" in "empathic listening" can be used 
metaphorically to refer to other forms of receiving information besides hearing. 
See Jackson, op.cit.
23. In addition, recent work on the placebo effect offers scientific evidence that a good 
physician-patient relationship plays an independent causal role in healing. This 
research sets out to measure through non-mechanical models, what for Descartes 
was in principle not measurable. See Doctors. Patients and Placebos. Howard 
Spiro, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
24. Aring, Charles, "Sympathy and Empathy," Journal o f the American Medical 
Association. 1958, 167;4. Blumgart, Herrman, "Caring for the Patient," The New 
England Journal o f Medicine. 1964, 270;9.
25. For a discussion o f the James-Cannon debate, see Sartre, The Emotions. Outline 
o f a Theory. N ew  Jersey: The Citadel Press, 1975, pp. 22-40.
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26. One problem with contrasting the intentionality o f emotions with the apparent non- 
intentionality of such bodily feelings as itches and twinges, is that even bodily 
feelings may have an essential intentional component. That is, the picture o f 
bodily 'feelings' as naked qualia, presupposes the possibility o f a field o f 
experiences in which body sensations are presented first in terms of their general 
quality, and than localized to one's own body in order to be hooked in with one's 
capacity for agency. But this model poorly suits both the foundational body sense, 
proprioception, and sensation. Consider first proprioception. According to this 
picture o f feelings as qualia, I would first have a general arm sensation, and then 
contingently refer this sensation to my left arm, here, bent at an angle. But I never 
have such a sensation. And more importantly, the kinesthetic information I receive 
about my left arm here leaning on the table, is not something I experience in 
isolation, but something that is integrated into my continuous activity o f moving 
and settling my body in space. So even proprioception cannot provide an example 
o f a  pure "feeling" in the sense o f pure qualia disconnected from experience.
Heidegger takes this point much further, arguing against the possibility o f pure 
"sensations" like seeing red, prior to perception o f objects o f interest to us, like the 
red car over there. Heidegger claims that we do not first see colors and hear 
sounds; rather, from the start we see things that interest us. Further, for Heidegger 
our original attitudes towards the world are essentially affective, a claim which will 
be considered in chapter two on the rationality o f emotion. The point here is that
the contrasting notion o f non-intentional "feels" used to highlight the intentionality
o f emotions may not itself have a phenomenological basis. See Heidegger, Martin, 
Being and Time. New  York: Harper and Row, 1962.
27. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, op.cit.
28. The term "mattering map" comes from Rebecca Goldstein, The Mind-Bodv
Problem . Dell, 1983.
29. De Sousa, The Rationality o f Emotion. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1987.
30. op. cit., Passions o f the Soul.
31. This is not to overlook the fact that there are cases in which shifting emotion is 
secondary to attaining new information. For example, if I am angry at someone 
for committing an injustice, and I learn that she did no such thing, my anger may 
go away. So emotions can shift because of changes in belief.
32. I am not using the term "belief1 here to include "faith." "Faith" can have inertia, 
and may be more like the affect hope than like purely cognitive beliefs.
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33. Joseph Fell, Emotion in the Thought o f Sartre. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1965.
34. Patricia Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons. New York: Routledge, 1988.
35. ibid., pp.86-87.
36. ibid., p .106.
37. Karsten Harries, personal communication.
38. Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept o f Mind. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949.
39. de Sousa, op. cit., chapter eight.
40. Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions. Outline o f  a Theory. New Jersey: Citadel Press, 
(1948) 1975.
41. Freud's emphasis on "the pleasure principle" as the primary aim of instinctual life 
is resonant with Sartre's view o f emotions as primarily oriented towards gratifying 
the self by transforming the self rather than the external world. See for example, 
Freud, Sigmund, "The External World," in An Outline o f Psychoanalysis, translated 
and edited by James Strachey, New York: Norton, 1949. However, instincts and 
emotions are not equivalent for Freud; logically, Freud rejected the idea o f an 
unconscious affect. And o f course Freud is quite interested in the way instincts 
can be transformed into emotions that serve the reality seeking goals o f the ego, 
and the ends o f the superego (consider for example, unconscious guilt).
42. Solomon, Robert, The Passions: The Myth and Nature o f Human Em otions. New
York: Doubleday, 1976.
43. de Sousa, op. cit., pp. 181-182.
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54. Now if  the concept that an ongoing physical influence causes an otherwise rational 
agent to behave strangely seems far-fetched, consider how this idea is very much 
part o f  our present view o f mental illness. The first mental disturbance to be 
explained by the early 'science' o f psychiatry was neurosyphilis, which involves 
exactly this picture o f a pathogen, a foreign physical agent, continuously 
determining how one perceives and thinks. The idea is that the germ not only 
makes the agent so sick that she can not think (ie. puts the agent into a  delirium) 
but also exerts a seamless ongoing influence on her thought processes. Currently 
psychiatrists are trying to find the pathogen responsible not only for states o f 
delirium that are clearly associated with infections o f  the brain, but for 
schizophrenia and manic-depressive illness. In these cases the 'pathogen' would 
arise within the agent's own body as a genetic mutation or chemical imbalance that 
occasioned an ongoing emotional lability, disrupting the agent's reasoning.
55. Gordon, Robert M., The Structure o f Emotions. Investigations in Cognitive 
Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp 118-119.
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the division o f rationality into forward-looking and backward-looking is strained 
in this case. Identificatoy emotions are adaptive because they are essential for 
representing other persons. (I argue in the clinical empathy chapter that the 
feelings/attitudes o f  another person are not available objects for detached 
cognition). The essential role o f  emotions in representing the emotional life of 
other persons shows that emotions are rationally required in the full-blooded sense 
o f rationality. See Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons, op.cit.
84. See W illiams, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1985.
85. Karsten Harries, Descartes seminar, 1986.
86. See Kant's discussion o f "The Formula o f the End in Itself', sec. 427 and 437, The
Groundwork o f the Metaphysics o f Morals. H.J.Paton, trans., New York: Harper 
& Row, 1964.
87. Physicians generally speak of respecting the patient as a "person" as the opposite
of treating the patient merely as a mechanism or a stereotype. See Alasdair
MacIntyre's discussion of the ideal o f  treating the patient "as a  person" in Changing 
Values in Medical Practice, eds. Eric Cassel and M ark Siegler, New York: 
University Publications o f America, 1979.
88. There are two different senses in which the Kantian moral agent can be considered 
"impersonal". At this early point I use the term "impersonality" to refer to the 
agent's psychological condition: the "impersonal" agent is disengaged from the 
ordinary affective ties that are constitutive o f  personal relationships. The GMM 
398 example o f the man with no sympathetic inclinations, who helps others out o f 
a  detached sense of duty embodies "impersonality" in this first sense. Later on, I 
argue that "impersonality" characterizes the ontological condition o f the Kantian 
pure practical reasoner.
89. For a critical review o f the equation of respect for patients with respect for the 
"rights" o f  patients, see John Ladd, "Legalism and Medical Ethics," Journal o f 
Medicine and Philosophy, vol.4, March 1979, pp. 70-80.
90. Kant, Groundwork, op.cit.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
239
91. O'Neil also defends the Kantian claim that, despite their differences in perspective, 
the FUL and the FEI are essentially equivalent; O'Neil seems to accept the Kantian 
assumption that the kind of reflection that is constitutive o f making universal law 
is the same kind o f reflection that is constitutive o f taking-up the ends o f other 
persons. See "Universal Laws and Ends in Themselves," The M onist. Henry 
Allison, ed., vol. 72, no.3, July 1989, p.341-362.
92. Kant, Immanuel. The Doctrine o f Virtue. Mary Gregor, trans., Philadelphia: 
University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1964.
93. See for example, passage 74, [252] where Kant defines "emotion" as the absence 
o f composure o f  mind, such that reflection is "impossible"; Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point o f View, trans. by Dowdell, Illinois: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1978.
94. Robin May Schott, Cognition and Eros: A Critique o f the Kantian Paradigm. 
Dissertation for the Department o f Philosophy, Yale University, May, 1983.
95. At the end o f GMM 400, Kant provides the following footnote:"Yet although 
'reverence' is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through outside influence, but 
one self-produced by a rational concept, and therefore specifically distinct from 
feelings o f the first kind, all o f which can be reduced to inclination or fear. What 
I recognize immediately as law for me, I recognize with reverence, which means 
merely consciousness o f the subordination o f my will to a law without the 
mediation o f external influences on my senses. Immediate determination o f the 
will by the law and consciousness o f this determination is called ' reverence.1 so 
that reverence is regarded as the effect o f the law on the subject and not the cause 
o f the law. Reverence is properly awareness o f a value which demolishes my self- 
love. Hence, there is something which is regarded neither as an object o f 
inclination, nor as an object o f fear, though it has at the same time some analogy 
with both. The object o f  reverence is the law alone—that law which we impose on 
ourselves but yet as necessary in itself. Considered as a law, we are subject to it 
w ithout any consultation o f self-love; considered as self-imposed it is a 
consequence o f our will. In the first respect it is analogous to fear, in the second 
to inclination. All reverence for a person is properly only reverence for the law 
(o f honesty and so on) o f which the person gives us an example. Because we 
regard the development o f our talents as a duty, we see too in a man of talent a 
sort o f  example o f the law (the law of becoming like him by practice), and this is 
what constitutes our reverence for him. All moral interest, so-called, consists
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
240
solely in reverence for the law."
96. Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality," p. 17, in Moral Luck. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981. Williams refers the original "drowning wife 
case" to Charles Fried, An Anatomy of Values. Massachusetts: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970, p.227. Blum, Friendship. Altruism and Morality. Boston: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982. Stocker, "The Schizophrenia o f Modern Ethical 
Theories," The Journal o f Philosophy, vol.73, 12, 1976, pp.453-466.
97. This reading o f Kantian impure practical reading as analogous to Aristotelian 
practical reasoning comes out o f a seminar given at Yale, Spring, 1988, by Rudiger 
Bittner. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book III, ch.3., The Basic Works of 
Aristotle, ed. McKeon, New York: Random House, 1941.
98. Kant, "The Transcendental Dialectic," Critique of Pure Reason. Smith, trans., New 
York: St. M artin's Press, 1965.
99. Kant attributes to "sensibility" all o f those "ideas with respect to which the mind 
is passive, and by which the subject is therefore affected." See Anthropology, 
op.cit., sec.7.
100. Brian O'Shaughnessy, The Will. A Dual Aspect Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980. Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
101. Onora O'Neil, "Universal Laws and Ends In Themselves," p.8, op.cit.
102. Barbara Herman, "Rules, Motives and Helping Actions," Philosophical Studies 45 
(1984), pp.369-377.
103. ibid., p.371.
104. ibid., p.373.
105. ibid., p.373.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
241
106. ibid., p.372.
107. Herman actually states only the negative counterfactual: one would refrain from 
acting if the act were impermissible (duty as a secondary motive); but her 
description o f the case in which duty becomes a primary motive is a description 
o f the case in which one actually acts against all ordinary motives, from the motive 
o f duty alone. See Barbara Herman, "On the Value o f Acting From the Motive of 
Duty," The Philosophical Review. XC, No.3, July 1981, p.372.
Baron states both the positive and negative counterfactual. See Marcia Baron, 
"The Alleged Moral Repugnance o f Acting from Duty," The Journal o f Philosophy. 
1984.
108. Herman, ibid.
109. ibid., p .374.
110. ibid., p.375.
111. ibid., p.382.
112. "Reflective Deliberation about the truth indeed brings in a standpoint that is
impartial and seeks harmony, but this is because it seeks truth, not because it is
reflective deliberation, and those features will not be shared by deliberation about
what to do simply because it too is reflective. The I that stands back in rational 
reflection from my desires is still the I that has those desires and will, empirically 
and concretely act; and it is not, simply by standing back in reflection, converted 
into a being whose fundamental interest lies in the harmony o f all interests. It 
cannot, just by taking this step, acquire the motivation o f justice." Bernard 
Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy. Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1985, p. 69.
113. Barbara Herman, The Practice o f Moral Judgment, The Journal of Philosophy. 
1985, pp.414-437.
114. Baron, 1984, op.cit.
115. ibid., p.220.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
242
116. ibid., p.209.
117. ibid., p.220.
118. See for example: Berger, David, Clinical Empathy. New Jersey: Jason Aronson, 
1987 for an extensive bibliography on the subject. A widely read article defending 
the importance o f empathy for general medical practice is Cassel, E.J., "The Nature 
o f  Suffering and the Goals of Medicine," New England Journal o f  Medicine. 1982, 
306, 639-645.
119. Basch, Michael, "Empathic Understanding: A Review o f the Concept and Some 
Theoretical Considerations," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. 
31:101-125, 1983.
120. Lipps borrowed the concept o f  "Einfiihlung" from aesthetics, where it had been 
used to refer to "an immediate continuation of an external observation in an inner 
feeling" (181). Lipps and William Wundt used the term "Einfiihlung" in their 
"scientific" psychological work to describe the mental capacity to understand the 
psychic life o f other persons (181). See Hunsdahl, Jorgen, "Concerning Einfiihlung 
(Empathy): A Concept Analysis o f its Origin and Early Development," Journal of 
the History o f the Behavioral Sciences. 3, 180-191. See Lipps, Theodur, 
"Empathy, Inner Imitation and Sense-Feelings," in A Modern Book o f Esthetics: 
An Anthology, ed. by Radar, M., trans. by Radar M. and Schertel, M., New York: 
Henry Holt, 1935.
Lipps' statement that one could "fully comprehend" another's experience has 
behind it both the idea that empathy allows for a  quasi first-personal understanding 
o f  another and the idea that this understanding could in principle approach 
certainty. For a discussion o f Lipps' view of empathy as involving a complete 
merging with another, see Edith Stein, On the Problem o f Empathy. The Hague: 
Nijhof, 1964, p. 16.
Schutz (and Dilthey before him) extended the idea that one could strive for 
certainty in one's knowledge o f  other persons to the idea that empathy could be 
that basis o f  a distinct form o f objective knowledge appropriate for the human 
sciences. See Schutz, Alfred, "Intersubjective Understanding," in The 
Phenomenology o f the Social World. Walsh and Lehnert, trans., Chicago: 
Northwestern University Press, 1967. See Berger, op.cit., pp 62-63 for Dilthey on 
empathy. In contrast, physicians have often used the term "empathy" to describe 
a non-scientific understanding o f human experience. Most o f  the authors I will 
consider here sit between these points of view. They are psychoanalysts who have 
taken empathy to be an important source o f knowledge about patients regardless
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
243
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o f  affective images, in the way that observing the body requires clear and distinct 
perception o f  physical signs. Hence Osier's emphasis on the need for the physician 
to purify him self from his own emotions, so that the mental medium constituting 
the projection, like the light from a "projector," would have no interference.
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Aring and Blumgart share Osier's concern that the physician's empathic 
understanding of the patient be free from the interference of present emotions. 
They speak metaphorically o f the physician's sympathetic feelings as tying him 
down to  a particular way of seeing the patient's situation, and hence restricting the 
maximal freedom o f movement that is needed for objectivity. Blumgart warns the 
physician to strive for detachment in order to keep from losing "objectivity and 
perspective." But what exactly can the detached physician learn about the patient 
from the detached standpoint? According to Rosenberg and Towers, Blumgart's 
ideal physician does not relate to the patient "as one person to another, but rather 
collects 'data' from the patient's behavioral expressions for analysis and responses 
within the physician's own perspective. The physician is satisfied merely to 
observe the signs o f  the patient's illness, rather than to comprehend its experiential 
content." See Aring, op.cit, p.449, and Blumgart, op.cit., p.451. See Rosenberg, 
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Plenum Press, 1977.
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differentiating sadness from anger, or even from any other moment in the "stream" 
o f consciousness. Furthermore, in our physical world identification requires a mark 
that can be perceived via the senses. But to recognize that another's gestures show 
anger or fear is hardly a  sufficient condition for understanding what her anger or 
fear is like. The question at hand is thus: what in addition to recognizable marks 
o f  emotion, contributes to a qualitative grasp of another person's feelings?
138. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - American Psychiatric 
Association. Third Edition, Washington D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1987.
139. This quote o f Cassel's is in Rosenberg and Towers, op.cit.
140. W ebster's Dictionary, op. cit.
141. The kind o f emotional neutrality that Freud describes for psychoanalysis is not 
equivalent to detachment in the Oslerian sense. Freud notes that archaic, emotional 
resonance plays a role in analytic listening. And his notion o f psychoanalytic 
abstinence still allows the analyst to have an emotional interest in the well-being
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o f the patient. But he urges the analyst to avoid using the clinical encounter to 
gratify unconscious wishes o f  his own or o f the patients. Also, the analyst is to 
refrain from taking sides in the analysand's intrapsychic conflicts, since the 
analyst's involvement in such conflicts would inhibit his intellectual freedom and 
non-judgmentalness (see my earlier discussion o f non-reactivity, and my discussion 
of curiosity in chapter five).
However, there has been a strong anti-affectivity strand in psychoanalysis. The 
orthodox view has been that the physician's emotions are "countertransference" 
phenomena that must be attended to because otherwise they act as resistances that 
impede the analytic process. Such feelings are informative only to the degree they 
can be translated into conceptual models that can be used to make inferences about 
the patient's condition. The underlying presupposition is that the object o f the 
physician's insight is the patient's psychic condition as it is, ultimately for an 
aperspectival knower. Hence the goal o f clinical empathy is to arrive at 
information that is purified o f  the physician's experiential responses to the patient. 
The physician strives to be aware o f countertransference phenomena in order to 
correct for the distortions such phenomena introduce into her understanding o f the 
patient. See Dorpat, T.L., "On Neutrality," International Journal o f Psychoanalytic 
Psychotherapy. 6: 39-64.
142. Tugendhat, Ernst, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, trans. Paul Stern, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986.
143. Stein, op.cit.
144. The idea that empathy involves making inferences about the patient is related to 
the definition o f empathy as "projection." "Projection" is also defined as 
"prediction...based on known data or observations; extrapolation." Webster's 
Dictionary, op. cit.
145. There are several reasons for rejecting the picture of empathy as detached 
inference-making. First o f all, there is no phenomenal correlate o f this putative act 
o f inference: in empathic understanding one does not independently listen to the 
patient's story and then compare this information to a conceptual model o f typical 
emotional attitudes in order to make predictions about the patient's inner life. 
Secondly, there is no explanatory power in positing such a mental act. What 
would be the criteria one would use to apply the general conceptual model of 
emotions to the case o f the particular patient? How would one know that these 
features o f one's mental model o f emotional attitudes were relevant to this aspect 
o f the patient's situation? Wittgenstein's criticism of the Cartesian view of 
understanding as making 'inner' comparisons is relevant here. The idea that the 
physician could see the patient's expressions o f emotion as similar to some general
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feature o f emotional experience presupposes that she already knows how to 
recognize this feature o f emotional experience. To equate such recognition with 
detached inference is to attribute to the physician an 'inner' mental map pairing off 
particular expressions of emotion with general features o f emotional experience. 
But how could the physician know which aspect o f the patient's emotion should 
be paired off with which general concept? What would direct her towards a quasi 
first-personal grasp o f the dramatic quality of the patient's experience versus third- 
personal observation o f the patient's gestures and facial expression? The physician 
would need a  third diagram or image to make these comparisons. But even this 
diagram could be understood in a variety of different ways. So another diagram 
would be needed, and so on, into an infinite regress. The idea o f an 'inner' act of 
inference does not explain how the empathizer is able to recognize and appreciate 
the emotions o f other people. See Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations. 
N ew  York: MacMillan, 1958.
It might be argued that to equate empathy with insight based on inference does 
not entail making the Cartesian error o f  positing a discrete act o f  "inner" inference- 
making that is accessible on reflection. Even so the "inference" model o f empathy 
still confuses what the telos, or goal o f empathic understanding is. As I argue in 
the following pages, empathic understanding does not aim for prediction in the way 
scientific inference aims for prediction.
146. Sawyier, Fay, "A Conceptual Analysis o f Empathy," The Annual o f 
Psychoanalysis. 3:37-47.
147. I hypothesize that the fact that empathy involves multiple modes o f cognition, 
including affective imagery, and reflective thought, contributes to the "reality" o f 
the object o f empathy. This thought is based on the common observation that 
using multiple senses contributes to the reality o f an object o f perception.
148. After this chapter was already written, Stanley Jackson published "The Listening 
Healer and the History o f Psychological Healing," op. cit. In addition to providing 
a thorough historical analysis of the concept o f clinical listening, this article 
includes important references on empathy, including an early, interesting 
psychoanalytic work on empathy that is rarely referenced today: Schroeder, 
Theodore, "The Psychoanalytic Method of Observation," International Journal o f  
Psvcho-Analvsis. London, 1925, vol.vi, pp. 155-170. Schroeder's describes 
empathy as a form o f "inductive introspection" in which one puts "one's own 
consciousness at the disposal of the unconscious determinants o f another's 
personality" (p. 162). He also argues that "psycho-analytic theory does not in the 
least depend upon logical inference based upon the surface introspection o f a 
relatively static psyche." This point interestingly anticipates my own views, but
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Schroeder does not go on to provide philosophical arguments showing the 
inadequacy o f  inferential reasoning for empathy (he instead uses the psychoanalytic 
concepts o f  projection and introjection to explain how empathy is possible). Yet 
Schroeder also emphasizes the importance o f the psychoanalyses own "conscious 
withdrawal o f  interest" for empathy to be possible (pp. 159,162).
149. Lipps, in Hunsdahl, op. cit., p. 182.
150. ibid., p. 184.
151. See Heidegger. M. Being and Time, op.cit. Heidegger offers a model for the kind 
o f  experiential "projection" o f meaning that is essential for empathy. He argues 
that we do not first perceive things as meaningless sense data, and then infer that 
they are objects that interest us, like tools, forests and persons. Rather, the fact 
that as perceivers we attend to certain phenomena rather than others, in meaningful, 
practically useful patterns, reveals our capacity to "understand" the world pre- 
reflectively. Heidegger says, referring to ordinary things we encounter, that:
The ready-to-hand is always understood in terms o f a totality o f 
involvements. This totality need not be grasped explicitly by a thematic 
interpretation. Even if it has undergone such an interpretation, it recedes 
into an understanding which does not stand out from the background. And 
this is the very mode in which it is the essential foundation for everyday 
circumspective interpretation. In every case this interpretation is grounded 
in something we have in advance -- in a fore-having [G 150].
Something very much like this can also be said o f our understanding of 
persons. There are two aspects of Heidegger's picture o f how meaning is 
"projected" in the human world that I want to clarify. First, the term "totality" 
does not indicate a collection of unrelated things. Heidegger is referring to a web 
o f mutually implicated things, like the totality of a painting, a workshop, or the 
world-as-lived [G 102-105] by an individual. Heidegger's claim that the ready-to- 
hand is always understood in terms of a totality of involvements is the claim that 
understanding always takes place in a context o f interests and projects. We will 
return to this basic presupposition later on.
A second major point o f this passage is that the cares and interests that 
provide a context for understanding something must be partially pre-reflective, 
unthematized. For Heidegger the experience o f being interested in something, 
which he calls a "fore-having," is necessary for recognizing a gap in one's grasp 
o f  the thing and hence for questioning and finally conceptualizing it [G 150-152], 
The idea that our overall comportment towards things and other persons underlies 
the possibility o f understanding them, lies behind Heidegger's claim that "moods" 
disclose reality.
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152. Sartre's views all emotions as aiming to sustain one's self-esteem. Thus he would 
have to have something like this narrow conception of the interests o f the 
empathizer. See Sartre, The Emotions: Outline o f a Theory, op.cit.
153. The concept o f imagining has at least as complex and confused a history as the 
concept o f empathy. Casey traces the term "imagine" to the latin root, "imaginari," 
which means "to copy." This root coheres with the Cartesian and later, empiricist 
theses that mental images are only more or less accurate copies o f sensations. But 
Casey also sees in our current concept o f imagining the earlier Greek idea of 
"phantasia" "which includes any kind of mental seeing or impression in the soul" 
(Zeno). See Casey, Edward, Imagining. Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 
1976.
154. Freud talks about the identification o f the analyst with the analy sand's experiences, 
and (we turn to this next) about the role o f resonant emotion. See for 
example,"The Unconscious,"(V. 14) and "Observations on Transference-Love"(v. 12) 
in the Standard Edition, translated and edited by Strachey, London: Hogarth Press. 
Also see "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," trans. and ed. by 
Strachey, New York: Norton, 1959.
155. Deutsch, Helene, "Occult Processes Occurring During Psychoanalysis," 
Psychoanalysis and the Occult. Ed. Devereux, New York: International University 
Press, 1970.
156. Fliess. R.. "The Metapsychology of the Analyst." Psychoanalytic Quarterly. 11:211- 
227, 1942.
157. Fenichel, Otto, "Identification," The Collected Papers o f Otto Fenichel. First Series. 
New York: Norton, 1953, pp.97-112.
158. Kohut, op.cit.
159. Deutsch, op.cit.
160. Fenichel, op.cit.
161. Fliess, op.cit.
162. Kohut, op.cit.
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163. Berger, op.cit., pp. 30-31.
164. Basch, op.cit., p .105.
165. Freud, "Group Psychology," op.cit.
166. Buie, op.cit., p.297,301.
167. Basch, op.cit.
168. Tomkins, Silvan, A ffec t Imagery, and Consciousness. Vols. One and Two, New 
York: Springer, 1963.
169. Buie, op.cit., p.301.
170. ibid.
171. Stein, op.cit., p. 16.
172. Kohut, op.cit.
173. Stein, op.cit., p .16.
174. ibid., p.13.
175. It might be argued that Stein's criticisms o f Lipps are not relevant to the merging
model o f  empathy because the physician is not like an audience to the patient's
suffering, but rather is an actual participant in the patient's trials. Some physicians 
take themselves to share the patient's struggles against disease to such a degree that 
they think they actually feel the same way the patient feels. For example, some
doctors speak o f fighting off cancer together with their patients as if  it was pretty
much the same battle to give chemotherapy as to receive it. But it seems highly 
unlikely that the physician and the patient could genuinely feel the same way about 
the patient's pain, suffering, death. It is just not the same thing to recognize that 
a patient one cares about is dying as it is to recognize one's own imminent death. 
And it is even more unlikely that the physician could take each and every one of 
her patient's experiences on in this manner. But even if  it were possible for the 
physician and the patient to feel the same way about the patient's illness, this 
would not explain how the physician could grasp the patient's feelings via her own 
feelings.
Stein addresses this point by agreeing with Lipps that it is possible to have an 
experience o f  oneness with another person. But she argues that such an experience 
cannot be the basis o f empathy, since it actually presupposes empathy. She points
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to the case in which two persons actually share a situation, and respond to the 
same news with the same feeling, and recognize each other's feelings, hence 
coming to share a response to the same object. For example, two soldiers in the 
front lines, hear that the war is won. Both feel joy and relief, and recognize each 
other's joy and relief. Stein says in this case the barriers separating one 'I' from 
another have not entirely broken down.
"I feel my joy while I empathically grasp the others' and see it as the same. 
And seeing this, it seems that the non-primordial character o f the foreign joy 
has vanished. Indeed, this phantom joy coincides in every respect with my 
real live joy, and their's is just as live to them as mine is to  me. Now I 
intuitively have before me what they feel. It comes to life in my feeling,
and from the "I" and the "you" arises the "we" as a subject of a higher
grade."57
Stein shows here that even when two persons are actually in the same boat, their 
experience o f merging already presupposes a prior act o f empathy, and thus cannot 
explain how empathy is possible.
See Stein, op.cit., p. 16.
176. Husserl, Edmund, "Fifth Meditation," Cartesian Meditations. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1977. Sartre is influenced by Husserl's idea that one can intuitively 
experience the absence o f the other. However, Sartre takes the more extreme 
position that awareness of another creates not only a sense o f absence but a 
dynamic negation within one's own sense o f being. See "The Look," in Being and 
Nothingness. Barnes, trans., New York: The Philosophical Library, 1956.
177. Kohut, op.cit.
178. Websters New World Dictionary, op.cit.
179. Katz, Jay, The Silent World o f Doctor and Patient. New York: The Free Press,
1984, p .132.
180. ibid.
181. Basch, op.cit. Note that Basch takes resonance emotions at birth to be examples 
o f "fixed action patterns," which are reflex arcs that involve cortical functioning.
182. Freud, "The Unconscious," op.cit.
183. Basch's theory is Aristotelian in that it emphasizes how natural dispositions can be 
educated into complex attitudes that comprise practical knowledge.
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184. Basch, op.cit., p .l 13. Basch credits his use o f term "generalization" to Novick, J.
and Kelley, K., "Projection and Externalization," Psychoanalytic Study o f the
Child. 25:69-95, 1970.
185. Buie, op.cit.
186. See for example, Greenson, R.R., "Empathy and its Vicissitudes," International 
Journal o f Psychoanalysis. 41: 418-424.
187. Buie, op.cit., p.300.
188. ibid.
189. Casey, op.cit.
190. ibid., pp.44-45.
191. Casey describes the imagined agent as either the imaginer him self or a proxy. His
reason for leaving this open is that he wants to give an account o f all imagining-
how, including fantasies that specifically pertain to oneself — imagining how I will 
feel when I finish this chapter, as well as fantasies that are not necessarily self- 
referential — imagining how it feels to dive into a cool swimming pool.
192. Casey, ibid., p.45 footnote 11: "By the terms 'action,' 'activity,' 'agent,' etc. I do
not mean to imply that the content o f imagining-how is always a form o f action
in which the su b jec t... takes the initiative. This is often so in imagining-how, but 
there are also cases of imagining-how to suffer, to be imposed upon by others, etc. 
Thus the central notion o f 'personal agency1 includes a broad spectrum o f ways in 
which the imaginer becomes implicated via self-projection or by proxy in his own 
imaginative presentation, and some of these ways include adopting a passive stance 
within the state o f  affairs contained in the presentation."
193. Casey, ibid., p.45.
194. ibid., p.45.
195. W ollheim, R., "Identification and Imagination," in Philosophers on Freud. 
W ollheim, ed., New York: Jason Aronson, 1977, p. 180.
196. ibid.
197. This does not contradict the point made earlier by Stein that such imagining can 
only announce the presence o f another's ownness, rather than present it fully as 
here and now. Rather, I take it that Wollheim's point is not that the imagined
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experiences will be as complete as actual experiences, but rather that they will be 
consistently unified according to the perspective o f an experiencing subject rather 
than the perspective o f an observer.
198. Howard Spiro argues that attending physicians can "teach" empathy, by including 
narrative accounts o f patients' lives in clinical rounds. See "What is Empathy and 
Can It Be Taught?" Annals o f Internal Medicine, vol. 116, no. 10, 1992.
199. Casey, op.cit.
200. Wollheim, op.cit. and Casey, op.cit.
201. There would seem to be an additional meaning to the physician's idea that via
empathy she is in the patient's situation. I take this additional meaning to be what 
Wollheim calls a  "master thought": "the way in which we conceive or in which we 
represent to ourselves our mental processes, or the conception under which a 
mental process occurs." According to the merging model, the physician takes her 
imaginative portrayal o f the patient to project her into the patient's situation. It is 
this representation of empathic imagining as a merging experience that is mistaken. 
Rather, in imagining how it would feel to be in the patient's situation the physician 
mixes her own affective repertoire with the patients in order to fill-out her
portrayal o f the patient's experience. Recall Edith Stein's (and Husserl's) point that
the guiding intention o f empathy is to grasp the situation o f another person. This 
goal, with its explicit awareness o f another's separateness, is the genuine "master 
thought" o f empathy. See Wollheim, op.cit., p. 192, and Stein, op. cit.
202. To make this traditional conception o f the interaction o f thought and feeling more 
explicit, I elaborate on Wollheim's (op.cit.) description o f the features o f 
"imagining how" as the "inner" creation and performance o f a play for an audience. 
The mistaken picture o f empathic understanding is as follows: one's cognitive 
faculty writes and performs a play for an audience o f two, including a translator 
who watches and translates the images into affective signals, and an affective 
audience who responds mechanically to the signals. Given this picture, the 
possibility for appreciating new aspects o f  the drama cannot be explained. I f  the 
audience somehow gives emotional responses that translate into images that are 
appropriate for the next part o f the drama, this would be have to be a matter o f 
sheer luck or based on some magical, extrasensory capacity o f the translator.
This model o f the interaction o f mind and feeling in "imagining how" another 
feels should be familiar to the reader by now. It brings back into play something 
very similar to the view encapsulated in the "insight" model o f empathy: 
understanding another's feelings involves "projecting" mental images that convey 
the person's experience, then using these images to make inferences about another's
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feelings. Except in this case, it is not strictly introspection and detached inference 
that are invoked, but the ability to "observe" an imaginative portrayal o f another 
person's experience, respond to it emotionally, and "apply" one's responses to 
further imaginative portrayals.
203. See Freud, "The Interpretation of Dreams," S.E., op.cit., vol. IV and V. I read this 
after writing an initial draft of this chapter. In addition to the structural similarity 
between primary process thinking and imagining how another feels, there are other 
concrete similarities. For example, Freud points out on p.534 that in dreams there 
is an elision of the "perhaps" that characterizes speculative thought in waking life: 
I f  one is worried that someone is, perhaps, angry at one, one does not dream that 
she might be angry, but that she is angry.
The elision o f the "perhaps" in dreaming corresponds to the elision o f the 
hypothetical in empathy; empathy involves experiencing the announcement o f 
another's feelings, rather than positing that, hypothetically, the other might feel a 
certain way.
204. At the beginning of this analysis o f  clinical empathy, I argued that concepts must 
guide empathic understanding, rather than just contribute to the retrospective 
description o f some independent pre-conceptual act o f empathy. I pointed out that 
physicians often derive much o f the content o f their initial grasp o f  the patient's 
world from their conceptual understanding o f what certain illnesses and certain 
types o f persons are like. I now add the point that these concepts influence the 
selection o f the content o f the physician's imaginative experience. For example, 
if  one knows that, as a matter o f  fact, schizophrenics suffer from feelings o f 
isolation, then one can use this information to pick-up salient features o f a new 
schizophrenic patient's history. For example, one will attend to any indication the 
patient gives of feeling removed from others at school.
But the richness o f empathic understanding depends not upon pre-conceived 
notions but upon spontaneous communication between physician and patient. The 
two must work together to co-narrate their imaginative production. Sometimes this 
will involve a dance that is like a waltz in which the physician follows the patient; 
other times it is more like dancing to rock and roll in which innovation and even 
completely changing directions is essential for adequate empathy. For example, 
the physician might initially imagine that an elderly woman patient, whose husband 
has died in the past year, after forty years o f marriage, is feeling lonely and sad. 
She might then ask the patient if  she thinks about her husband much o f the time. 
I f  the patient than says that her marriage was not all that happy and she has more 
time now for her service club, the physician must be able to change gears. The 
physician may find herself imagining new opportunities, and independence, and 
beginning to feel the excitement and fear that going it alone involves for this
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patient.
Just as there is no reified "model" o f the patient's inner life, it is incorrect to 
picture the "feedback" from the patient as leading to the editing of some already 
created entity, which is cut and pasted to be made more accurate. Rather, the 
patient's input must influence the physician's capacity to imagine how the patient 
feels. The patient's input leads to a greater attunement on the part o f the physician 
to the particular affective imagery o f the patient. One concrete manifestation o f 
this process o f attunement is that, over the course of time, the empathic physician 
will begin to use phrasing and gestures that closer to the style o f the patient. This 
seems to be the behavioral correlate o f the tuning in process that allows the 
physician to utilize images that are closer and closer to the patient's own. The 
physician's capacity to follow the patient's story as one follows a drama, which was 
mentioned earlier as an important factor for being a good listener, can now be 
explained. In order to follow the patient, the physician needs to be able not only 
to imagine how the patient feels in any particular situation, but to modify and 
direct her imaginings in response to what the patient communicates. We have seen 
that sometimes one strives to imagine new features o f the patient's situation, and 
at other times the images and affects come involuntarily, and even surprise the 
empathizer. An example o f this follows in the final chapter.
205. Lawrence Linett, M.D., "Last Impressions," in A Piece of My Mind, ed. Bruce Dan 
and Roxanne Young, New York: Random House, 1988,pp.162-165.
206. Although the point that physicians are socialized into their roles argues for the 
directedness o f the physician's emotions, it does not explain how it is that, like Dr. 
L, an individual physician can grapple with conflicting emotions towards patients, 
only some o f which are appropriate to his role. The issue we face here is 
understanding how one deliberately sustains one's role-related responses over time? 
We have already argued that a detached choice to "act like a doctor" could not 
account for the flow of emotions in response to patients that is necessary for the 
doctor to fulfill her role. And physicians do not consciously remind themselves 
over and over — I am a doctor, not a lover or parent, so its best for me to be 
moved by the patient's courage but not his animal attractiveness.
One does not become a doctor the way one becomes a real estate broker, but 
rather the way one becomes a family member in one's family o f origin. One 
begins as a vulnerable medical student and then intern who is totally dependent on 
senior physicians to guide one, who is deprived o f sleep and family, threatened 
with incompetency that could cost other people's lives and harm one's own. One 
practically lives in the hospital for a period o f years during third and fourth year 
o f  medical school and internship and residency (surgical residencies now take on
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average eight years, medicine residencies and fellowships six years, psychiatry, 
four to six years, etc.). This period of medical "training" does train one's very 
responses to reality, rather than just offering one a fund of knowledge. This is 
perhaps most obvious when one considers the way physicians see naked bodies and 
body excretions differently than other people do.
It might be argued that my comparison of the role o f doctor with the role of 
parent or lover is still inaccurate, because even though doctors are raised to be 
doctors, the role is still artificial, whereas being a parent or lover is doing what 
comes naturally. I challenge this artificial/natural distinction. I am influenced here 
by the feminist analyses o f gender that show that not only roles like mother/father 
and wife/husband but even such apparently natural phenomena as walking and 
talking like a woman or a man are constituted socially through recognition and 
reinforcement o f certain attitudes rather then others. And the social construction 
o f gender never requires a conscious or deliberate taking on of masculine or 
feminine roles. However, it is possible to become aware that one's most "natural" 
responses are in fact directed by socially constituted roles. It is possible to 
consider other ways o f  responding and to find that one's potential range is larger 
than one's role dictates. This is what "consciousness raising" is all about.
207. The phrase "concernful" manner comes from Robert Roberts in "What an Emotion 
Is: A Sketch," The Philosophical Review. Vol. XCVII, no.2, 1988
208. Robert Roberts, op. cit., pp. 183-209.
209. Roberts, op. cit., p. 187.
201. Roberts, op.cit., p. 199.
202. The actual behavior o f sitting down next to the patient may have had direct 
emotional impact on Dr. L. A familiar experience to most people is the "whistle 
a happy tune" phenomenon in which we can shift our own moods by changing our 
behavior to something that is more conducive to another mood. Although I have 
argued earlier against Sartre's view of emotion as generally involving an activity 
o f moving oneself through a kind of magical enactment, I agree with his 
observation that we can set the stage for certain moods in ourselves, just as we set 
the stage for moods in others. See Sartre, The Emotions, op.cit.
203. O f course, emotions can simply remit without the agent in any way deliberately 
redirecting herself, but this does not help explain how an agent can direct her own 
emotions.
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
257
204. Davidson, "Mental Events," in Actions and Events. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1980, pp. 207-227.
205. "Paradoxes o f Irrationality," in Freud: a Collection o f Critical Essays, ed. R. 
Wollheim, Doubleday, 1974.
206. Davidson, op.cit., p.298.
207. However, I do think that what is at stake in Davidson's thesis is the core concept 
o f Freud's idea o f a  dynamic unconscious. Davidson's argument relates to Freud's 
idea o f  essential divisions within mental life, but is general enough not to depend 
upon some archeological metaphor o f  the mind in which there are literal divisions 
in consciousness as radical as id, ego and superego. I agree with Davidson, and 
would extend his work to argue that the necessity of alter-agency in explaining 
akrasia sheds light on how Freud's innovative conception of the dynamic 
unconscious is burdened by the archeological metaphor. W hat Freud was trying 
to account for was how there could be, in addition to rational instrumental thought 
and agency, an alternative way of structuring reality and hence an alternative way 
o f causing action, codetermining one's conscious acts. W hat is not new with 
Freud, and not essential to the point o f dual agencies, is that the alter-agent be 
determined by a buried past that is out o f awareness. (This is not to deny the 
enormous importance o f the idea of forgotten trauma to Freud's particular 
conception o f repression).
The point is that the metaphor o f the unconscious as a subterranean force that 
is blind to the here and now, which occasionally erupts like a volcano into the 
present, is wrong and misses what is radical in Freud's notion o f a dynamic 
unconscious. In fact, I would turn the archeological metaphor for the unconscious 
on its side here, and point out what is meant by the dynamic unconscious is not 
some underlying (hence blind) force that imposes the past on the present without 
attending to the here and now. This picture o f a blind unconscious mind is 
inconsistent with the core empirical discovery o f psychoanalysis, which is that we 
can read into the manifest content o f  our utterances/gestures, a latent, primary 
process message. (For this emphasis on the unconscious as living text I am 
indebted to James Grotstein, personal communication). The unconscious speaks to 
us in translation, using here and now events to garb itself.
But if  the unconscious mind did not attend to the present aspects o f our situation, 
then how could any semantic links between here and now conversation and the 
unconscious be established? Our unconscious mind and our conscious mind must 
co-determine our here and now attention. (This point is also presupposed by the 
idea o f symptoms as compromises, another central tenet o f  all psychoanalytic 
theories).
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208. In order to see how Dr. L's invoking emotion B to act on emotion A could be role-
directed. consider a familiar example o f self-persuasion. Think o f a  situation in 
which you felt very angry (emotion A) at the inconsiderateness o f  someone you 
love, and tempered that anger by conjuring up thoughts about times when that 
person treated you lovingly. Such thoughts would likely be accompanied by 
affectionate feelings (emotion B). Chances are that you spent some time in an 
ambivalent state in which you genuinely felt both anger and affectionate gratitude 
towards the same person, construed in two different ways. Depending on a host 
o f  factors including your own emotional character/ embedded associational ties, but 
also including the time and freedom o f thought available to you, and the nature of 
the rejecting and loving behaviors that you are focusing on, the impact o f  B on A 
could go in several different directions. You might wind up in a complex 
emotional state in which a feeling o f affection coexists with subdued anger 
(emotion C l). The focus o f your emotions would remain your friend, but in his 
or her different aspects. Or you might wind up in a more self-reflexive emotional 
response which takes your own ambivalence as its focus. Depending on how harsh 
or accepting o f  yourself you are you could wind up with any of a host o f emotions 
including the following: a  feeling o f self-pitying resignation which has as its focus 
the unpredictability o f your friend (emotion C2), or a feeling o f being proud of 
yourself because you can tolerate the bad with the good in others (emotion C3), 
or a feeling o f  shame for trying to flee your angry feelings (emotion C4).
Note that in this example there is no reason to posit that the agent has to go from 
emotion B to any particular emotion C. It is not that conjuring up loving feelings 
is sufficient for determining any particular response from C 1-n, but rather that 
because emotions determine salience, the occurrence o f B will direct the agent 
towards certain further responses rather than others. All o f the responses C 1 -n are 
influenced by the affectionate construal o f one's friend; they are thus different ways 
o f  sustaining the role of being a friend.
209. W ebsters New World Dictionary, op.cit.
210. My discussion o f family therapy is influenced by my clinical experiences and the 
ideas o f Melvin Lansky and Benahz Jalili, who teach family therapy at UCLA 
Neuropsychiatric Institute.
211. O f course there are important differences in how Dr. L understands a "couple" that 
includes him self and the patient compared to the couple therapist's understanding 
o f an independent couple. But as I argued in chapter four, the absence o f a  distinct 
mental act o f  introspection suggests that introspective self-awareness involves 
something like empathizing with oneself. For this reason I believe the couple 
therapist's functions can be usefully applied here, as long as the point that this is 
a  metaphor is not forgotten.
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212. Psychiatric training involves one to one supervision o f trainees with senior 
psychiatrists, where the task is to teach the neophyte to become curious about her 
difficult emotional responses to patients. One result o f such curiosity is an 
increased ability to empathize with patients others find off-putting.
213. The analyst Eve Schwaber writes about an analysis in which for several months 
every interpretation she made was immediately rejected by her patient. She felt 
incompetent and irritated, but these experiences were muted by her strong curiosity 
about how the patient was experiencing her interpretations. This decentering 
curiosity about the patient's subjective world allowed her to listen empathically to 
the patient. She came to understand empathically that the patient was longing for 
closeness and understanding, but wished to be understood non-verbally and 
immediately, and thus found the analyst's tentative interpretations painful and 
rejecting. See Evelyne Albrecht Schwaber, "On the Mode of Therapeutic Action: 
A Clinical Montage," How does Treatment Help? On the Modes o f Therapeutic 
Action o f Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy. Workshop Series o f the American 
Psychoanalytic Association, Monograph no. 4, Rothstein, ed., Connecticut: 
International Universities Press, 1988.
214. The claim that Dr. L's curiosity and prideful reconstrual o f his situation plays a 
causal role in shifting him into an empathic stance raises certain surface conflicts 
with my account o f empathy. In particular, I argued that for empathy to be 
possible, it must be possible for shifts in one's affects to arise prior to any 
deliberate construals o f another's situation. I argued that the fact that such shifts 
could be directed by the other person's affects, via a kind o f  pre-verbal resonance, 
helped explain the magic o f empathy, the fact that the affective experience one 
happened to have as a listener could direct one to a new understanding o f the other 
person's situation. It would contradict the results of my empathy discussion to 
posit that Dr. L deliberately imagines the patient's world in a  detailed first personal 
way that conveys the helplessness o f the patient, and then feels sadness with the 
patient. This would be sham empathy, which involves no genuine communication.
However, what I rejected in the empathy chapter was the idea o f being able to 
infer another's mental contents, not the idea of being able to imaginatively amplify 
one's own mental contents. Dr. L shifts his construal o f his interaction with the 
patient prior to resonating with the patient, so that his empathic understanding of 
the patient has multiple determinants, including his own deliberate imagination 
work. Recall that in the empathy chapter we pointed out that affective resonance 
alone was insufficient for empathy (argument against the "merging" hypothesis). 
Rather, the physician relies upon her accumulated knowledge o f the first personal 
details o f the patient's life, built into a  working model o f his or her world as lived, 
to steer her construals o f the patient's situation. Hence the great increase in
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accuracy one has in empathizing with familiar versus unfamiliar people. Although 
this working model can direct one's empathic imaginings unconsciously, one often 
has to consciously invoke parts o f it to gear into an empathic response to a patient.
So in this vignette Dr. L deliberately shifts his focus from his personal irritation 
with the patient, which precludes empathic listening, to an image o f himself as a 
good physician who can listen to his patient. This shift is facilitated by curiosity 
about the patient's experience, which decenters him from his own irritation and 
facilitates listening. The activity o f listening to the patient or o f "trying" to 
empathize, involves building an initial working model o f the patient's world 
including the idea of having cancer and being alienated from others. But all o f 
this imagination work does not yet include the particular affective grasp of the 
patient's fear o f showing his pain to his family that Dr. L then arrives at through 
empathic resonance with the patient.
215. My own view o f how therapy is effective is that within the safety o f a strong 
therapeutic relationship, the patient is invited to become curious about her own 
sincerity, in the Sartrean sense.
The idea that one can be for oneself only what one is, is challenged. The patient 
realizes that her emotions are already appropriated by others for strategic reasons, 
and that she herself has inadvertently colluded in these uses o f herself. I am 
indebted here to Judith Broder, personal communication. See Sartre on sincerity 
as the apparent antithesis of "bad faith," in Being and Nothingness. Washington 
Square Press, 1966, pp. 100-101.
216. My discussion o f curiosity and use o f the image of the stargazer is particularly 
influenced by discussions with Karsten Harries. Some o f his ideas about curiosity 
are in his essay on "Truth and Freedom," in Edmund Husserl and the 
Phenomenological Tradition. Essays in Phenomenology. Sokolowski. ed., 
W ashington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1988. See also Plato, 
"Theaetetus," 174a-175d, Collected Dialogues. New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1961.
217. The idea that curiosity detaches one from other emotions is consistent with our 
view that attention is always directed by mood, because curiosity is itself an affect. 
One is moved to wonder.
218. It would be interesting to empirically compare the value of the therapist's curiosity 
versus the value o f her warmth in building up a therapeutic alliance with patients, 
using measures for therapeutic alliance that correlate with outcome measures for 
psychotherapy.
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219. Although we have rejected Freud's statements that the analyst should have affective 
neutrality, his conception o f the analyst's cognitive stance is close to our 
conception of curiosity. Freud, Sigmund, "Recommendations to Physicians 
Practicing Psychoanalysis," Standard Edition. 12: 109-120.
220. Freud, ibid.
221. However, I again differ with at least a  traditional reading of Freud in that I take 
it that there is no single archetypal experience o f evenly hovering attention, guided 
by the external landscape, free o f particular personal meaning. The train rider's 
experience of moving away from some town will be colored by a particular attitude 
— such as nostalgia, grief or relief —about the miles separating her from the town.
The image o f the moving train suggests how curiosity can attenuate one's 
emotions without requiring affective disengagement. Consider, for example, how 
one can reflectively experience a past emotion o f one's own with combined 
involvement and curious disengagement. I may still feel moved by the image of 
a teen-age boyfriend, but I am also aware o f the childishness o f  his ways, and of 
the difference between what felt like love then and what feels like love now. This 
experience is characteristic o f the sense o f ourselves as changing over time. One 
relives empathically some of the old longing or fear, but also feels that the 
construal o f  the loved or feared one no longer has the same value or meaning.
222. See Spiro, "What is Empathy and Can It Be Taught?" op.cit. Spiro emphasizes the 
importance of giving narrative accounts of illness on clinical rounds as the patient's 
situation is presented. I agree with this integrated approach, which sees empathy 
as essential to, rather than ornamental to, medical care.
223. Fox, "The Human Condition o f Health Professionals," in Essays in Medical 
Sociology. Transactions Press, 1988, p.582. I agree with this integrated approach, 
which sees empathy as essential to understanding patients, rather than as 
ornamental.
224. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Book 3, Chapter 9, 1117a. In The Basic Works of 
Aristotle. New York: Random House, 1941.
225. To non-physicians, doctors' jokes appear to be cruel portraits o f the ridiculousness 
o f  patients -- for example, the obtunded patient with his tongue hanging out o f his 
mouth is said to be showing the 'Q ' sign. See Samuel Shem, The House o f God. 
N ew  York: Dell, 1978, a novel about internship.
W hat is apparent from the inside is that it is usually the most pathetic 
experiences of patients that inspires humor. The subtext o f  these jokes is
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physicians' own feelings o f helplessness towards, and their feelings o f identification 
with, their patients. That is why a simple sentence from the novel House of God, 
is almost universally amusing to physicians — "remember, the patient is the one 
with the disease." Most importantly, such jokes allow physicians to tell each other 
how they feel, and thus to make empathic contact, w ithout breaking the code of 
suffering in silence — there is no apparent suffering, only laughter. Humor o f this 
sort starts with one's first course in medical school— gross anatomy, where for 
example, my own group named our human cadaver Earnest, because we were
"working in dead Earnest." This allowed us a no-risk way to tell each other how
strange it felt to dissect a person who was dead. Like curiosity, humor allows one 
to slacken the lines o f one's identification with one's role, to note how strange the 
normal practice o f medicine can be. But humor stops far short of curiosity in that 
it typifies the present experience rather than liberating one to imaginatively 
reconstrue and thus transform one's situation. For a discussion of the sociology of 
humor in medicine, see Rene Fox, "The Human Condition of Health Professionals," 
op.cit., pp.579-581.
226. Judith Ross, personal communication.
227. See Osier, "Aequanimitas," in Aeauanimitas. New York: Norton, 1963.
228. Consider, for example, a story told by William Carlos W illiams about the impact
o f  resonance emotion on a physician's anti-semitism. The doctor was visited by
a Jewish European couple who asked him several anxious questions about their 
apparently healthy infant, and were mistrustful o f his handling of the baby. They 
barely spoke english, and seemed in his eyes foolish and superstitious. Yet on 
learning that the woman had lost her entire family in Nazi-occupied Poland, the 
physician says he was "touched," and began to respect her protective attitude 
toward the baby. This shift in his perspective allowed him to communicate 
effectively, and help them for the first time. See "A Face o f Stone."The Doctor 
Stories. New York, New Directions Books, 1984.
229. This is relevant to the current debate about how best to  restructure cost-effective 
medical care. The values o f medical practice are not well served by any direct 
commercialization o f  medical care. Rather, given the urgent need to restrict the 
cost o f health care, the kind o f  physician-patient relationship argued for in this 
dissertation would be better grounded in a form of health care, such as National 
Health Insurance on the Canadian model, that emphasizes a long-term relationship 
with a primary care physician who is not a direct beneficiary o f any limiting of 
care.
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230. "Four Models o f the Physician-Patient Relationship," in the Journal o f the 
American Medical Association. Vol. 267, no. 16, April 1992, pp. 2221-2226.
231. For a practical defense of the claim that the physician's moral reasoning needs to 
grow out o f her moral experience in daily medical practice, see Edward Hundert, 
"A Model for Ethical Problem Solving in Medicine, with Practical Applications," 
American Journal o f Psychiatry. 144:7, July 1987, pp. 839-846. Hundert's views 
are compatible with my account o f the importance o f perceptions o f moral salience 
for the Kantian moral agent.
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